Miller v. Simonds

Citation5 Mo.App. 33
PartiesSILAS W. MILLER ET UX., Appellants, v. JACOB W. SIMONDS, Respondent.
Decision Date02 January 1878
CourtCourt of Appeal of Missouri (US)

1. Where a disposition of property in favor of the grantor's father and former guardian is made by one in his early majority, courts of equity will look very narrowly into the question how far the transaction was advantageous or otherwise desirable for the grantee; and where the pecuniary advantage is on the side of the grantee, the burden is on him to show that the transaction was free from every element of influence over the grantor's mind, growing out of the former relations between the parties.

2. It is immaterial, in equity, that the gift from a daughter to her father and former guardian was made three or more years after the minor's technical majority, where it is shown that the grantor's habits of submission and dependence, contracted during minority, remain unchanged, and that at the time the gift was made the grantor was motherless, resided with her father, the grantee, and had no other protector. In such a case, equity will extend the legal term of disability.

3. Where a conveyance has been procured through undue influence exercised upon the grantor, it is immaterial whether this influence was that of the grantee or of a third person.

APPEAL from St. Charles Circuit Court.

Reversed and remanded.

WILLIAM A. ALEXANDER and LACKLAND & BROADHEAD, for appellants: The burden of proof as to undue influence rests upon defendant.-- Street v. Goss, 62 Mo. 226. Equity will, in cases like the present, extend the term of legal disability beyond the technical majority of the ward.-- Garvin's Administrators v. Williams, 44 Mo. 465; 50 Mo. 206; Huguenin v. Baseley, 3 White & Tudor's Ld. Cas. 47, 55, et seq.; Archer v. Hudson, 7 Beav. 521; Rivett v. Harvey,1 Sim. & St. 502; Jennings v. McConnell, 17 Ill. 148; 1 Story's Eq., sec. 309; 12 Pet. 261; Young v. Peacy, 2 Atk. 258; Bergen v. Udall, 31 Barb. 9; Taylor v. Taylor, 8 How. 183. Where undue influence is exercised, it is immaterial whether it be the influence of the grantee, or person who receives the benefit, or a third person.-- Highberger v. Stifler, 21 Md. 338; 6 Ves. 278; and cases cited in 3 White & Tudor Ld. Cas. 123, 2 White & Tudor Ld. Cas. 64-66.

T. BRUERE and MCDEARMON & GAUSS, for respondent, cited Garvin v. Williams, 44 Mo. 470.

LEWIS, P. J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff, Margaret J. Miller, is the daughter of defendant, who, in 1860, was regularly appointed guardian of her person and estate, she being then about seven years of age. Her property consisted chiefly of an undivided half of three hundred and ten acres of land, worth, according to the testimony, about $18,000, which she and her only brother, William T. Simonds, had inherited, in part from their mother and in part from an uncle on the mother's side. The defendant was also guardian of his son, and the two wards reached their majorities, respectively, in 1871. On May 18, 1874, a few weeks before the marriage of Margaret with her co-plaintiff, a deed was executed by the two children, conveying to their father, in consideration of love and affection and the sum of one dollar, a life-estate in their tract of land. This suit is to set aside that conveyance as to the plaintiffs, because of undue influence in its procuration. The Circuit Court decreed in favor of defendant.

It appeared from the evidence that Margaret's mother died when she was about two years old. Her father married again, but lost his second wife when Margaret was eleven or twelve years of age. From that time until her marriage, excepting a short attendance at a boarding-school in the same county, she lived with her father and brother, the three composing the whole family. Their dwelling was situated on a tract of eighty acres, in which the defendant held a tenancy by the curtesy, and which was part of the land owned by his children. The defendant raised and educated his wards, and cultivated and improved their land, but kept no account of either receipts or expenditures, and made no settlements of his guardianship. It was about three years after the wards had become of age when defendant's sureties pressed him to make a final settlement, and obtain his and their discharge. Margaret was then engaged to be married, but her father was strongly opposed to the intended match. It seems to have been with a view to closing up the guardianship and satisfying the sureties that defendant, on May 18, 1874, took his wards into the city of St. Charles, and to the office of his legal adviser, Judge Andrew King. What then occurred may be best understood from the testimony given by some of the witnesses. The plaintiff Margaret Miller said: “My father managed and controlled my real estate. I relied on him in its management. I had no other property except the land conveyed by the deed. I was always under the impression that my father had other property besides this; I never thought much about it. My brother came home on Saturday, and mentioned it to me. He was the first and only one who ever mentioned it to me up to that time. I never thought of it before; that was on Saturday. On Monday I made the deed. He spoke of it, and said he thought it would be right. We came in on Monday, and made the deed. I never spoke to any one about it from the time he spoke, on Saturday, until Monday. A few minutes before I signed it, pa spoke to me about it. This was on the porch, or hall, of Judge King's office. I was not very well, was the reason I was out there. Father then told me he had plenty, and I need not sign it unless I wished. This was just before I signed it. My father went in with me to sign it. We all went in together. William T. Simonds was there when I signed it, also. My brother ordered the writing. I don't have any recollection of saying any thing about it. I suppose my brother selected the attorney to write the deed. He took me there. I didn't comprehend all I was doing in signing that deed; I never knew what I was doing; on Saturday, my brother told me about the property more than I ever heard before, and that we ought to convey it to pa for his lifetime, because he was old, and he thought it best for us to do it; and I very readily gave my consent, without thinking any thing about it. My father had only on one occasion spoken to me about it, a short time before, and told me he heard I was going to turn him out of house and home. I asked him who told him so, and wanted to know how he thought I could possibly do such a thing, even if I desired. He refused to tell me who told him, and said he never would tell me who told him. There was very little more said. I was then engaged to Mr. Miller at that time. I think he knew it. This conversation was shortly before the deed was made. My father was opposed to my marriage with Mr. Miller. My brother came home from St. Louis on Saturday evening, a little before sundown, the Saturday before the deed was made. He spoke to me, soon after he came home, about making the deed. He said to me, father had raised and clothed us; that we ought to have it fixed so that father could enjoy it in his old age. In most things, I had followed the directions of my brother. About this deed and the property, I then followed his advice. Before, I didn't think, or know, much about it. My brother only spoke to me once about it, that night. My brother was not at home on Sunday, and came home Sunday night. I was at home all day Sunday, and Sunday night. I talked to no one else about it (the deed). We came to town early Monday; I wasn't well at the time; was sick all day Monday when I signed the deed; was sick when I left home that morning. I don't remember any thing definite about it that day; I was sick all day.

I would never have thought of making the deed, had he not mentioned it. I would not have done it of my own accord. I thought the land was through my mother; but, in fact, I never thought any thing about it. My brother never said much about my contemplated marriage with Silas Miller. I didn't think he was exactly willing, but he never said much about it. After I signed the deed, my brother went back to St. Louis. I and my father and my brother came into town together in the wagon. We got in between ten and eleven o'clock, and went straight to King's office. * * * The deed was executed on May 18, 1874, and I was married June 11, 1874. I received no money from my father for the deed.”

Upon cross-examination, she said: “I went to Pitman's school two terms and a half. I quit school, I think, about four years ago. I stayed with my father until I married. I boarded at Pitman's when at school. At the time I signed the deed, I knew I had an interest in the property, but didn't know how much. There was no conversation between myself and father between Saturday and Monday, when the deed was made. It was not mentioned on the way into town. * * * I was then twenty-one years old. I was not insane or crazy at the time I signed it. I understood it was a deed, but did not realize what it really was. I didn't comprehend it. I understood the language, of course. * * * My father, on the porch, told me he did not need it (the property); that it would be a burden to him, and he would get along better without it. I don't think it was as much as a month from the time father spoke to me about turning him out of house and home, till the deed was made. * * * I gave father a receipt that day, but what I thought was that it was for $70. * * * I have no recollection of its being explained to me. * * * I knew--I had been told--I had property, but as to the quantity I did not know. I never thought seriously about the deed after I executed it, until after I married,--that is, not much, or seriously. I thought about it on my own reflection. I didn't see where I had done wrong, until after I had married. I thought about it from my own reasoning, and not upon suggestions from others. * * * I think I was...

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