Miller v. State
Decision Date | 21 November 1917 |
Docket Number | (No. 4628.) |
Citation | 200 S.W. 389 |
Parties | MILLER v. STATE. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appeal from Guadalupe County Court; J. B. Williams, Judge.
Le Roy Miller was convicted of being a juvenile delinquent, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.
H. E. Short and Jas. Greenwood, both of Seguin, for appellant. E. B. Hendricks, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
The information herein, which was based on a proper complaint, after the formal parts, which were regular, alleged that:
The court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to quash this information on the grounds: (1) Because the juvenile laws are unintelligible and not operative, and in violation of article 6, P. C.; (2) because the information is duplicitous and charges felonies and misdemeanors; (3) and because the juvenile laws do not provide any intelligent mode of procedure whereby a delinquent child can be legally tried, and any trial thereunder is a farce. It has all the time, and in many cases, been held that said laws (articles 1195 to 1207b, inclusive, 2 Vernon's Crim. Stats.) are not void under article 6, P. C.
The proof shows appellant was only 10 or 11 years old when tried. Article 1197, C. C. P., defines who is a delinquent child, and what acts he commits make him such. The different counts in said information allege the commission of the several acts which made appellant a delinquent child. None of them charge him with a felony because of his age. Article 1195 requires the proceeding to be begun on complaint and information, which is as was done herein. The testimony of the state was ample to show he had committed the acts alleged, which authorized the jury to find him to be a delinquent.
The court in charging the jury told them the law provides that a "delinquent child may be committed to the state juvenile training school for an indeterminate period not exceeding five years"; and if they believed from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt he had committed the acts alleged, or any of them, "you will find him a delinquent child and order him committed to" said school "for an indeterminate period not exceeding five years." The court was in error in telling the jury they could have him committed "not exceeding five years." The law is for a time not beyond a time when he shall arrive at 21 years of age. But appellant made no objection before the trial was concluded, and as the charge in this respect was in his favor, this charge presents no error.
The verdict was:
"We, the jury, find the defendant, Le Roy Miller, a delinquent, and have him committed to the juvenile training school for a term of five years."
Upon this verdict the court entered a judgment:
"That the defendant, Le Roy Miller, be and is hereby adjudged a delinquent child, and that he be placed in charge of the sheriff who shall forthwith commit him to the state industrial school for boys for a term of five years."
The appellant complains that the judgment entered did not conform to the verdict nor the law in that it was not for an indeterminate time. He concedes that while in some cases this court has reformed and affirmed a judgment, that it cannot do so in this instance. We think that this court can reform this judgment under the statute and decisions. Article 938, C. C. P., and decisions thereunder. The judgment herein will be reformed by this court so as to conform to the verdict in the particulars named.
The name of the school or institution at Gatesville has been changed from time to time by statute. There can be no doubt from the charge of the court, verdict, and judgment that the institution at Gatesville, providing for the training of male juveniles, was meant and intended so that while therein said institution is called the "juvenile training school" that would be no ground for a reversal of the judgment herein. Such calling it would undoubtedly be embraced within the said juvenile statute.
Appellant has only one bill of exception, which is to the effect that the court permitted this testimony by Wm. Neubauer, to be given over his objections, viz:
Appellant's objections were that it was not the best evidence of these convictions, that the record thereof would be the best evidence, and that it was hearsay. This testimony did not purport to be, and was not, the contents of any record of a previous prosecution of appellant. It was not hearsay because the witness was sheriff and testified he knew as a fact that appellant had been in jail several times for petty theft. He also knew as a fact that he had been convicted of stealing several times, although he knew nothing personally of the thefts themselves. It has all the time, and in a great number of cases, been held that a defendant or any witness may be impeached by proving by him that he had been indicted or convicted for a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude; that for that purpose it was unnecessary to produce and introduce the judgment of conviction. 1 Branch's P. C. § 167, and cases cited. This principle and these authorities are applicable herein by analogy.
The clerk of this court will enter a judgment reforming the judgment of...
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...the procedure in criminal cases. Ex parte McLoud, 200 S. W. 394; Ex parte Pruitt, 200 S. W. 392; Ex parte Ellis, 200 S. W. 840; Miller v. State, 200 S. W. 389; McLaren v. State, 199 S. W. 811; Acts 35th Leg. 4th Called Sess. c. 26. The law requires the prosecution to begin by complaint and ......
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...985, tit. 17. This act has been construed criminal in its nature. Ex parte McLoud, 200 S. W. 394; Ex parte Pruitt, 200 S. W. 392; Miller v. State, 200 S. W. 389; McLaren v. State, 199 S. W. 811. Since the application has been supplemented by the facts it appears that the proceeding grew out......
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