Milligan v. Ahlin
Decision Date | 21 October 2011 |
Docket Number | 2: 08 - cv - 2766 - MCE TJB |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Parties | TIMOTHY L. MILLIGAN, Petitioner, v. PAM AHLIN, Respondent. |
Petitioner, Timothy L. Milligan, is under an order of civil commitment and is proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner raises the following claims in this federal habeas petition: (1) his due process rights were violated in that the "standardized assessment protocol" used to evaluate him for civil commitment was "an illegal underground regulation" ("Claim I"); (2) his due process and equal protection rights were violated when the state appellate court falsely held the psychological evaluations were to be used only to keep meritless civil commitment petitions from reaching trial ("Claim II"); (3) the Sexual Violent Predator Act (SVPA) 2006 amendments unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to Petitioner ("Claim III"); and (4) Petitioner's due process rights were violated when the structured risk assessment instrument used in his case wildly inflated the prediction of Petitioner's re-offense likelihood ("Claim IV"). For the following reasons, the habeas petition should be denied.
After being civilly committed, Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal in December 2007. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on July 16, 2008. Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. On October 22, 2008, the California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition for review. Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court in February 2010. On March 10, 2010, the California Supreme Court denied the state habeas petition citing In re Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 709, 177 P.2d 918 (1947) and In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756, 264 P.2d 513 (1953).
Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition in November 2008. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss arguing that Claims II and IV were unexhausted. On April 20, 2010, Petitioner filed a "Notice of Exhaustion" of his claims. (See Dkt. No. 19.) On April 22, 2010, Magistrate Judge Brennan ordered the Respondent to file an answer to the federal habeas petition in light of Petitioner's representation in his April 20, 2010 filing. Respondent answered the petition on August 18, 2010. The matter was reassigned to the undersigned on July 5, 2011.
An application for writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under judgment of a state court can only be granted for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see also Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860, 861 (9th Cir. 1994); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). Petitioner filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus after April 24, 1996, thus the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") applies. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997). Under AEDPA, federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in the state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). When no state court has reached the merits of a claim, de novo review applies. See Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215, 1221 (9th Cir. 2005).
As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). "'[C]learly established federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.'" Id. (citations omitted). Under the unreasonable application clause, a federal habeas court making the unreasonable application inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was "objectively unreasonable." See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000). Thus, Id. at 411. Although only Supreme Courtlaw is binding on the states, Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court decision is an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2003) ().
In Claim I, Petitioner argues that he was denied due process of law when the "standardized assessment protocol" used to evaluate and try him for civil commitment was "an underground regulation." (Pet'r's Pet. at p. 5.) The last reasoned state court decision on this Claim was from the California Court of Appeal which stated the following:
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