Miller v. Woodward

• Decision Date: 31 July 1843
• Citation: 8 Mo. 169
• Parties: MILLER v. WOODWARD AND THORNTON, ADMINISTRATORS.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

8 Mo. 169

MILLER

v.WOODWARD AND THORNTON, ADMINISTRATORS.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

July Term, 1843.

ERROR TO RAY CIRCUIT COURT.

P. L. EDWARDS, for Plaintiff. 1. Whenever a security pays the debt of his principal, equity will subrogate the former to all the rights and remedies of the creditor against the latter. Wendall v. Van Renssellaer, 1 Johns. C. R. 343; Wiser v. Blakely and others, ibid., 437; Brown v. Rickets, 3 Johns. C. R. 553; Hays v. Ward, 4 Johns. C. R. 123; Finsley v. Oliver, 5 Munf. 419. 2. After funeral expenses and expenses of last sickness of decedents, the State is a preferred creditor, Rev. St. p. 55, § 1, and a security having paid a debt due from the deceased to the State is entitled to be subrogated to all the benefits of her priority; for the same right of priority which belongs to the government attaches to the claim or individual who, as surety, has paid money to the government. Hunter v. The United States, 5 Peters' R. 172; Hickman v. Hall's Adm'rs, 5 Littell, 338. 3. The only question presented by the record is, whether the State, had she proceeded against the administrators, would have been entitled to priority over other creditors except those of the first and second classes. If so, it follows that all other creditors will be postponed to the surety who has paid the debt at her suit. Parks and others v. The State, 7 Mo. R. 194; see 2 Wheeler's Am. Ch. Dig., title Principal and Surety, p. 486. 4. The complainant was entitled to a decree, for assets might yet come to hands of the administrators: surely he cannot be prevented from establishing his claim.

DUNN, for Defendants. 1. A court of equity has, in general, no jurisdiction where a plain, adequate and complete remedy exists at law. Mitf. Ch. Pl. 26, note; Rev. St. p. 155, § 8. 2. The complainant should have presented his demand for allowance to the County Court. Rev. St. p. 55, art. 4. 3. The priority given to the State in the administration of the assets of the estate is a plain legal right. Rev. St. p. 55, § 1. 4. The State must have enforced that right at law, and if the complainant, upon the payment of the money, occupies the same ground, his remedy is at law. 5. The creditors whose demands have been allowed by the County Court have a vested legal interest in the estate, which it would be inequitable to take from them. 6. The complainant having failed to exhibit his claim for allowance within three years, his remedy at law is barred by the statute of limitations. Rev. St. p. 55, § 2. 7. And although the statutes of limitations are, in their terms, applicable to corts of law only, yet equity acts by analogy to the rules of law, and this court will refuse relief. 1 Story's Eq. p. 73, § 55; 3 Marsh. R. 223. 8. It will not take a case out of the statute that the cause of action did not come to the knowledge of the party until the limitation had expired. 5 Mo. R. 454. 9. It was the duty of the complainant to have looked after his principal, and if he was apprehensive of loss, to have sought relief from future liability. Rev. Code, 575; 7 Mo. R. 196. 10. As soon as the collector made default, the complainant, his security, could have compelled the State to collect the debt from the principal. 1 Story's Eq. p. 322, § 327. 11. If the complainant is entitled to the priority which the State held, still the maxim, nullum tempus occurrit reipublicœ, is applicable to the State only. Balantine on Limitations, 18; 4 Bibb's R. 62; 9 Wheat. R. 737.

NAPTON, J.

This was a bill in chancery, filed by the plaintiff in error against Woodward & Thornton, administrators of the estate of William W. Mauzey, deceased, and John S. Wilkerson, James S. Ball, and others, creditors of said estate. The bill alleges, that in the year 1836, the complainant, in connection with three others, became securities in a collector's bond for William W. Mauzey, in the penal sum of ten thousand dollars, conditioned for the faithful performance of his duties in that office; that, in 1837, Mauzey died intestate, and defendants, Woodward & Thornton, administered upon his estate; that the greater portion of the assets were yet in the hands of said administrators, and no final settlement had been made; that the estate is insolvent, and will not pay fifty cents on the dollar on the demands against it; that the County Court of Ray county had ordered distribution of such moneys as were in the hands of said administrators to be made among, the creditors, paying on all debts in class No. 5, thirty-seven and a half cents on the dollar. The bill further charges, that in April, 1841, suit was instituted by the State of Missouri against the complainant and other securities of Mauzey, on said collector's bond, and judgment obtained for two hundred and sixty-four dollars, which suit was not commenced until more than three years had elapsed from the date of the letters of administration. The bill charges, that complainant paid the whole amount of this judgment, and that his co-securities are insolvent. The bill prays for an injunction restraining the administrators from making distribution, and that they be decreed to pay over to complainant the amount paid by him to the State. To this bill defendants demurred generally; the demurrer was sustained by the Circuit Court.

How far courts of chancery in this State have original jurisdiction in matters relating to the administration of estates, is a question which the various and apparently conflicting provisions of our statutes have very much embarrassed.

The subject was very much investigated by this court in the case of Erwin v. Henry, 5 Mo. R. 473,^(a) and a majority of the court in that case, in construing the fifteenth section of the act to establish Courts of Record, and prescribe their power and duties, determined, that the words “exclusive original jurisdiction,” should not be extended beyond the first clause of that section, and consequently inferred that Courts of Chancery and the County Courts had concurrent jurisdiction in the cases enumerated in the remaining clauses of the section. This appears to have been a hasty and unwarranted reading of the section.

That section embodies in its twelve clauses the various powers and duties of the County Court; it declares that this court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all the matters detailed in the first six clauses, concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit Court in the cases enumerated in the seventh clause, and exclusive original jurisdiction, or (to use more appropriate phraseology) power to perform the various acts specified in the five last clauses. This is plain by a proper grammatical construction of the section, which requires the words, exclusive original jurisdiction,” to be understood in all the clauses except the seventh (where the words, “concurrent jurisdiction.” are used), and is made plainer by reference to the act in the Revised Code of 1825, in pari inateria. The provision, as it stands in the Revised Code of 1835, is substantially a copy of the former law: with a view to brevity and perspicuity, it is merely divided into clauses, and its phraseology slightly altered.

The section, as it is found in the Revised Code of 1825, is thus: “The several courts of probate shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases relative to the probate of last wills and testaments, the granting letters testamentary and of administration, and repealing the same, appointing or displacing guardians of orphans, minors, and persons of unsound mind, in binding out apprentices, in the settlement and allowance of accounts of executors, administrators, and guardians; to hear and determine all disputes and controversies whatsoever in relation to wills, the right of executorship, administration or guardianship, or respecting the duties or accounts of executors, administrators, or guardians, and disputes and controversies between masters and their apprentices: to hear and determine all suits and other proceedings instituted against executors and administrators, upon any demand against the estate of their testator or intestate, when such demand shall not exceed two hundred dollars, and concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit Court, where the demand shall exceed that sum, subject to appeal in all cases, &c. they shall have power to amend process, and cause to come before them,” &c., proceeding to enumerate the matters specified in the eighth and subsequent clauses of the fifteenth section of the act of 1835. It will be seen, that there is no essential difference between the two sections, except as to the amount necessary to give jurisdiction to the Circuit Court. and the verbal alterations appear to have been solely with a view to classify and to strip the act of verbiage. A comparison of the two acts places, we think, bey ond all reasonable doubt, the inference, that the Legislature, in adopting the phraseology of the act of 1835, had no intention of substantially altering the distribution of the subjects of jurisdiction appertaining to the County Court, and that, consequently, that court was invested with exclusive original jurisdiction in all the cases enumerated in that section, except the seventh.

So far, then, as the fifteenth section of this statute is concerned, there appears to be no difficulty in establishing the nature and extent of the jurisdiction of the County Court. But the sixth clause of the eighth section of the same act gives to the Circuit Court “a general control over executors, administrators, guardians, minors, idiots, lunatics, and persons of unsound mind,” and they are directed to proceed therein according to the rules, usages, and practice of courts of equity.” This is a very indefinite grant of power, or definition of jurisdiction, and it must be confessed, that to fix upon it a proper and reasonable construction, is not without its difficulties. If the section were alone on the statute book, and disconnected from the fifteenth section heretofore alluded...