Miller v. Sallaz, 060320 WVSC, 18-1001

Party NameAngela Dawn Miller, Petitioner Below, Petitioner v. J.D. Sallaz, Superintendent, Lakin Correctional Center, Respondent Below, Respondent
Judge PanelCONCURRED IN BY: Chief Justice Tim Armstead, Justice Margaret L. Workman, Justice Elizabeth D. Walker, Justice Evan H. Jenkins, Justice John A. Hutchison
Case DateJune 03, 2020
CourtSupreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

Angela Dawn Miller, Petitioner Below, Petitioner

v.

J.D. Sallaz, Superintendent, Lakin Correctional Center, Respondent Below, Respondent

No. 18-1001

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

June 3, 2020

Wyoming County 17-C-96

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Angela Dawn Miller, self-represented, appeals the October 11, 2018, order of the Circuit Court of Wyoming County denying her fourth petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Respondent J.D. Sallaz, Superintendent, Lakin Correctional Center, by counsel Caleb A. Ellis, filed a summary response in support of the circuit court's order.

The Court has considered the parties' briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court's orders is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

In August of 1994, petitioner was convicted in the Circuit Court of Wyoming County of first-degree murder. The circuit court sentenced petitioner to a life term of incarceration without the possibility of parole. Petitioner appealed her conviction on several grounds, and we affirmed in State v. Miller ("Miller I"), 197 W.Va. 588, 593, 476 S.E.2d 535, 540 (1996). Thereafter, in 2001, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court and raised twenty-five grounds for relief, including ineffective assistance of trial counsel and insufficient evidence. The court entered an order on January 31, 2002, dismissing twenty-four of petitioner's asserted grounds for relief.

Subsequently, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing to address the only remaining issue, petitioner's assertion that during deliberations, some jurors returned to the courtroom to attempt to identify a witness. By order entered on July 19, 2002, the circuit court rejected that claim and denied petitioner's habeas petition. Petitioner filed an appeal from the circuit court's denial of habeas relief, and this Court refused that appeal by order entered on February 26, 2004. In 2004, petitioner filed a second habeas petition in the circuit court. By order entered on March 18, 2005, the circuit court summarily denied that habeas petition.

Despite the denial, the circuit court appointed petitioner counsel in 2010, and counsel filed an amended habeas petition. That petition was denied by order entered on January 21, 2014. Petitioner sought post-judgment relief, which was denied. This Court declined to review the denial of habeas relief in Miller v. Nohe ("Miller II"), No. 14-0482, 2015 WL 1740514 ( W.Va. Apr. 13, 2015) (memorandum decision), because the appeal was untimely. In Miller II, this Court notably remarked that "the circuit court clearly established that petitioner's prior direct criminal appeal and [first] habeas corpus proceeding barred further prosecution of these claims under the doctrine of res judicata." Id. at *2. Notwithstanding this Court's decision in Miller II, petitioner filed a third habeas petition in the circuit court, and the court denied that petition by order entered on June 10, 2016. Petitioner did not appeal the June 10, 2016, order.

On June 27, 2017, petitioner filed a fourth habeas petition in the circuit court, the denial of which is the subject of this appeal. Petitioner argued that both her first and second habeas counsel were ineffective in failing to adequately present her claims that (1) her psychiatrist's expert testimony was improperly excluded at trial; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support a first-degree murder conviction; and (3) trial counsel was ineffective. Petitioner further argued that she had newly-discovered evidence that a juror had a familial connection with individuals having...

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