Miller v. State
| Citation | 440 P.2d 840,73 Wn.2d 790 |
| Decision Date | 09 May 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 38803,38803 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
| Parties | Robert H. MILLER and Richard W. Savage, Respondents, v. The STATE of Washington, William Schneider, Director of the State Department of General Administration, and Robert Graham, Auditor of the State of Washington, Appellants. |
John J. O'Connell, Atty. Gen., Olympia, Herbert Gelman, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert F. Hauth, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellants.
Brodie, Fristoe & Taylor, Doane Brodie, Olympia, Hamblen, Gilbert & Brooke, Spokane, for respondents.
Light bulbs are no trifling matter to the state of Washington. The state buys nearly $300,000 worth each biennium--and the amount will increase steadily in the future. A brace of taxpayers now claim that the state must procure its light bulbs through competitive bid instead of negotiated contracts, the means currently employed. 1
In 1957, through its Department of General Administration, the state called for competitive bids to supply it with all of the light bulbs required during a 12-month period. About 12 firms put in bids. Platt Electric Supply, Inc., in Seattle, with main offices in Portland, Oregon, won the contract with the lowest and best bid, and the state executed with that company an agreement designated as 'General Contract No. 184--Agreement for the Purchase of Ken-Rad Brand Westinghouse Lamps.' This contract, effective February 1, 1958, had a one-year term.
Thereafter, instead of putting the light bulb purchases up for competitive bids, the state has regularly renewed this 1958 contract No. 184 with Platt Electric Supply Company by negotiation. Officials in the Department of General Administration maintain that they have consistently obtained lower prices and better service for the state by negotiation than could have been done through competitive bidding, but the trial court, on conflicting evidence, found contra. 2 Price catalogs issued by three of the Nation's major light bulb manufacturers and evidence concerning the prices paid by several cities provided a basis for the court's findings.
Plaintiff taxpayers brought this action against both the state and the Director of the Department of General Administration, seeking an injunction to prohibit the state from extending or renewing lamp 'General Contract No. 184--Agreement for the Purchase of Ken-Rad Brand Westinghouse Lamps.' From a judgment and decree granting plaintiffs the relief prayed for in the Superior Court for Thurston County, the state appeals.
The state contends that the statutes relating to competitive bidding give it a latitude to negotiate contracts for the purchase of state supplies, or to renew by negotiation contracts reached through competitive bids because the statute directs that purchases be made by competitive bidding only Insofar as practicable. Thus, it is contended, the Department of General Administration need not call for competitive bids when in its judgment to do so would be impracticable.
The purchase of material, supplies and equipment needed for the support of all state institutions, colleges, universities, offices and installations, represents a complicated undertaking. To carry on this never-ending and constantly recurring business, the legislature created special agencies, establishing a Division of Purchasing under the Director of General Administration (RCW 43.19.190), and a State Purchasing Committee appointed by the Governor (RCW 43.19.1902). RCW 43.19.1904 requires the standards and specifications for all categories of purchases to be reviewed and approved by the State Purchasing Committee. Unless the purchases fall within three specific exceptions, or competitive bidding proves manifestly impracticable, all purchases by the state must be on competitive bids under RCW 43.19.1906, which says:
Insofar as practicable, all purchases and sales shall be based on competitive bids and a formal sealed bid procedure shall be used as standard procedure for all purchases and contracts for purchases and sales executed by the director of general administration through the division of purchasing and under the powers granted by RCW 43.19.190 through 43.19.1939: Provided, That sealed competitive bidding shall not be necessary for:
(1) Emergency purchases if such sealed bidding procedure would prevent or hinder the emergency from being met appropriately; and
(2) Purchases not exceeding five hundred dollars but in all such purchases quotations shall be secured from enough vendors to assure establishment of a competitive price; and
(3) Purchases which are clearly and legitimately limited to a single source of supply and purchases involving special facilities, services or market conditions, in which instances the purchase price may be best established by direct negotiation. RCW 43.19.1906. (Italics ours.)
Since the instant contract is not an emergency purchase, does exceed $500 in content, and does involve more than a single source of supply, the exemptions set forth in the foregoing section do not apply. This leaves for our interpretation the matter of practicability arising from the language of the statute which says All purchases shall be based on competitive bids according to a prescribed bid procedure Insofar as practicable. RCW 43.19.1906.
That the statute places a heavy duty upon the state's agents to overcome and solve the manifest difficulties of calling for and canvassing competitive bids is shown in the universal approval given by the courts and text authorities to the idea of competitive bidding in government. Competitive bidding is widely heralded among most authorities as a device to promote economy in government, prevent fraud, favoritism, extravagance and collusion, and to provide equal opportunities...
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State v. Hodge
...of other jurisdictions indicates that other state * * * courts generally agree with this definition. See, e.g., Miller v. State (1968), 73 Wash.2d 790, 793-794, 440 P.2d 840; Unverzagt v. Prestera (1940), 339 Pa. 141, 144, 13 A.2d 46; Beech Fork Coal Co. v. Pocahontas Corp. (1930), 109 W.Va......
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State v. Jesse F. Hodge Iii, 02-LW-6115
...... 'practicable' as: '* * * that which may be done,. practiced or accomplished; that which is performable,. feasible, possible * * *.' Our review of the law of other. jurisdictions indicates that other state * * * courts. generally agree with this definition. See, e.g.,. Miller v. State (1968), 73 Wash.2d 790, 793-794, 440. P.2d 840; Unverzagt v. Prestera (1940), 339 Pa. 141,. 144, 13 A.2d 46; Beech Fork Coal Co. v. Pocahontas. Corp. (1930), 109 W.Va. 39, 46-47, 152 S.E. 785;. People, ex rel. Williams v. Errant (1907), 229 Ill. 56, 66, 82 N.E. 271. * * * The Ohio ......
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State v. Jesse F. Hodge, Iii
...... 'practicable' as: '* * * that which may be done,. practiced or accomplished; that which is performable,. feasible, possible * * *.' Our review of the law of other. jurisdictions indicates that other state * * * courts. generally agree with this definition. See, e.g.,. Miller v. State (1968), 73 Wash.2d 790, 793-794, 440. P.2d 840; Unverzagt v. Prestera (1940), 339 Pa. 141,. 144, fn., 13 A.2d 46; Beech Fork Coal Co. v. Pocahontas. Corp. (1930), 109 W.Va. 39, 46-47, 152 S.E. 785;. People, ex rel. Williams v. Errant (1907), 229 Ill. 56, 66, 82 N.E. 271. . . ......
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