MILLS v. DAILEY

• Decision Date: 03 July 2008
• Docket Number: 2060807.
• Citation: 38 So.3d 731
• Parties: Lisa R. MILLS v. Robert F. DAILEY.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

38 So.3d 731

Lisa R. MILLS

v.Robert F. DAILEY.

2060807.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

July 3, 2008.

David P. Shepherd, Fairhope, for appellant.

D. Robert Stankoski, Jr., and Joshua P. Myrick of Stankoski, L.L.P., Fairhope, for appellee.

THOMAS, Judge.

Lisa R. Mills (“the mother”) and Robert F. Dailey (“the father”) were divorced in 1987. They had two children, whose physical custody was vested in the mother. Pursuant to an agreement between the parties to remedy omissions in the divorce judgment, the parties agreed that any noncovered medical, dental, optical, and orthodontic expenses (hereinafter referred to as “medical expenses”) for the children would be divided equally; the agreement stated that the father would pay his half of any such expense upon presentment to him by the wife of the bill or receipt evidencing the expense. The father did not pay the medical expenses as required by the parties' agreement, and, in 1990, the mother secured a judgment incorporating the terms of the parties' agreement and ordering the father to pay an unspecified amount of medical expenses upon the mother's presentment of receipts evidencing those expenses. That judgment also required the father to maintain health insurance on the children; the father's premium for health-insurance coverage was used in computing his child-support obligation.

In September 2005, the mother petitioned for a modification of the divorce judgment, seeking postminority educational support for the parties' younger child; in that petition, she also sought reimbursement for an unspecified amount of unpaid medical expenses and reimbursement for nine years of insurance premiums she had paid because, she alleged, the father had informed her that he could no longer cover the children with health insurance. The father answered the petition, denied owing any medical expenses or premiums, and asserted the defenses of laches, waiver, and estoppel. ¹ After several continuances by the court, the case was tried on March 2, 2007.

At trial, the mother testified that she had sent receipts evidencing the children's medical expenses to the father between 1990 and 1992 to no avail. She said that, at that point, she stopped mailing receipts to the father. The father, for his part, denied receiving any receipts evidencing medical expenses incurred on behalf of the children. The father admitted that, during the years between 1990 and 1997, he received statements from his insurance company indicating that the insurance company had received and/or paid a claim for one or both of the children. The father also admitted that, after 1999, he no longer covered the children with health insurance because of his divorce from his second wife. The father testified that, because the mother had insured the children through her second husband's employer from 1997 to 2005, he had not received any statements regarding insurance claims for his children's medical expenses during those years.

The trial court awarded the mother the medical expenses for which she produced receipts for the years between 1990 and 1992. Because the mother admitted that she had not provided the father receipts evidencing the children's medical expenses after 1992, and because the mother admitted that she had not asked the father to reimburse her for the insurance premiums after the insurance the father had had on the children lapsed in 1999 (although she testified that she had twice asked for such reimbursement in the years between 1997 and 1999), the trial court, relying on the doctrine of laches, declined to award the mother those expenses. The mother appeals.

The mother argues that the doctrine of laches should not be applied to bar her from recovering the medical expenses that the father was required to pay pursuant to the parties' agreement amending the divorce judgment because, she asserts, the mere passage of time without evidence of prejudice to the father resulting from the delay is insufficient to establish the defense. The father argues otherwise, stressing that the mother knew that she had a right to reimbursement of one-half of the medical expenses incurred on behalf of the children, provided that she sent the father receipts evidencing those medical expenses, and that she admittedly did not send the father any receipts, sat on her rights, and did nothing to recover medical expenses incurred as far back as 1992. Both parties argue on appeal several cases supporting their respective positions.

Many cases have explained the doctrine of laches. As the father points out, some cases have stated that “the principal factors in determining whether to apply the doctrine of laches are acquiescence and lapse of time.” Roden v. Walker, 535 So.2d 130, 132 (Ala.1988). That is, “ ‘[m]ore specifically, [laches] is inexcusable delay in asserting a right; an implied waiver arising from knowledge of existing conditions and an acquiescence in them.’ ” Dunn v. Ponceler, 235 Ala. 269, 276, 178 So. 40, 46 (1937) (quoting 21 Corpus Juris, pp. 210, 211). For example, this court has stated:

“Laches is a doctrine of equity. In speaking of the doctrine, Chief Justice Taney said in the case of McKnight v. Taylor, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 161, 168, 11 L.Ed. 86 (1843):

“ ‘We do not found our judgment upon the presumption of payment; for it is not merely on presumption of payment or in analogy to the statute of limitations that a court of chancery refuses to lend its aid to stale demands. There must be conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence to call into action the powers of the court. In matters of account, where they are not barred by the act of limitations, courts of equity refuse to interfere after a considerable lapse of time, from considerations of public policy, and from the difficulty of doing entire justice, when the original transactions have become obscure by the lapse of time and the evidence may be lost.’

“The above quotation appeared in the opinion of the Alabama Supreme Court in the case of Salmon, Administrator v. Wynn, Administrator, 153 Ala. 538 [, 544], 45 So. 133[, 134] (1907), and was repeated in that court's opinion in Creel v. Baggett Transportation Co., 284 Ala. 47[, 50], 221 So.2d 683 [, 686] (1969). The court in Creel also repeated other statements and quotations from Salmon such as:

“ ‘ The principle [principal] foundations of the doctrine are acquiescence and lapse of time. But other circumstances will be taken into consideration. Thus it is material circumstance that the claim is not made until after the death of him who could have explained the transaction. (Citations omitted.) It has been well said by Davis, J., in McQuiddy v. Ware, 20 Wall. (U.S.) 14, 19, 22 L.Ed. 311 [ (1873) ]: “There is no artificial rule on such a subject, but each case as it arises must be determined by its own particular circumstances.” In other words, it would seem that the question is addressed to the sound discretion of the chancellor in each case.’ ”

Williamson v. Shoults, 423 So.2d 874, 876 (Ala.Civ.App.1982) (emphasis on “stale” original; other emphasis added). Thus, the father argues that laches in the present case arises out of the mother's awareness of her duty to supply him receipts and her delay in doing so.

The mother, however, argues that laches does not arise from mere delay but instead requires a showing of prejudice or harm caused by the delay, see, generally, Hankins v. Crane, 979 So.2d 801, 811 (Ala.Civ.App.2007), or a showing that the claim has become “stale” such that, due to the passage of time and loss of evidence, a trial court cannot ascertain the merits of the controversy without engaging in speculation or conjecture. See, generally, Ex parte Grubbs, 542 So.2d 927, 928-29 (Ala.1989). Our supreme court has stated:

“With regard to laches, we quote the following from Hauser v. Foley & Co., 190 Ala. 437, 440, 67 So. 252, 253 [ (1914) ]:

“ ‘ “The true doctrine concerning laches has never been more concisely and accurately stated than in the following language of an able living judge: ‘ Laches, in legal significance, is not mere delay, but delay that works a disadvantage to another. So long as parties are in the same condition, it matters little whether one presses a right promptly or slowly, within limits allowed by law; but when, knowing his rights, he takes no step to enforce them until the condition of the other party has, in good faith, become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the right be then enforced, delay becomes inequitable, and operates as estoppel against the assertion of the right. The disadvantage may come from loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes; but, when a court sees negligence on one side and injury therefrom on the other, it is a ground for denial of relief.’ Stiness, J., in Chase v. Chase, 20 R.I. 202, [203-04,] 37 A. 804, [805 (1897) ].' 5 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 21.

“ ‘ “ Laches, as has been well said, does not, like limitation, grow out of the mere passage of time, but it is founded upon the inequity of permitting the claim to be enforced-an inequity founded upon some change in the condition or relation of the property, or the parties.- Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U.S. 368 [12 S.Ct. 873, 36 L.Ed. 738] [ (1892) ].” First Nat. Bank v. Nelson, 106 Ala. 535, [542,] 18 So. 154[, 155 (1895) ].’ See, also, Wise v. Helms, 252 Ala. 227, 230, 40 So.2d 700[, 702 (1949) ]; Meeks v. Meeks, 251 Ala. 435, 437, 37 So.2d 914[, 916 (1948) ]; Fanning v. Fanning, 210 Ala. 575, 576, 98 So. 804[, 805 (1924) ].”

Sykes v. Sykes, 262 Ala. 277, 281-82, 78 So.2d 273, 277 (1954) (emphasis added).

More recent cases have required the person asserting the defense of laches to show (1) that the claimant delayed in asserting his or her right, (2) that the delay was inexcusable, and (3) that the delay caused the person asserting the defense undue prejudice. Hankins v. Crane, 979 So.2d 801, 811 (Ala.Civ.App.2007). Our supreme...