Millette v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corrs.
| Decision Date | 17 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 8:18-cv-2232-WFJ-SPF |
| Parties | REYNALDO MILLETTE, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Reynaldo Millette, pro se
Mr Millette, a Florida prisoner, initiated this action by filing a petition for the writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C § 2254 (Doc. 1) challenging convictions for first-degree murder, robbery, and false imprisonment. Respondent filed a response opposing the petition (Doc. 6) to which Petitioner replied (Doc. 11). Upon consideration, the petition will be denied.
Mr. Millette had been staying at the Siesta Inn but was told to leave by the victim (the proprietor of the motel) (Doc. 15-2, Ex. 29, docket pp. 58-59). He and the victim had an argument, and the police were called (Id., docket p. 59). As Mr. Millette was leaving, he said he was going to get his money back (Id., docket p. 60). A few days later, the victim was found dead at the Siesta Inn's front office from blunt trauma to his head (Doc. 6-2, Ex. 1, docket pp. 15-16). Because the victim's wallet and money from the office were missing, it was apparent he was killed during a robbery (Id.). During the robbery and homicide, the victim's mother was bound with duct tape (Id.). Petitioner Millette's DNA (and not the co-defendant's) was discovered on two pieces of the duct tape. His co-defendant's, Benjamin Rogers, DNA was found under the victim's fingernails and on the door of the motel office (Id.).[1] The evidence was that Petitioner and his co-defendant were acquaintances.
At the conclusion of his trial, Mr. Millette was found guilty of first-degree felony murder, robbery, and false imprisonment (Id., docket pp. 121-22). He was sentenced to life in prison (Id., docket pp. 147-53).[2] His convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal (Doc. 6-6, Ex. 6).
Mr. Millette, through counsel, filed a motion under Rule 3.850, Fla.R.Crim.P., alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel (Id., Ex. 11). He filed an amended Rule 3.850 motion (id., Ex. 12), and a second amended motion (Id., Ex. 14). Grounds 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, and 8 were summarily denied (Id., Ex. 28), and Grounds 3 and 5 were denied following an evidentiary hearing (Id., Ex. 25). The denial of the second amended Rule 3.850 motion was affirmed on appeal (Id., Ex. 26).
Mr. Millette filed his federal habeas petition in this Court alleging ten grounds for relief (Doc. 1).
Because Mr. Millette filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001); Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 889-90 (11th Cir. 2003). The AEDPA “establishes a more deferential standard of review of state habeas judgments, ” Fugate v. Head, 261 F.3d 1206, 1215 (11th Cir. 2001), in order to “prevent federal habeas ‘retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002); see also Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) ().
Under the AEDPA, habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The phrase “clearly established Federal law, ” encompasses only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court “as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).
“[S]ection 2254(d)(1) provides two separate bases for reviewing state court decisions; the ‘contrary to' and ‘unreasonable application' clauses articulate independent considerations a federal court must consider.” Maharaj v. Secretary for Dep't of Corr., 432 F.3d 1292, 1308 (11th Cir. 2005). The meaning of the clauses was discussed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 835 (11th Cir. 2001):
Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the United States Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the United States Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the ‘unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the United States Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
If the federal court concludes that the state court applied federal law incorrectly, habeas relief is appropriate only if that application was “objectively unreasonable.” Id.
Finally, under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if the state court's decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” A determination of a factual issue made by a state court, however, shall be presumed correct, and the habeas petitioner shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. See Parker, 244 F.3d at 835-36; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
The United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), established a two-part test for determining whether a convicted person is entitled to relief on the ground that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance: (1) whether counsel's performance was deficient and “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”; and (2) whether the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687-88. A court must adhere to a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689-90. “Thus, a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct.” Id. at 690; Gates v. Zant, 863 F.2d 1492, 1497 (11th Cir. 1989).
As observed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the test for ineffective assistance of counsel:
has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have done. We ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial. Courts also should at the start presume effectiveness and should always avoid second guessing with the benefit of hindsight. Strickland encourages reviewing courts to allow lawyers broad discretion to represent their clients by pursuing their own strategy. We are not interested in grading lawyers' performances; we are interested in whether the adversarial process at trial, in fact, worked adequately.
White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220-21 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). Under those rules and presumptions, “the cases in which habeas petitioners can properly prevail on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel are few and far between.” Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th Cir. 1994).
Before a district court can grant habeas relief to a state prisoner under § 2254, the petitioner must exhaust all state court remedies that are available for challenging his conviction, either on direct appeal or in a state post-conviction motion. See § 2254(b)(1)(A); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999) (“[T]he state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition.”). A state prisoner “‘must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process,' including review by the state's court of last resort, even if review in that court is discretionary.” Pruitt v. Jones, 348 F.3d 1355, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845.)
To exhaust a claim, a petitioner must make the state court aware of both the legal and factual bases for his claim. See Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 1998) () (quoting Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (alteration in original)). A federal habeas petitioner “shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State...if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.” Pruitt, 348 F.3d at 1358. The prohibition against raising an unexhausted claim in federal court extends to both the broad legal theory of relief and the specific factual contention that supports relief. Kelley v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1344 (11th Cir. 2004).
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