Miller v. Stauffer Chemical Co.

• Decision Date: 12 July 1978
• Docket Number: No. 12321,12321
• Citation: 581 P.2d 345,99 Idaho 299
• Parties: Carl L. MILLER and Mary Jo Miller, husband and wife, and Margo Miller, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STAUFFER CHEMICAL COMPANY, a Delaware Corp., Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 345

581 P.2d 345

99 Idaho 299

Carl L. MILLER and Mary Jo Miller, husband and wife, and Margo Miller, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STAUFFER CHEMICAL COMPANY, a Delaware Corp., Defendant-Respondent.

No. 12321.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

July 12, 1978.

Michael W. Moore, of Imhoff, Lynch & Davis, Boise, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Mark S. Geston, of Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & Gillespie, Boise, for defendant-respondent.

McFADDEN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing an action as barred by Idaho's borrowing statute, I.C. § 5-239, which applies the California statute of limitations. The judgment is affirmed.

Appellant Carl L. Miller was an Oregon resident employed as a truck driver at the time he was allegedly injured by employees of respondent Stauffer Chemical who were loading his truck at a California fertilizer plant. More than a year later and after California's one-year statute of limitation ¹ on negligence actions had run, appellant moved from Oregon to Idaho without having filed suit in California. Nor had appellant filed suit in Oregon, which apparently he could have done under that state's two-year statute of limitation. ² A few days before Idaho's two-year statute of limitation ³ had run, appellant filed a negligence action against respondent in an Idaho court, obtaining personal service on a resident agent.

Respondent moved to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b), maintaining that the action is barred by lapse of time under Idaho's borrowing statute, I.C. § 5-239:

When a cause of action has arisen in another state or territory, or in a foreign country, and by the laws thereof an action thereon can not there be maintained against a person by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon shall not be maintained against him in this state, except in favor of one who has been a citizen of this state and who has held the cause of action from the time it accrued.

The court below agreed with respondent and dismissed the action. This appeal followed.

Appellant presents two issues on appeal. He first argues that the exception in I.C. § 5-239 for "one who has been a citizen of this state" does not require that a plaintiff be an Idaho resident when his cause of action accrues but only when he files suit. ⁴ Secondly, appellant maintains that I.C. § 5-239 as construed below is unconstitutional because it burdens the right to travel and violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. ⁵

I.

This court rejects appellant's interpretation of I.C. § 5-239 and concludes that the district court properly construed and applied I.C. § 5-239 to the facts in the instant case. Under the statute, a cause of action that arises in California and is barred by the California statute of limitation cannot be maintained in Idaho unless the plaintiff comes within the exception for "one who has been a citizen of this state." We hold that under this exception, Idaho's statute of limitation will apply only if the plaintiff is an Idaho citizen When the cause of action accrues.

This court finds support for this holding not only in the linguistic structure of the statute ⁶ but also in other cases construing similar statutes and in the legislative purpose of borrowing statutes.

Our borrowing statute was adopted in 1881 from identical California legislation. ⁷ The California cases construing the statute have rejected the construction urged by appellant. Under California cases, for the local statute of limitations to apply, a plaintiff must be a "citizen" of the forum when his action accrues rather than when he files suit. Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal.2d 108, 109 P.2d 701 (1941), Cited with approval in Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953) (Traynor, J.) (dicta); Stewart v. Spaulding, 72 Cal. 264, 13 P. 661 (1887) (dicta). In Biewend, plaintiff brought suit for unpaid alimony payments that had accrued under a Missouri divorce decree entered twenty years earlier. The action was barred in Missouri but was not barred in California, unless the result was changed by the California borrowing statute. The California Supreme Court (per Traynor, J.) stated: "Since the plaintiff has not been a citizen of this state from the time the cause of action accrued, this section has the effect of applying the Missouri statute of limitations . . . ." 109 P.2d at 706.

There is further support for our construction in the legislative policy expressed in borrowing statutes. The common law rule governing choice of the applicable statute of limitation is that the forum normally applies its own statutes of limitations to actions before it, for various reasons. Jackson v. Continental So. Lines, Inc., 172 F.Supp. 809 (W.D.Ark.1959) (applying Arkansas law); Corrigan v. Clairol Inc., 126 F.Supp. 791 (D.Conn.1954) (applying Connecticut law); Pierce v. Stirling, 225 Ark. 108, 279 S.W.2d 840 (1955); Fimian v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 209 Ga. 113, 70 S.E.2d 762 (1952); Doughty v. Prettyman, 219 Md. 83, 148 A.2d 438 (1959); Dowse v. Gaynor, 155 Mich. 38, 118 N.W. 615 (1908); Smith v. Turner, 91 N.H. 198, 17 A.2d 87 (1940); McClellan v. F. A. North Co., 14 N.J.Misc. 760, 187 A. 337 (1936), Aff'd118 N.J.L. 168, 191 A. 753 (1937); In re Goldsworthy's Estate, 45 N.M. 406, 115 P.2d 627 (1941); Burrows v. French, 34 S.C. 165, 13 S.E. 355 (1891) (by implication); Davison v. Sasse, 72 S.D. 199, 31 N.W.2d 758 (1948); Wetmore v. Karrick, 95 Vt. 318, 115 A. 234 (1921). A. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws § 162, at 433 (1962). Where an action might be brought in one of several jurisdictions, a plaintiff can choose a forum with a longer statute of limitation. The common law rule thus precludes a uniform limitations period for a particular cause of action and encourages forum shopping. R. Leflar, American Conflicts Law § 128, at 307 (1968). Borrowing statutes change the common law rule governing choice of the applicable statute of limitation. R. Leflar, Supra at 307. Borrowing statutes attempt to promote uniformity of limitation periods and to discourage forum shopping by requiring the trial court to "borrow" the statute of limitations of the jurisdiction that the legislature has determined bears the closest relationship to the action, usually the jurisdiction where the action arose. See generally Vernon, Statutes of Limitation in the Conflict of Laws: Borrowing Statutes, 32 Rocky Mt.L.Rev. 287 (1960); Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws, 15 U.Fla.L.Rev. 33 (1962).

These purposes of the borrowing statute would be circumvented by the construction appellant proposes. If a plaintiff could avoid the application of the borrowing statute by removing to Idaho with the stated intent of becoming a permanent resident, few instances of forum shopping would be prevented. We note that none of the more than thirty states with borrowing statutes have adopted, either by legislation or by judicial decision, a position so easily circumvented as that advanced by appellant. See generally Vernon, Supra.

This court therefore holds that the language of I.C. § 5-239 as well as the general purpose of such legislation requires that "one who has been a citizen of this state" be construed to mean "one who has been a citizen of this state from the time his cause of action accrued." The trial court's ruling that the California statute of limitation is applicable and bars this action is hereby affirmed.

II.

Appellant also argues that as construed below, the borrowing statute is unconstitutional. Appellant first argues that I.C. § 5-239 penalizes the exercise of the right to travel and, secondly, that I.C. § 5-239 violates the equal protection clause by treating residents more favorably than nonresidents.

A. RIGHT TO TRAVEL

The constitutional right to travel from one state to another is a fundamental right. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966). Nevertheless, not all state action that affects interstate movement "penalizes" the right to travel. McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645, 96 S.Ct. 1154, 47 L.Ed.2d 366 (1976) (upholding dismissal of Philadelphia fireman who moved to New Jersey in violation of municipal regulation requiring employees to be city residents); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973) (requirement that airline passengers and carry-on baggage be screened prior to boarding does not burden right to travel); Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro Township, 535 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1976) (ordinance prohibiting "for sale" signs on homes does not burden right to travel), Rev'd on other grounds, 431 U.S. 85, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977); Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante, 535 F.2d 140 (1st Cir. 1976) (U.S. district court local rule requiring nondomiciliary plaintiffs to post security for costs does not burden interstate travel); Prigmore v. Renfro, 356 F.Supp. 427 (N.D.Ala.1972) (statute allowing absentee voting only by certain classes of voters does not infringe right to travel), Aff'd 410 U.S. 919, 93 S.Ct. 1369, 35 L.Ed.2d 582 (1973). Indeed, not even all state durational residency requirements are unconstitutional. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975) (one year residency requirement for filing divorce petition).

On the other hand, states have considerable power to adopt an appropriate conflict of laws doctrine in a situation touching more than one state. Where more than one state has sufficiently substantial contact with the activity involved in the litigation, the forum state can constitutionally apply to the case the law of one or another state having such an interest in the multistate activity. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 82 S.Ct. 585, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962); Watson v. Employer's Liability Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 75 S.Ct. 166, 99 L.Ed. 74 (1954); Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), Cert. denied 372 U.S. 912, 83 S.Ct. 726, 9 L.Ed.2d 720 (1963). See generally R. Leflar, Supra, §§ 56-64;...