Miller v. United Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 03 October 1952 |
| Citation | 248 P.2d 113,113 Cal.App.2d 493 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | MILLER v. UNITED INS. CO. Civ. 8112. |
Vernon F. Gant, Modesto, for appellant
Nathan B. McVay and C. O. Thrasher, Jr., Modesto, for respondent.
This is an appeal by defendant from a judgment for plaintiff in an action to recover the death benefits payable under an insurance policy issued by defendant to deceased, plaintiff's husband, under which plaintiff was the sole beneficiary.
The facts pertinent to the questions raised show that William R. Miller, husband of plaintiff, while driving his automobile, successfully avoided a collision with another car by turning his car slightly to the left and suddenly applying the brakes. The sudden braking of the car caused him to be thrown forward, apparently striking his chest or side against the steering wheel. In that particular model car the two front seats operate independently in each other. The driver's seat is hinged to the floor at the front end thereof and operates as one unit; so that to gain entrance to the rear seat from the driver's side it is necessary to tilt the entire seat forward, over and against the steering wheel. The hinges are the only means by which the seat is held in place. The front seat on the other side is stationary but the back is hinged, allowing the back to be pushed forward and down.
Mr. Miller made no comment concerning his condition immediately following the accident but after driving approximately one-half block he turned to his wife and said, 'That hurt me * * * I believe it broke my ribs.' She suggested that he see a doctor but he replied, 'No, maybe I'll be all right.' But shortly before reaching home he again complained of pain. When they arrived home Mrs. Miller went into the house. Mr. Miller got out of the car, turned on the water in the yard and likewise went into the house. After entering he exhibited further distress, becoming quite pale and having apparent difficulty with breathing. He then got up from where he was sitting and went out to the front porch. Shortly thereafter plaintiff went out on the porch and found her husband dead.
The testimony of the autopsy surgeon who was called by plaintiff was that one of decedent's lungs was adhered to the wall of his chest, a condition probably caused by a prior injury, and that his death was caused by a hemorrhage from a tear of the bronchi tube. In response to a hypothetical question by plaintiff's counsel, summarizing the undisputed facts surrounding the occurrence, the doctor replied that from the history of the accident given to him the only thing to which he could ascribe the fatal injury was the accident. The mortician who assisted the doctor in performing the autopsy testified that the decedent's lung was completely adhered to the body, and although not qualified, he further testified that a twisting of decedent's body 'in any way' would have caused his death.
No testimony was offered by the defendant. Following the submission of the case, findings were made in favor of plaintiff and judgment was entered accordingly. In particular the court found:
'That it is true that on the 28th day of May, 1949, in the County of Stanislaus, State of California, the said William Roscoe Miller, through accidental means, namely, through the accidental over-turning of the seat of the motor vehicle then and there being driven and operated by said William Roscoe Miller, caused by the sudden swerving and stopping of said vehicle in order to avoid a collision with another vehicle, collided with the inside front portion of said automobile, thereby sustaining bodily injuries, which, independently and exclusively of disease and all other causes, resulted in his death on said 28th day of May, 1949.'
The defendant insurance company, on appeal, sets forth four separate contentions. However, an analysis of such contentions discloses that in fact there are only two: (1) that the decedent was not injured by a peril insured against, and (2) that even assuming that his injury was caused by such a peril his death was not directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injuries sustained by accidental means.
The pertinent clause of the policy in question insures 'against loss resulting directly and independently from all other causes from bodily injuries sustained by accidental means * * * provided, such injury was caused solely by the collision or upset of any passenger automobile, motor but or motor truck (tractors and trailers excepted), while the insured was riding or driving therein, or by being struck knocked down or run over by such motor vehicle; * * *.'
In support of its first contention appellant argues that since the insuring clause was not against the upsetting of the seat but was against 'collision or upset of any passenger automobile * * * while the insured was riding or driving therein' that therefore the finding of the court is not supported by the evidence, and that such finding does not come within the terms of the policy.
Secondly, it argues that the further words of the policy, 'being struck, knocked down or run over by any such motor vehicle' likewise excludes decedent from the provisions thereof. This is true, defendant contends, because the words 'any such motor vehicle' under the terms of the policy must refer to a vehicle other than the one in which the decedent was driving.
In answer to such contention, and in support of the judgment, respondent argues that the meaning of the word 'collision' as used in the policy is not limited to a collision between the car driven by the insured and another vehicle but covers as well a collision between the car so driven and any other object. Hence respondent concludes that since decedent did in fact collide with the steering wheel of the car it was a peril insured against under the policy.
Furthermore respondent argues that if the second clause of the policy, 'struck, knocked down or run over by any such motor vehicle' does not cover such a situation then said clause is ambiguous and must be construed in light of the general rule relative to the construction of insurance contracts.
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