Miller v. State

Decision Date04 May 2009
Docket NumberNo. 645, September Term, 2007.,645, September Term, 2007.
PartiesChad Everette MILLER v. STATE of Maryland.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Marc A. DeSimone, Jr. (Nancy S. Forster, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for Appellant.

Michelle W. Cole (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, for Appellee.

Panel: DEBORAH S. EYLER, WRIGHT, J. FREDERICK SHARER (Ret'd, Specially Assigned), JJ.

DEBORAH S. EYLER, Judge.

On May 14, 2007, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Chad Everette Miller, the appellant, entered a guilty plea to one count of burglary in the first degree. As part of a plea agreement, the prosecutor recommended a sentence of 15 years' incarceration, suspend all but five years, to be followed by a period of probation. The court was not bound by the recommendation, however. After hearing from the appellant and the victim, and after considering the appellant's record, the court sentenced him to 15 years' incarceration, with no period suspended.

The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, which this Court treated as an application for leave to appeal under Md. Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol.), section 12-302(e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ("CJ"). The appellant supplemented his application with a written challenge to the voluntariness of his guilty plea.

On September 25, 2008, we granted the appellant's application and ordered the parties to brief the following question:

Did the guilty plea voir dire establish that the [appellant] had the requisite understanding of the nature and elements of the crime of first-degree burglary?

For the following reasons, we answer this question in the negative and therefore shall vacate the judgment of the circuit court and remand the case for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

On January 4, 2007, the appellant was charged in a criminal information with first-degree burglary of the dwelling of Gilda Jeraldine Henry, his 89-year-old grandmother, and with related offenses.1 Ms. Henry lived in a seniors apartment building, and had a car there. The appellant had a key to Ms. Henry's apartment, but Ms. Henry had made it clear that he was not allowed in.

The appellant was arraigned on January 4, 2007. He was presented with an Initial Appearance Report. He signed a receipt for the report acknowledging that he had been told of "the offense(s) for which I am charged."

On May 14, 2007, the appellant appeared in court with counsel to plead guilty to Count 1 of the charging document (burglary in the first degree). The prosecutor informed the court that the sentencing guidelines for the offense were one to five years, and that the State would recommend incarceration for 15 years, with all but five years suspended, to be followed by a period of probation, with the addition that the appellant was free to request a different disposition. Defense counsel acknowledged that was his understanding of the agreement with the State.

The court then directed defense counsel to advise the appellant of his rights. The following colloquy took place:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Mr. Miller, we went through negotiations today, you understand?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You understand the plea offer, right?

THE DEFENDANT: That's correct.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The State is offering 15 years suspend all but five. As we talked about earlier this morning, you don't have to plead guilty, you could enter into not guilty, and what would happen then you would have a right to a jury trial. A jury would be picked from the voter rolls of Baltimore County or the Department of Motor Vehicle rolls.

That jury would be impaneled, and they will listen to the facts and evidence of the case, and that jury would have to make a determination that the Assistant States's Attorney ... has met ... his burden of proving you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

Defense counsel further advised the appellant that, if the case went to trial, the jury would have to reach a unanimous verdict; the State would call his grandmother to testify and he (the appellant) would have the right to cross-examine her; he could call witnesses on his own behalf and could ask the court for assistance in securing their testimony at trial; he could advance motions asserting legal defenses; he would be presumed innocent and the State would have to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and he could choose to exercise his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and, if he did, the judge would instruct the jurors that that could not be held against him. The appellant acknowledged that he understood these rights and that he would be forfeiting them by pleading guilty.

With regard to the guilty plea itself, defense counsel advised the appellant that, if he were on parole or probation, the entry of the guilty plea could be considered a violation; if he were not a citizen of the United States, he could be deported as a result of the guilty plea; he only could seek review of his guilty plea on limited grounds; and because the crime was committed in Baltimore County, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County had jurisdiction. The appellant acknowledged that he understood. He stated that he was 31 years old, had completed three years of college, could read and write, and was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

Defense counsel then advised the appellant about whether he could challenge the legality of the sentence imposed and whether he was pleading guilty of his own volition:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: ... The next would be whether the sentence imposed by the Court is illegal, and I believe first degree burglary carries a maximum sentence of 20 years; do you understand?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So if [the judge] gave you 20 years that would not be an illegal sentence.

Next would be whether or not you didn't enter into this plea freely and voluntarily. Anybody promise you anything to get you to enter into this plea—

THE DEFENDANT: No.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:—negotiations this morning? Ms. Henry is your grandmother, right?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: For the record, Ms. Henry suggested that you enter into the plea. She wants to see you when you come home. She is 89 years old, right?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Wasn't a promise, she didn't get you to promise anything to plead this way?

THE DEFENDANT: Correct.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Neither did I?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Correct.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: What you are doing is your sole decision despite what your grandmother said, you still have an opportunity to go to trial.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

The appellant said he was satisfied with the services of his lawyer, there was nothing else he wanted his lawyer to do that was not done, and he did not have any questions for his lawyer. He told the court that no one had made any threats or promises to induce him to plead guilty. The plea colloquy ended as follows:

THE COURT: The choice was made [to] give up your right to a jury trial, right to a trial before me, your Constitutional rights, part and parcel of any trial that takes place in a criminal action in the United States of America, are they choices you have made freely, knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, they are.

THE COURT: All your questions have been answered and you know what you are doing here today?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you have a clear mind?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: I find the defendant is qualified. I will hear the statement of facts.

The prosecutor proceeded to read the statement of facts in support of the guilty plea: On January 4, 2007, at approximately 9:00 a.m., police officers were dispatched to Ms. Henry's apartment in the seniors apartment building. She reported that, when she woke up that morning, her purse and her car keys were missing.

Ultimately, investigation revealed, all caught on video, the defendant was seen during the night walking through the hallways of Ms. Henry's residence [i.e., the seniors apartment building]. Walks into her apartment, comes out about four minutes later, rifling through the purse he has now stolen in the burglary.

Ultimately, later that day, the police catch the defendant asleep in the victim's car in Baltimore City. When they do a search of the car, Ms. Henry's purse was also located in the car.

Ms. Henry certainly didn't give the defendant permission to come in the residence on that date and steal her purse, which included her keys and take her car as well. All events did occur in Baltimore County, Your Honor.

The judge concluded that the evidence was legally sufficient and found the appellant guilty of burglary in the first degree. After the State nolle prossed the balance of the charges, the court was told of the appellant's prior record, which included five adult convictions. The court also was informed that, less than a week after the appellant had been released on his own recognizance in this case, he had again stolen his grandmother's car and also had withdrawn money from her bank account. His bail status then was revoked. The court sentenced the appellant to 15 years' incarceration, with no time suspended.

The appellant filed his notice of appeal on May 17, 2007, three days after the guilty plea was entered. As noted, this Court treated the notice of appeal as an application for leave to appeal.

DISCUSSION
(a)

For a guilty plea to meet constitutional muster, the record must affirmatively show that it was entered into by the accused (1) voluntarily; (2) with an intelligent understanding of the nature of the offense and of the possible consequences of the plea; and (3) unconditionally. Hudson v. State, 286 Md. 569, 595, 409 A.2d 692 (1979). See also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Yoswick v. State, 347 Md. 228, 239, 700 A.2d 251 (...

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