Miller v. United Airlines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 June 1985
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 53 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1397 Anne E. MILLER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC., et al., Defendants and Respondents. AO25579.

Page 684

220 Cal.Rptr. 684

174 Cal.App.3d 878, 53 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1397

Anne E. MILLER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC., et al., Defendants and Respondents.

AO25579.

Court of Appeal, Sixth District, California.

June 21, 1985.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing

July 18, 1985.

Susan R. Reischl, Law Offices of Robert L. Mezzetti, San Jose, for plaintiff and appellant.

Gilmore F. Diekmann, Jr., Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon, San Francisco, for defendants and respondents.

Introduction

AGLIANO, Associate Justice.

Plaintiff Anne Miller appeals from a summary judgment in favor of her employer United Airlines, Inc. (United) and fellow employees, Laurie Whipple, Susan Remsberg, Karen Burke and Edda Beering.

Plaintiff's ten causes of action included claims of invasion of privacy, libel, slander, interference with contract, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, false imprisonment, and violation of civil rights. She alleged resultant humiliation, mental anguish, emotional and physical distress and mental and physical injury requiring medical treatment with hospital and doctor expense.

The trial court found, on facts essentially undisputed for summary judgment purposes, that plaintiff's exclusive remedy for the matters set forth in nine of her ten causes of action was the grievance and arbitration process prescribed in a Collective Bargaining Agreement between United and plaintiff's union, and as to the tenth cause of action plaintiff had not exhausted an administrative remedy under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. The trial court determined as an alternative ground for judgment that plaintiff's claims were covered exclusively by the California Worker's Compensation Act.

On appeal, we conclude that summary judgment was properly entered in favor of defendants. Plaintiff's exclusive remedy lies within the procedures outlined in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, and plaintiff has not exhausted her administrative remedies under the Fair Employment and Housing Act. Having reached this conclusion, we do not decide whether plaintiff's claims are covered exclusively by the Worker's Compensation Act.

It is first noted that plaintiff's brief argues the liability of United and not that of the individual defendants. Under these circumstances, the appeal as it relates to these individual plaintiffs is deemed abandoned.

The Factual Contentions

The deposition testimony of plaintiff supplies the facts proffered by defendants in aid of their summary judgment motion.

Plaintiff is a senior flight attendant who, at age 20, commenced her employment with United in 1960. The genesis of plaintiff's complaint was a 1982 written petition to United by some of her fellow flight attendants, including defendant Laurie Whipple, listing a number of complaints concerning plaintiff's performance as a first flight attendant. Ms. Whipple, a junior flight attendant, had circulated the petition, urging as an inducement, the removal of seniors to make room for junior attendants. Plaintiff was told the document was highly critical of her work and character.

Defendant Sue Remsberg, employed in United's Inflight Services, called plaintiff to arrange a meeting. Plaintiff asked but was not told the purpose of the meeting. Had she known, she would have been accompanied by a union representative to represent her. Plaintiff attempted suicide three days before the scheduled meeting because she felt distraught about the forthcoming meeting, its mysterious nature, two prior cancellations of the meeting and the information she had gained of the petition. She was also upset at her union's advice that nothing could be done about the petition, because she had not been disciplined, and the petition was not part of her record.

Plaintiff finally met with Remsberg on June 21, 1982. Plaintiff was provided a summary of the petition. Ms. Remsberg told plaintiff that if any of the matters set forth in the petition were true, or believed by her to be true, she would see to it that plaintiff was fired. Plaintiff asked to see the original petition and the names on it but her request was denied. She asked to have those who signed the petition brought into the United office so that she could confront and question them. This request was also denied. Ms. Remsberg told plaintiff she was receiving an oral warning and that she would be observed in the future.

Plaintiff felt involuntarily detained in the meeting room prior to being dismissed from the meeting by Ms. Remsberg, a representative of management.

On July 24, 1982, plaintiff was required to participate in a counseling session, after which she was told not to worry, that nothing adverse would appear in her personnel file. However, she later discovered that the July 24 session had been noted on her counseling performance record and she was also advised of new articles of conduct and disciplinary measures applicable to an employee in her position.

On October 11, 1982, plaintiff attended another counseling session in which she was advised of a "ghost ride" observation of her performance on a flight. In the opinion of the observer, plaintiff met basic expectations for a United employee. Nevertheless, Remsberg gave her an oral warning.

On or about October 22, 1982, an "onion" letter was sent to United by a passenger complaining that plaintiff had been discourteous, rude and offensive on a certain flight from Hawaii. It turned out that plaintiff was not on the flight, leading plaintiff to infer that the offended passenger had been given plaintiff's name rather than that of the attendant whose conduct generated the complaint.

During the period of time plaintiff was subjected to the described treatment, United passengers had written laudatory letters concerning plaintiff's performance. Known in the industry as "orchid" letters, they were attached to plaintiff's declaration in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

At a March 14, 1983 counseling session, plaintiff was again advised she had been observed by a "ghost rider." This observer reported plaintiff was sitting in "seat 5B conversing with passenger [in seat] 5A from 2:58 pm until 3:41 pm, a total of 43 [minutes]," while other passengers were left unattended. The contention was not true, since no passenger occupied seat 5A on this flight and plaintiff had saved the documentation to prove it.

Plaintiff alleged subjection to harassment on other occasions as well. She was called into the office unexpectedly for "off the record" discussions and interrogations. Also, she and her husband were telephoned at home a number of times.

Plaintiff claimed the treatment she was exposed to was part of United's campaign to force senior employees out of its workforce and reduce its costs. Plaintiff overheard two supervisors discuss the use of "ghost riders" on the flights of senior attendants as part of the campaign. Two senior flight attendants with 25 years or more experience had been similarly treated and one of them resigned. Plaintiff had six years remaining before full retirement.

Plaintiff testified that the conduct of United and her fellow employees caused her attempted suicide, anxiety, doubts as to her ability, nervous tension, headaches, stomach pains, back aches, and neck aches. Her career was severely damaged by destruction of her working relationship with management. Plaintiff's flying partners became nervous because they knew she was "targeted" for surveillance by management. The harassment caused her to relinquish her position as first flight attendant which cost her approximately $200 a month in income.

Plaintiff filed a grievance with the Systems Board of Adjustment as provided for in the Collective Bargaining Agreement between United and the Association of Flight Attendants. The grievance process was still pending when she filed the instant action.

Discussion

Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in determining that her first through ninth causes of action are barred by the provisions of the Railway Labor Act (RLA).

The Railway Labor Act, 45 United States Code section 151, et seq., governs the employment relationship between airlines engaged in interstate commerce and their employees. ¹ A primary purpose of the RLA is to provide uniform regulations applicable to the industry nationwide. In referring to congressional considerations relating to this legislation, the Supreme Court in California v. Taylor (1957) 353 U.S. 553, at pages 567-568, footnote 15, 77 S.Ct. 1037, 1045-46, 1 L.Ed.2d 1034, quoted from the report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce: " 'Railroads and airlines are direct instrumentalities of interstate commerce; the Railway Labor Act requires collective bargaining on a system-wide basis; agreements are uniformly negotiated for an entire railroad system and regulate the rates of pay, rules of working conditions of employees in many States; ...' (H.R.Rep. No. 2811, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5)."

45 United States Code section 151a itself defines some of the purposes of the RLA: "(4) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions; (5) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." In order to implement these purposes, railroads and airlines have a duty "to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether arising out of the application of such agreements or otherwise." (45 U.S.C., § 152.) Employers also have an obligation to establish a grievance procedure which employers and their employees must follow in resolving employment disputes. Section 153 requires that disputes...