Miller v. United States Fidelity & Casualty Co.

• Decision Date: 06 July 1935
• Citation: 291 Mass. 445,197 N.E. 75
• Parties: MILLER v. UNITED STATES FIDELITY & CASUALTY CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

291 Mass. 445

197 N.E. 75

MILLER v. UNITED STATES FIDELITY & CASUALTY CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

July 6, 1935

Exceptions from Superior Court, Essex County; Burns, Judge.

Action of contract by Herbert A. Miller against the United States Fidelity & Casualty Company. The trial court found for the defendant, and plaintiff brings exceptions.

Reversed and rendered.

E. C. Jacobs and R. W. Reeve, both of Lynn, for plaintiff.

J. N Clark, of Boston, for defendant.

QUA Justice.

The defendant issued to the plaintiff a motor vehicle liability policy which contained provisions for extra-territorial liability and property damage, by the terms of which the defendant agreed to pay all sums which the assured should ‘ become liable to pay as damages imposed upon him by law for bodily injury accidentally sustained by any person or persons,’ if caused by the ownership, maintenance or use of the motor vehicle described in the policy within the limits of the continental United States.^[1]

There was evidence which, taken most favorably to the defendant, tended to show the following facts: While the policy was in force and while the plaintiff was operating the insured automobile on a narrow road in the State of Georgia, a heated altercation arose between the plaintiff and one Link, who was riding in another automobile, over the manner in which the Link automobile had passed the plaintiff's automobile. After both vehicles had proceeded some distance, the plaintiff drove past the Link automobile at a speed of fifty miles an hour and intentionally turned to the right in front of it. There was no collision, but as a result of the plaintiff's conduct, the driver of the Link automobile was frightened and lost control of the automobile, which in consequence ran up an embankment and overturned, causing personal injuries to Link and to one Armstrong, the driver of the Link automobile.

Actions against the plaintiff were brought in the State of Florida by Link and by Armstrong. The plaintiff duly notified the defendant to defend the actions according to the terms of the policy, but the defendant refused to do so. These actions resulted in judgments against the plaintiff, the amount of which he has paid. The present action is brought to secure indemnity for the sum so paid and for the expenses of defending these Florida actions and for the expenses of defending certain other similar actions in Florida arising out of the same occurrence, but in which the verdicts were in favor of the present plaintiff.

It is agreed that if the plaintiff is entitled to recover he shall have judgment in the amount of $3,115 plus costs.

The bill of exceptions states that the trial judge justifiably found that the plaintiff drove his automobile toward and in front of the Link automobile, intending to frighten its occupants, but not intending to inflict any harm upon them, and that he was guilty of recklessness. He ruled that the plaintiff's loss was not within the terms of the policy and found for the defendant. We assume that if the facts found by the trial judge were to govern the result of the case, his ruling would have been right. Sontag v. Galer, 279 Mass. 309, 181 N.E. 182, and cases cited.

But the declarations in the Florida actions are based solely upon the ground that the plaintiffs in those actions were injured by the negligence of the plaintiff in this action. Nowhere is it stated that the injuries were caused by an assault or by an intentional or willful act. In the absence of anything in any form to indicate the contrary, it must be assumed that the law of Florida is the same as the law of this Commonwealth. Kelley v. Kelley, 161 Mass. 111, 36 N.E. 837,25 L.R.A. 806, 42 Am.St.Rep. 389; Atlantic Transportation Co., Inc., v. Alexander Shipping Co., Inc., 261 Mass. 1, 8, 157 N.E. 725; Lennon v. Cohen, 264 Mass. 414, 420, 163 N.E. 63; Richards v. Richards, 270 Mass. 113, 117, 169 N.E. 891; Seemann v. Eneix, 272 Mass. 189, 194, 172 N.E. 243. It must now be taken as fully settled in this Commonwealth that negligence and willful and wanton conduct are so different in kind that words properly descriptive of the one commonly exclude the other. Aiken v. Holyoke Street Railway Co., 184 Mass. 269, 68 N.E. 238; Altman v. Aronson, 231 Mass. 588, 121 N.E. 505, 4 A.L.R. 1185; Cotter v. Boston, Revere Beach & Lynn Railroad Co., 237 Mass. 68, 72,192 N.E. 426; Prondecka v. Turners Falls Power & Electric Co., 238 Mass. 239, 130 N.E. 386; Adamowicz v. Newburyport Gas & Electric Co., 238 Mass. 244, 130 N.E. 388; McIntyre v. Converse, 238 Mass. 592, 131 N.E. 198; Foynes v. New York Central Railroad, 276 Mass. 89, 177 N.E. 119. A plaintiff cannot recover for willful and wanton conduct on a count which alleges only negligence. In effect this was decided in Cotter v. Boston, Revere Beach & Lynn Railroad Co., 237 Mass. 68, 72, 129 N.E. 426, where it was held that a question to the jury as to whether the acts of the defendant were wanton and reckless was inapplicable to the issue raised by a count alleging negligence. As the verdicts and judgments in the Florida cases are presumably based upon the declarations, at least in the absence of any evidence to the contrary (see Waterhouse v. Levine, 182 Mass. 407, 65 N.E. 822; People v. Public Service Commission, 255 N.Y. 232, 174 N.E. 637; Prisant v. Feingold, 169 Ga. 864, 867, 151 S.E. 799), it follows that on the present record the plaintiff has been held liable in Florida for negligence and not for intentional or willful conduct (Stefus v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 111 N. J. Law, 6, 166 A. 339).

It is not contended and could not be contended successfully that bodily injury resulting from negligence is not ‘ accidentally sustained’ as those words are used in the policy. H. P. Hood & Sons v. Maryland Casualty Co., 206 Mass. 223, 224, 92 N.E. 329,30 L.R.A. (N. S.) 1192, 138 Am.St.Rep. 379. See Henderson v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 262 Mass. 522, 525, 160 N.E. 415, 56 A.L.R. 1088; Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 232 N.Y. 161, 133 N.E. 432, 19 A.L.R. 876. It is common knowledge that protection against liability on the ground of negligence is the principal purpose of such plicies.

The grounds on which liability has been imposed upon the insured are to be determined from an investigation into the matters decided in the action which established that liability and not from facts subsequently developed in an action by the insured against the insurer. This is clear from the language of the policy itself wherein the defendant agreed to pay, not such damages as might be imposed upon the plaintiff for bodily injuries which were in fact accidental, but all sums which the assured should ‘ become...