Miller v. State

Decision Date27 June 1956
Docket NumberNo. 28379,28379
Citation163 Tex.Crim. 381,292 S.W.2d 108
PartiesSidney MILLER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Criminal Appeals

McCarthy, Rose & Haynes, Amarillo, George S. McCarthy, Amarillo, of counsel, for appellant.

Leon B. Douglas, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

DICE, Commissioner.

Appellant was convicted under Article 1177a, V.A.P.C., of kidnapping for extortion and his punishment assessed at 45 years' confinement in the penitentiary.

This is a companion case to that of Tyler v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 288 S.W.2d 517, in which we upheld the conviction of one of appellant's co-defendants for the same offense growing out of the same transaction.

The testimony of the prosecuting witness, Pete Rydolph, is substantially the same as given upon the trial of the Tyler case, a summary of which may be found by reference to our opinion delivered in the case.

Rydolph's testimony shows that, after the appellant, Bill Tyler, Freda Bills, and an unidentified man had come to his home about dark and the appellant had threatened his life, he was forced to accompany them to a motel, in the city of Victoria. Upon arrival at the motel, after his life had again been threatened by the appellant, he was forced to take off his clothes and get on a bed with Freda Bills. While on the bed, the lights were turned off and three clicks of a camera were heard. At the direction of appellant, Rydolph was then taken by Tyler and the unidentified man in an automobile and held in their custody throughout the night, during which time he was in constant fear of being killed. On the following morning, upon the appellant's demand and instructions, Rydolph went to a bank in Victoria, and, while under appellant's surveillance, withdrew from his account $30,000 in cash, which he thereafter delivered to the appellant before being finally released from custody.

Appellant did not testify but called as a witness his codefendant, Freda Bills, after the indictment pending against her had been dismissed.

Mrs. Bills in substance testified that she participated in the deal after a conference with the appellant and Bill Tyler in San Antonio. She testified that she went to Victoria upon the instructions of appellant, thinking it was a gambling deal, but, after arriving in Victoria, found out it was a 'picture score;' that, after arriving in Victoria, she and Tyler went to Rydolph's place to fish, at which time Rydolph arranged to have a date with her at the motel; that, on the night in question, Rydolph was brought to the motel by Tyler for the purpose of fulfilling the date; and that, after they had undressed and the lights were switched off, Rydolph offered the appellant money for the films. She further testified that Rydolph then left the motel with Tyler and the unidentified man and the next morning she saw Rydolph at the motel with Tyler and the man; that she later saw appellant take a kodak out of the car and stamp a fire out; and that later she received $5,000 from the appellant.

The court's charge is substantially the same as given in Tyler v. State, supra which we held to be a correct charge under the facts in that case.

Appellant insists that, under the testimony of Freda Bills, he was entitled to the submission, as an affirmative defense, his requested charges Nos. 4 and 6, which would, in substance, have instructed the jury to acquit him if they believed that Rydolph paid money to the appellant to induce him to destroy or eliminate pictures or negatives taken of Rydolph in a compromising position or that said money was paid for any reason other than his release or freedom.

We find no error in the court's refusing to give the two requested charges.

In Tyler v. State, supra, we held that the payment of money was not an essential element of the offense of kidnapping for extortion.

Appellant complains of certain statements made by the district attorney in his closing argument to the jury.

Such complaints are presented by the court's Bills of Exception Nos. 8, 9 and 11, which were prepared and filed by the court in lieu of the appellant's bills, after the court had qualified the same and appellant had excepted to the qualifications....

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • Brown v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 16 Febrero 1972
    ...v. State, 164 Tex.Cr.R. 395, 299 S.W.2d 145 (1957); Christesson v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 27, 353 S.W.2d 28 (1962); Miller v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 381, 292 S.W.2d 108 (1956). The prosecutor's remarks to appellant, while not proper, were not of such nature as to require reversal. The same argu......
  • Selvidge v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 8 Febrero 1961
    ...the deduction that he was in fact a professional. We find no merit in the bill. Chamberland v. State, supra. See also Miller v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 381, 292 S.W.2d 108. Further complaint is made because the trial court refused to grant a mistrial when the prosecutor in his argument express......
  • Chamberland v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 8 Junio 1960
    ...as a professional gambler was a reasonable deduction from the evidence and therefore did not constitute error. Miller v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 381, 292 S.W.2d 108. The reference by counsel to the game as 'this sixty-forty game' is, contrary to appellant's contention, supported by the evidenc......
  • Anaya v. State, 28444
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 30 Junio 1956

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT