Miller v. State
Decision Date | 13 September 1999 |
Docket Number | No. A99A1684.,A99A1684. |
Citation | 522 S.E.2d 519,240 Ga. App. 18 |
Parties | MILLER v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Peter D. Johnson, Augusta, for appellant.
Daniel J. Craig, District Attorney, Charles R. Sheppard, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Defendant was found guilty by a jury of aggravated assault (Count 1) and battery (Count 2). He appeals from the judgment of conviction and enumerates as error the trial court's: (1) failure to declare a mistrial after the State injected extrinsic evidence of bad character; (2) failure to declare a mistrial after an allegedly burden-shifting closing argument by the State's attorney; and (3) failure to charge the jury on battery under OCGA § 16-5-23.1, as alleged in the indictment. Held:
1. Defendant contends that the trial court should have declared a mistrial arguing that evidence of his bad character was introduced through two of the State's witnesses.
On cross-examination, the battery victim, Louise Jones, was asked, "[Do] you consider yourself to be [defendant's] common law wife?" Jones replied, On direct examination later in the trial, Lucinda Barnes recalled the verbal exchange between the battery victim (her daughter) and defendant in Barnes' backyard as follows,
The trial court denied trial defense counsel's motions for mistrial but immediately ordered Jones' testimony accusing defendant of beating her and Barnes' hearsay testimony to such effect stricken from the record and instructed the jury at length to disregard the testimony.
On appeal, defendant argues that: (1) the curative instructions given by the trial court were inadequate to cure complained-of testimony of defendant's bad character because each emphasized the prejudicial nature of the testimony; and (2) the objectionable testimony was intentionally given in that it was unresponsive to any question propounded. The trial court's curative instructions described the offending testimony as "highly prejudicial" and "obviously prejudicial," in directing the jury to give such testimony no consideration. In our view, this was proper as an appropriate explanation of the law prompting the charge. See Emory Univ. v. Lee, 97 Ga.App. 680, 697(4), 104 S.E.2d 234 ( ). We need not determine whether witnesses Jones and Barnes intentionally gave prejudicial testimony going to matters beyond the questions put to them. It is enough that the trial court excluded their extraneous remarks and gave immediate and appropriate curative instructions in each situation. This was sufficient to remove any prejudicial impression arising from the unsolicited testimony of witnesses Jones and Barnes concerning Jones' prior difficulties1 with defendant. McKibbons v. State, 226 Ga.App. 452, 453-454(2), 486 S.E.2d 679; Marlowe v. State, 162 Ga.App. 37-38(1), 290 S.E.2d 136.
2. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial upon the ground that the State's attorney made a "burden shifting" statement in his closing argument, impermissibly commenting upon the defendant's failure to testify.
During closing argument the prosecutor stated: Thereafter, defendant moved for a mistrial on the ground that the statement was an improper comment on defendant's failure to testify at trial. The trial court denied the motion and immediately issued a curative instruction to the jury wherein the court admonished the State's attorney for making the statement in that "we have established that the State has brought to this courtroom every known witness to this incident[,]" and instructed the jury to disregard the statement and give it no part in their deliberations. Defendant did not object or renew his motion for a mistrial after such instruction was given, and so failed to preserve the issue for appeal. Jones v. State, 221 Ga.App. 374, 375(2), 471 S.E.2d 318. Consequently, this enumeration of error presents nothing for review. Even were there no waiver, "" Williams v. State, 200 Ga.App. 84, 86(3), 406 S.E.2d 498. This is neither burden shifting nor an impermissible comment on defendant's failure to testify. See McGee v. State, 260 Ga. 178, 179(4), 391 S.E.2d 400.
3. In his last enumeration of error, defendant correctly contends the trial court erred in charging the jury on "battery" (Count 2) by using the OCGA § 16-5-23 definition of simple battery,2 rather than charging battery as defined at OCGA § 16-5-23.1(a), as alleged in the indictment. When the trial court asked if there were any "objections, exceptions, or suggestions ... to the charge[, there were] [n]one from the defense."
Medina v. State, 234 Ga.App. 13, 15(2), 505 S.E.2d 558. While the trial court...
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