Miller v. State

• Decision Date: 12 February 2010
• Docket Number: No. CR 08–1297.,CR 08–1297.
• Parties: James Aaron MILLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

2010 Ark. 1

362 S.W.3d 264

James Aaron MILLER, Appellant,

v.STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. CR 08–1297.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Jan. 7, 2010.Rehearing Denied Feb. 12, 2010.

Montgomery, Adams & Wyatt, PLC, by: Dale E. Adams and James W. Wyatt, Little Rock, for appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Att'y Gen., by: Brad Newman and Jake H. Jones, Ass't Att'ys Gen., for appellee.

DONALD L. CORBIN, Justice.

This is an automatic appeal pursuant to Ark. R.App. P.-Crim. 10 (2009) from the judgment of the Sebastian County Circuit Court convicting Appellant James Aaron Miller of three counts of capital murder and sentencing him to death on each count. Jurisdiction is properly in this court pursuant to Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 1–2(a)(2) (2009). We find that no error occurred in the guilt phase of the bifurcated trial, and therefore affirm the judgment of convictions for capital murder. We find that reversible error occurred in the penalty phase of the trial, however, when two victim-impact witnesses improperly recommended to the jury that they impose the death penalty. We therefore reverse the death sentences and remand to the trial court for resentencing pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 5–4–616 (Repl.2006).

A detailed recitation of the evidence produced at trial is not necessary, as Miller does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him. However, the following basic facts and review of the procedural history are helpful to an understanding of the arguments raised in this appeal.

Miller was charged by felony information with the capital murders of his girlfriend Bridgette Barr, her five-year-old daughter Sydney Barr, and her two-year-old son Garrett Barr. The information alleged that the murders occurred on or about December 22, 2006. Police received a request in the early morning hours of December 26, 2006, from Miller's father, who was then out-of-state, to check on Miller because he had threatened to hurt himself. Sometime after police arrived at the apartment that Miller shared with Ms. Barr, Miller agreed to be transported by ambulance for a mental evaluation. While awaiting transport, Miller admitted to police that he committed the murders. Physical evidence indicated that the murders had occurred some three or four days earlier.

Miller was tried, convicted, and sentenced by a Sebastian County jury during the first week of April 2008. Immediately following the entry of the judgment and commitment order on April 7, 2008, the circuit clerk filed a notice of appeal on Miller's behalf, pursuant to Rule 10. After a partial record was lodged, we granted the motion of Miller's trial counsel to withdraw, and we appointed new counsel for Miller's Rule 10 appeal. Miller v. State, CR 08–499, 2008 WL 1970951 (Ark. May 8, 2008) (unpublished per curiam). Miller filed a pro se motion to withdraw his appeal, which we determined to be moot since this court's review of a death sentence is mandatory pursuant to Rule 10. Miller v. State, 2009 Ark. 143, 2009 WL 636714 (per curiam) (citing Newman v. State, 350 Ark. 51, 84 S.W.3d 443 (2002) (per curiam)).

Miller's Rule 10 counsel enumerates fourteen points for our review in this automatic appeal. Of the fourteen points raised by Miller's Rule 10 counsel, we first address the eight that are alleged to have occurred during the guilt phase of the trial.

I. Guilt–Phase Issues

A. Motion to Suppress

Miller's first assignment of error in the guilt phase is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of the search of his residence, which included all the evidence seized from the crime-scene investigation as well as statements he made subsequent to the search. Miller contends the search of his home was conducted without a warrant, without his consent, and was otherwise unjustifiable under the Fourth Amendment. He further contends his statements should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.

In reviewing a circuit court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we conduct a de novo review based on the totality of the circumstances, reviewing findings of historical facts for clear error and determining whether those facts give rise to reasonable suspicion or probable cause, giving due weight to inferences drawn by the circuit court. Baird v. State, 357 Ark. 508, 182 S.W.3d 136 (2004). We reverse only if the ruling is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Wofford v. State, 330 Ark. 8, 952 S.W.2d 646 (1997).

Warrantless searches in private homes are presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and the State bears the burden of proving that the warrantless activity was reasonable. Baird, 357 Ark. 508, 182 S.W.3d 136; Mann v. State, 357 Ark. 159, 161 S.W.3d 826 (2004). However, law enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant if the State establishes an exception to the warrant requirement. Baird, 357 Ark. 508, 182 S.W.3d 136. One such exception is stated in Ark. R.Crim. P. 14.3 (2009) as follows:

Rule 14.3 Emergency searches.

An officer who has reasonable cause to believe that premises or a vehicle contain:

(a) individuals in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm; or

(b) things imminently likely to burn, explode, or otherwise cause death, serious bodily harm, or substantial destruction of property; or (c) things subject to seizure which will cause or be used to cause death or serious bodily harm if their seizure is delayed;

may, without a search warrant, enter and search such premises and vehicles, and the persons therein, to the extent reasonably necessary for the prevention of such death, bodily harm, or destruction.

This court applied Rule 14.3(a) and stated that a warrantless entry into a home may be upheld under the emergency exception if the State shows that the intruding officer had reasonable cause to believe that someone inside the home was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm. Wofford, 330 Ark. 8, 952 S.W.2d 646. This court stated further that any search that follows the emergency entry may be upheld under Rule 14.3 if it was reasonably necessary for the prevention of such death or serious bodily harm and is strictly circumscribed by the exigencies that necessitated the emergency entry in the first place. Id. citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)). Police may seize evidence that they observe in plain view while conducting legitimate emergency activities. Mincey, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408.

In holding as it has regarding exigent circumstances, this court has expressly noted with approval the United States Supreme Court's recognition of the emergency exception to the warrant requirement in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Steinmetz v. State, 366 Ark. 222, 234 S.W.3d 302 (2006). The Supreme Court's most recent statements of the emergency exception reiterate that the emergency exception does not depend on the officers' subjective intent or the seriousness of any crime they are investigating, but rather it requires only an objectively reasonable basis for believing that a person within the house is in need of immediate aid. Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 546, 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009) (per curiam). Furthermore, though “[o]fficers do not need ironclad proof of ‘a likely serious, life-threatening injury’ to invoke the emergency aid exception,” there must be “ ‘an objectively reasonable basis for believing’ that medical assistance was needed, or persons were in danger.” Id. at ––––, 130 S.Ct. at 549.

Keeping in mind Rule 14.3 and this court's application of that rule, we turn now to the facts surrounding the search in this case. Fort Smith Police Officer Stephen Hutchinson testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress that he was dispatched pursuant to a 911 call from Miller's father, who was in Colorado and had received a text message from Miller stating that Miller was thinking of killing himself with pills. Officer Hutchinson and Officer Derek Harwood went to an apartment rented to Bridgette Barr to conduct a welfare check on Miller. They knocked on the door, and Miller opened it. They explained to Miller that they were there in response to a 911 call from his father about a suicide threat and that they were checking to see how he was doing. Officer Hutchinson asked if they could come inside to talk because it was so cold outside. After first asking to leave immediately with the officers, Miller agreed to let them in the apartment and to wait for an ambulance to take him to the hospital for a mental-health evaluation. While inside the entryway, Officer Hutchinson began to offer help to Miller and to inquire about what kind of problems he was having. Miller stated that he and his girlfriend had been fighting. While this conversation was occurring inside the apartment, Officer Hutchinson noticed pictures of a woman, whom Hutchinson thought to be Miller's girlfriend because he had his arm around her and two small children. He also noticed a dried blood stain approximately six to eight inches in diameter on the door. Despite having a head cold at the time, Officer Hutchinson also noticed a foul odor in the apartment.

Officer Hutchinson continued his testimony by relating that the ambulance arrived and Miller left the apartment with the Emergency Management Services personnel. While Officer Harwood sought the keys from Miller to lock the apartment, Officer Hutchinson observed that Miller seemed like he did not care whether the apartment was locked. Officer Hutchinson then recalled that Miller was acting suspicious in wanting to leave the apartment so quickly. He also recalled the blood stain on the door and then wondered where the people in the picture were. Accordingly, before locking the door, the officers walked through the apartment to make sure everything was okay. Officer Hutchinson stated that since they were dealing with a suicidal subject, he wanted to make sure they were not leaving...