Miller v. State, s. 477S267

Decision Date24 July 1979
Docket NumberNos. 477S267,575S119,s. 477S267
Citation392 N.E.2d 445,271 Ind. 260
PartiesDarryl S. MILLER, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

James V. Tsoutsouris and John F. Hoehner, Valparaiso, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Wesley T. Wilson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

PRENTICE, Justice.

Defendant (Appellant) was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment upon a plea of guilty to a charge of first degree murder. His first appeal, No. 575 S 119, with Justice Hunter dissenting, resulted in a remand to the trial court for a determination of the defendant's competency at the time the guilty plea was accepted. (See 264 Ind. 548, 348 N.E.2d 14). Pursuant to such remand, the trial court did conduct such a hearing, at which the only evidence presented was the testimony of the two court appointed physicians. One of such physicians testified that in his opinion the defendant was incompetent at the time the guilty plea was entered. The other first testified that in his opinion the defendant was competent at such time. However, when cross examined and confronted with hypothetical questions disclosing certain of the circumstances under which the defendant had made the guilty plea, circumstances previously unknown to the witness, he acknowledged a serious doubt as to the defendant's competency. The trial judge, nevertheless, determined that the defendant was competent at the time the plea was entered and reinstated the sentence, in accordance with our remand order.

ISSUE

The single issue presented upon this appeal is whether or not there was sufficient evidence to support a trial court's determination that the defendant was competent at the time he entered the guilty plea.

There is no question but that once a defendant properly raises the issue of his competency to stand trial, due process requires a hearing upon that issue. Neither is there any question but that such hearing must be adequate to meet and preserve the defendant's right to due process and that there must be a record of substantial and competent evidence sufficient to sustain the trial judge's determination of competence. It does not follow, however, that this record discloses that the trial judge ignored the evidence and substituted his "naked judgment," as is contended by the defendant.

In prior cases dealing with the question of the sufficiency of the evidence presented at a competency hearing, we have held that the trial court's "determination involves questions of fact, and an appropriate finding by the trial court is reversible on appeal only if clearly erroneous as unsupported by the facts and circumstances before the court together with any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. * * * The trial court is not bound by the recommendations of the psychiatric witnesses; otherwise there would be no need for a hearing." Howard v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 503, 355 N.E.2d 833. It is upon this basis that the evidence herein challenged must be assessed.

The opinion testimony adduced at the competency hearing was conflicting. The opinion of Dr. Hogle, arrived at from two examinations and interviews with the defendant, was that the defendant understood the nature of the charges against him and the applicable sentence, if convicted, and that he had the ability to assist his attorney. It was his further opinion, however, that on the critical date, the date of the guilty plea, he was under severe emotional stress, stemming from having viewed a photograph of his infant son, and that by reason of such stress, he did not fully appreciate the "unwiseness" of his plea. He also testified that his conclusion was also premised upon the defendant's act of pleading guilty to such a serious offense, without the benefit of legal counsel. The witness' testimony, otherwise, revealed that other relevant factors considered indicated competency.

Dr. Makovsky testified that he examined the defendant on two occasions and concluded therefrom that he was competent on the critical date. He supported his conclusion with testimony that he saw no evidence of organic brain damage, of hallucinations or of delusions. That defendant was cooperative and was able to relate historical facts concerning himself, his family and the criminal incident. That defendant was nervous but normally responsive, was oriented as to time and place and understood his situation. This witness testified that from the aforementioned, he was of the opinion that the defendant was emotionally upset because of his jail environment and his circumstances but that he understood the nature of the charges against him, the applicable sentence if convicted and that he had the ability to assist his attorney in his defense but elected not to avail himself of legal counsel.

It is the defendant's position that the related testimony of Dr. Makovsky was negated by the following related testimony adduced on cross examination and that Dr. Makovsky's testimony, in toto, supported only a finding of incompetence.

"Q. You understand Doctor the critical period we're concerned with relates back to over two years ago at a time when you were not present to see the Defendant, that is on the 13th day of September, 1974?

"A. Right.

"Q. The critical question revolves around whether on that date he was competent to enter a plea by himself to the charge of First Degree Murder, you understand that's the critical issue here?

"A. I understand that.

"Q. Let me ask you this Doctor, when were the murder charges filed against the Defendant if you know?

"A. Well I'd have to look at the records. The records here, August 21st, 1974.

"Q. Doctor, if I were to indicate to you that in August of 1974 there were other charges lodged against the Defendant, not the pending charge, not the murder charge, if I were to tell you that the record shows that at two o'clock in the morning on the 12th of September a purported confession was taken from the Defendant in the Porter County Jail and on the 13th day of September, the very next day, he was brought to court for arraignment, pleaded guilty and was found guilty to First Degree Murder and was shipped off, that was it. Almost simultaneous. Would that make a difference to you as to your opinion whether or not he had the...

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  • Byrd v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • June 18, 1992
    ...is in issue, or during the penalty phase of capital cases. Corbin v. State (1990), Ind., 563 N.E.2d 86 (insanity); Miller v. State (1979), 271 Ind. 260, 392 N.E.2d 445, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1088, 100 S.Ct. 1051, 62 L.Ed.2d 776 (1980) (competency); Moore v. State (1985), 479 N.E.2d 1264, 1......

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