Miller v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co.

• Decision Date: 31 January 1963
• Citation: 28 Cal.Rptr. 126,212 Cal.App.2d 555
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Nancy MILLER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY a California corporation, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 6908.

Page 126

28 Cal.Rptr. 126

212 Cal.App.2d 555

Nancy MILLER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY a California corporation, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 6908.

District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, California.

Jan. 31, 1963.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 20, 1963.

Hearing Denied March 27, 1963.

Higgs, Fletcher & Mack, by Edward M. Wright, San Diego, for plaintiff and appellant.

Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, by Jack W. Crumley, San Diego, for defendant and respondent.

MONROE, J. pro tem.

The plaintiff and appellant, Nancy Miller, commenced this action against the defendant to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been the proximate result of an electric shock. It developed that in July 1960 the agents of the defendant San Diego Gas & Electric Company had occasion to install a new transformer upon the electric line in Chula Vista from which the Miller home was served. This change was rendered necessary by reason of additional demands on the electric line. In the course of the change it became necessary to disconnect the wires running to the Miller property and later to reconnect them.

The evidence is sufficient to support a finding that in reconnecting the wires they were reversed and the ground wire was connected with the part of the installation to which theretofore the 'hot' wire had been connected. The evidence indicates that as a result of such connection the ground and things connected with it became charged. In any event, it appears that when Mrs. Miller lifted the lid to her mail box she received an electric shock.

It was claimed that as a result of this shock Mrs. Miller received severe and permanent injuries. She claimed that by reason of the shock her arm became discolored and that eventually it turned a deep black, which condition lasted for some months. It was further claimed that her arm became blistered and that the skin sloughed off from the blistered area. The further claim was made that as a result of the injuries she had suffered nervous and mental damage as a result of which she had undergone a personality change.

Plaintiff introduced evidence that she went to several doctors who treated her for various periods. She also was in hospitals for brief periods. She furnished evidence that her total medical bills amounted to the sum of $1,133.18.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant San Diego Gas & Electric Company in the amount of $1,133.18, the exact amount of the medical expenses. The plaintiff moved for a new trial on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict and upon the further ground that the verdict was inadequate. This motion was denied and plaintiff has appealed.

Plaintiff's main contention on appeal is that the verdict was inadequate. She takes the position that a verdict in the exact amount of the medical expenses incurred by plaintiff is inadequate as a matter of law, for the reason that no allowance is made for the injury received or the pain and suffering incidental thereto. In this connection the plaintiff points out that there is ample evidence to support the implied finding of the jury that defendant was negligent and that as a result thereof plaintiff suffered electric shock.

There are a number of California cases in which the courts have permitted small or nominal judgments on jury verdicts to stand even though they apparently are inadequate as compensation for the damage suffered. Some of these cases are based upon the proposition that where a cause of action has not been adequately proved but the jury, as a matter of compromise has rendered a small verdict, the court may permit the judgment thereon to stand if the defendant is willing that it do so. The appellant contends that this line of cases has no applicability to the case at bar, for the reason that there was ample proof to support a finding of negligence of the defendant and its agents. Upon the authority of Bencich v. Market St. Ry. Co., 20 Cal.App.2d 518, 67 P.2d 398, and cases therein cited, the appellant contends that a judgment on a verdict in an insufficient amount may not be affirmed.

Plaintiff further contends that there was no attempt to dispute the amount of the medical expenses paid by defendant, and relies upon the following cases as authority for the proposition that an award of no more than medical expenses is an insufficient verdict: Clifford v. Ruocco, 39 Cal.2d 327, 246 P.2d 651; Crowe v. Sacks, 44 Cal.2d 590, 283 P.2d 689; Rose v. Melody Lane, 39 Cal.2d 481, 247 P.2d 335; and Weiskopf v. Smith, 44 Cal.App.2d 438, 112 P.2d 665.

An examination of the record reveals ample testimony, although contradicted, to support the implied finding of the jury that defendant was negligent. It is true that the defendant did not dispute the amount of expenses paid by plaintiff. In fact, defendant stipulated to the bills and receipts presented by plaintiff. In making that stipulation, however, defendant expressly refrained from stipulating that the expenses were reasonable or that they were for treatments rendered necessary by reason of the negligence of the defendant. In fact, defendant, seriously disputed the extent of plaintiff's alleged injuries and contended that the expenses incurred were not proximately caused by the shock suffered by her. An examination of the cases relied upon by appellant demonstrates that they involved situations where the right to recover was established and that there was also proof that the medical expenses were incurred because of defendant's negligent act. It is of course clear that in such situation a judgment for no more than the actual medical expenses occasioned by the tort would be inadequate. It cannot be said, however, that because a verdict is rendered for the amount of medical expenses or for a less amount the verdict is inadequate as a matter of law. Every case depends upon the facts involved. In Dimmick v. Alvarez, 196 Cal.App.2d 211, 16 Cal.Rptr. 308, the verdict was rendered for an amount substantially less than the medical expenses proved. In that case there was a serious controversy as to the extent of the injuries and as to whether the expenses paid resulted from the tort complained of. The court held that there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for new trial, and the judgment was affirmed. The court quoted with approval the following language from Gersick v. Shilling, 97 Cal.App.2d 641, 645, 218 P.2d 583, 586:

'* * * The question as to the amount of damages is a question of fact. In the first instance, it is for the jury to fix the amount of damages, and secondly, for the trial judge, on a motion for a new trial, to pass on the question of adequacy. Whether the contention is that the damages fixed by the jury are too high or too low, the determination of that question rests largely in the discretion of the trial judge. The appellate court has not seen or heard the witnesses, and has no power to pass upon their credibility. Normally, the appellate court has no power to interfere except when the facts before it suggest passion, prejudice or corruption upon the part of the jury, or where the uncontradicted evidence demonstrates the the award is insufficient as a matter of law. In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the facts on the issue of damage most favorable to the respondent must be considered.'

See also Morseman v. Mangum, 177 Cal.App.2d 218, 2 Cal.Rptr. 67; Chaparkas v. Webb, 178 Cal.App.2d 257, 2 Cal.Rptr. 879. In the two foregoing cases it is held that in the face of substantial conflict in the evidence as to the extent of the injuries and as to whether the expenses were incurred as a result of the negligence complained of, the court was justified in denying the motion for new trial, and the judgments for less than the medical...