Millmine v. Harris
| Decision Date | 15 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | C/A NO. 3:10-1595-CMC |
| Parties | Tammy Rene Millmine as Personal Representative of the Estate of Billy Frank Cornett, Jr., and in her individual capacity, Plaintiff, v. Major James Harris, Lt. Kevin Jones, Sgt. Sheralet Taylor, C/O Mary McElveen, C/O Farish Anderson, John Doe Lexington Correctional Officers 1-5, individually and in their official capacities, Defendants.1 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
On June 24, 2007, Billy Ray Cornett, Jr. (Cornett), son of Plaintiff Tammy Rene Millmine, committed suicide by hanging in a shower stall while he was a pretrial detainee in the Lexington County Detention Center. Plaintiff, in her capacity as Cornett's Personal Representative, brought suit in this court, alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as several state law claims.
This matter is before the court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff has responded in opposition, and Defendants have replied. On February 21, 2012, this court held oral argument regarding Defendants' motion, and the parties thereafter supplemented the record. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion forsummary judgment. This matter shall proceed to trial on the question of whether Defendants McElveen and Anderson were deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of Cornett.2
Summary judgment should be granted if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). It is well established that summary judgment should be granted "only when it is clear that there is no dispute concerning either the facts of the controversy or the inferences to be drawn from those facts." Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Properties, 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987).
The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and the court must view the evidence before it and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
Rule 56(c)(1) provides as follows:
A party "cannot create a genuine [dispute] through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another." Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985). Therefore, "[m]ere unsupported speculation . . . is not enough to defeat a summary judgment motion." Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1995).
At the time of his suicide on June 24, 2007, Cornett was a pretrial detainee in the custody of the Lexington County Detention Center (LCDC). Pretrial detainees are entitled to at least the same protection under the Fourteenth Amendment as are convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment. City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 243 44 (1983); Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567 (4th Cir. 2001). Therefore, even though Plaintiff's complaint speaks in terms of violation of the Eighth Amendment, the applicable constitutional provision is the Fourteenth Amendment. The standard for evaluation of Plaintiff's claims, however, is the same. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998) (); Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999) (); Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 34 (4th Cir. 1990) ().
In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Supreme Court held that prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they are deliberately indifferent to serious medical needs of prisoners. See 429 U.S. at 104 05. However, the court did not define the term "deliberate indifference."
In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), the Supreme Court defined "deliberate indifference" and set forth the framework for analysis of claims of deliberate indifference. First, to violate the Constitution, an alleged deprivation must be "objectively, sufficiently serious." Id. at 834. "A substantial risk of suicide is certainly the type of 'serious harm' that is contemplated by the first prong of Farmer." Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 389 (4th Cir. 2001) ();3 Buffington v. Baltimore County, Md., 913 F.2d 113, 120 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (same).
Second, an official must have "a sufficiently culpable state of mind. " Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal quotations omitted). The requisite state of mind is "deliberate indifference." See id.In Farmer, the Supreme Court expressly equated the "deliberate indifference" standard with the "subjective recklessness" standard of criminal law. See id. at 839-40; see also Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 2004) (same). "True subjective recklessness requires knowledge both of the general risk, and also that the conduct is inappropriate in light of that risk." Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 340 n.2 (4th Cir. 1997).
To be deliberately indifferent, "the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk [to inmate health or safety] exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. "[I]t is enough [to establish liability] that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk [to inmate health or safety]." Id. at 842. "Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, . . . and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk [to inmate health or safety] from the very fact that the risk was obvious." Id.
However, "that a trier of fact may infer knowledge from the obvious . . . does not mean that it must do so." Id. at 844. Additionally, an official "who actually [knows] of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if [he] responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm was not ultimately averted." Id. That is, "[w]hether one puts it in terms of duty or deliberate indifference, prison officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable" for a constitutional violation. Id.
A prison official is also not liable if he "knew the underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent." Id. "[T]he failure to alleviate a significant risk that [the official] should have perceived, but did not isinsufficient to show deliberate indifference." Domino v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotation and citation omitted).
Plaintiff names Defendants "John Doe Lexington County Correctional Officers 1-5." A plaintiff may name "John Doe" as a defendant when the identity of a defendant is unknown. However, a district court is not required "to wait indefinitely" for a plaintiff to provide a defendant's true identity to the court. Glaros v. Perse, 628 F.2d 679, 685 (1st Cir. 1980). Plaintiff has had sufficient time to identify all the defendants in this action yet has failed to identify any John Doe defendants. Therefore, Defendants "John Doe Lexington County Correctional Officers 1-5" are dismissed from this action without prejudice.
Additionally, Plaintiff names Defendant Major James Harris. There is no evidence that Harris was ever served with a summons and complaint, nor has he made any appearance in this matter. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Harris is dismissed from this action without prejudice.
Plaintiff offers no argument to counter Defendants' position that Defendants Lt. Kevin Jones and Sgt. Sheralet Taylor should be dismissed from this action with prejudice as they were not present at the time of Cornett's suicide.4 It is well-settled that in order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of rights. Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977). Additionally, to state a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must show that Cornett suffered a specific injury as a result of specific conduct ofa defendant, and an affirmative link between the injury and that conduct. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, (1976). Further, vicarious liability theories such as respondeat superior are not available in § 1983 actions. Vinnedge, 550 F.3d at 928. Therefore, Defendants Lt. Kevin Jones and...
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