Millers Cas. Ins. Co., of Texas v. Briggs

• Decision Date: 30 June 1983
• Docket Number: No. 48731-6,48731-6
• Citation: 665 P.2d 891,100 Wn.2d 1
• Parties: MILLERS CASUALTY INSURANCE CO., OF TEXAS, Appellant, v. James A. BRIGGS, a single person, Myrtle Briggs, a single person and James A. Summers, as guardian for Milo Summers, an incompetent, Respondents, Pemco Insurance Company, a Washington corporation, Defendant.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 1

100 Wn.2d 1

665 P.2d 891

MILLERS CASUALTY INSURANCE CO., OF TEXAS, Appellant, v. James A. BRIGGS, a single person, Myrtle Briggs, a single person and James A. Summers, as guardian for Milo Summers, an incompetent, Respondents Pemco Insurance Company, a Washington corporation, Defendant.

No. 48731-6.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

June 30, 1983.

Brooks & Larson, James E. Davis, Yakima, for appellant.

Raekes, Rettig, Osborne, Forgette & Brecke, Diehl R. Rettig, Kennewick, Carroll, Chvatal & Heye, John G. Carroll, Richland, for respondents.

Wash. Ass'n of Defense Counsel, William J. Rush, Tacoma, for appellant, amici curiae.

Wash. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, Gary N. Bloom, Bryan P. Harnetiaux, Spokane, for respondents, amici curiae.

DIMMICK, Justice.

This interpleader action was brought by Millers Casualty Insurance Company of Texas (Millers) to determine the limits of its liability under an automobile insurance policy. ¹ Passengers in a car involved in a 1-car accident sought coverage under both the liability and underinsured motorist provisions of an insurance policy insuring the host vehicle. The policy, issued by Millers, excluded the insured vehicle from the definition of an underinsured vehicle. The policy provided protection to the passengers under the liability provisions only. The trial court held that the exclusion was against public policy and violated the underinsured motorist statute, RCW 48.22.030, and ordered Millers to pay the full limits of both the liability and underinsured motorist coverages. We reverse.

Michael Legg, while intoxicated, was driving a vehicle owned by his stepfather. He was involved in a single-car accident. One passenger in the car, Jimmy Briggs, was killed, and another, Milo Summers, was permanently and seriously injured. The vehicle was insured by Millers. The policy provided liability coverage in the amount of $60,000, and underinsured motorist coverage also in the amount of $60,000. The policy defined an "underinsured motor vehicle" as

an automobile ... with respect to the ownership, maintenance, or use ... to which a bodily injury liability ... policy applies at the time of the accident but its limit is not enough to pay the full amount the injured person is legally entitled to recover as damages....

The policy provided further that an "underinsured motor vehicle" shall not include:

(1) an insured automobile or an automobile furnished for the regular use of the named insured or a relative, unless the named insured or relative was neither operating nor occupying such vehicle at the time of the accident;

* * *

(4) an automobile or trailer to which the liability coverage of this policy applies.

Summers' father filed a claim with Millers. Millers, believing Briggs' family would do the same, brought this interpleader action. Millers deposited with the court $60,000, the limit of the policy's liability coverage. Summers and Briggs (hereinafter referred to as respondents) argued that Millers was also liable pursuant to the underinsured motorist provisions of the policy and must deposit an additional $60,000 with the court. Millers argued that the policy prevented this dual recovery. The trial court ordered Millers to pay the additional $60,000.

Millers provides underinsured motorist coverage pursuant to RCW 48.22.030 and .040. RCW 48.22.030, originally adopted in 1967, required that all new automobile liability insurance policies provide coverage "for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles". (Italics ours.) Laws of 1967, ch. 150, § 27, p. 738. In 1980 the Legislature amended RCW 48.22.030. Pursuant to this new statute, insurers are required to offer underinsured motorist coverage, although their clients may choose not to purchase it. RCW 48.22.030(4). Underinsured motorist coverage is designed to provide protection against not only damages caused by uninsured vehicles but also underinsured vehicles. An underinsured vehicle is defined by the statute as a vehicle with respect to which the sum of liability limits "applicable to a covered person after an accident is less than the applicable damages which the covered person is legally entitled to recover." RCW 48.22.030(1) ² The statute requires that

No new policy or renewal of an existing policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death or property damage suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle shall be issued with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles....

(Italics ours.) RCW 48.22.030(2). This coverage, like uninsured motorist coverage, is a first party coverage that individuals may purchase to protect themselves against other drivers. Additionally, the statute allows insurers to include provisions limiting coverage to liability for one accident regardless of the number of persons or vehicles involved and provisions preventing an injured person from stacking policies. RCW 48.22.030(5) and (6). These statutory exceptions implicitly overrule two of our rulings interpreting the uninsured statute. Federated Am. Ins. Co. v. Raynes, 88 Wash.2d 439, 563 P.2d 815 (1977); Cammel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 86 Wash.2d 264, 543 P.2d 634 (1975).

Respondents contend that RCW 48.22.030 mandates that they be able to collect under both the liability and underinsured motorist provisions of the policy insuring the vehicle. They argue, therefore, that Millers' restriction which does not allow this dual recovery violates the statute. Their conclusion is based on a very narrow interpretation of the statute. They maintain that since the Legislature set forth several permissible exceptions, and did not expressly allow the insurer to restrict the definition of an underinsured vehicle as Millers' policy does, the restriction is invalid. We disagree.

A basic goal of all statutory construction is to carry out the intent of the Legislature. State v. Waleczek, 90 Wash.2d 746, 585 P.2d 797 (1978). Legislative history is nonexistent with respect to this particular issue. This lack of history is undoubtedly due to the fact that the situation never arose under the former uninsured motorist statute. In fact, it could not arise under that statute because if the involved vehicle had liability insurance, it could not also be an uninsured vehicle. Strunk v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 90 Wash.2d 210, 580 P.2d 622 (1978).

To determine the intent of our legislation we are guided by the reasoning of the Louisiana State Supreme Court, the only court to interpret a statute which in all pertinent respects is identical to ours. The facts in Breaux v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 369 So.2d 1335 (La.1979), are similar to those in the present case. It involved a 1-car accident wherein a passenger was killed. The estate of the guest passenger settled with the host driver's insurer in the amount of the host's liability coverage only. The passenger's estate then sued the guest's own insurer under the un(der)insured ³ motorist provisions of that policy. The guest's insurer argued that it was not liable until the host's insurer also paid the limits of its un(der)insured motorist coverage. The host's insurer refused to pay relying on a provision in its policy which excluded the host vehicle from the definition of an un(der)insured automobile. The court held that this restriction was not in derogation of the statute's requirements. The court held:

In our view, the intent and effect of this provision is plain. A person insured under the uninsured motorist provision of a particular policy delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to a motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state must establish that he is legally entitled to recover damages from the owners or operators of uninsured or underinsured motor vehicles in order to obtain coverage thereunder. As to coverage under the uninsured motorist provisions of a particular policy, the statute thus contemplates two distinct motor vehicles: the motor vehicle with respect to which uninsured motorist coverage is issued and the "uninsured or underinsured" motor vehicle. In addition, as to each policy containing uninsured motorist coverage, the statute distinguishes between the person insured under the policy in question and the owner or operator of the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle.

(Italics...