Mills v. State
| Decision Date | 31 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D20-26, No. 1D20-33, No. 1D20-36, No. 1D20-35,No. 1D20-18,1D20-18 |
| Parties | Karen W. MILLS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. Benjamin D. Camp, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent. Heather A. Nolan-Williams, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent. Arlene O'neill Wilhelm, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent. Marlon Moreno Garcia, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Susan Z. Cohen and David M. Robbins of Epstein & Robbins, Jacksonville, for Petitioners.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Robert "Charlie" Lee, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
Karen W. Mills, Benjamin D. Camp, Heather A. Nolan-Williams, Arlene O'Neill Wilhelm and Marlon Moreno Garcia (Petitioners) seek second-tier certiorari review of a circuit court order denying their petitions for writ of prohibition.1 Petitioners each sought a writ of prohibition after the county court judge assigned to their DUI cases denied their motions for disqualification. Petitioners argued that the county court judge had to disqualify himself after he communicated ex parte with the State Attorney's Office in another DUI case.
Petitioners argued that the county court judge signaled in an email to prosecutors his policy to not accept certain categories of pleas. Because their cases fell within the scope of the alleged policy, Petitioners argued that the county court judge had prejudged their cases and limited the prosecutors’ discretion to negotiate pleas with them. The circuit court disagreed. It found that the county court judge did not establish a policy governing which pleas he would accept in pending or prospective cases. Applying the narrow standard applicable to our review of the circuit court's decision, we deny the petitions because the circuit court afforded due process and violated no clearly established principle of law.
The State charged each of the Petitioners with driving under the influence. Judge Wesley Poole was assigned to Petitioners’ cases. While the cases were pending, the judge emailed the State Attorney's Office, offering his interpretation of a statute governing pleas in DUI cases. The statute, section 316.656, Florida Statutes (2019) is titled "Mandatory adjudication; prohibition against accepting plea to lesser included offense," and provides:
In his email to the State Attorney's Office, Judge Poole shared his view on the limitations the statute places on the court's discretion to accept a plea in a DUI case. He wrote:
Counsel for Petitioners learned about Judge Poole's email when she was negotiating with an assistant state attorney over a plea for a defendant facing a DUI charge in a different case. The assistant state attorney had told Petitioners’ counsel in that other case that there was "no wiggle room" on an adjudication of guilt, as "Judge Poole notified my office that he will not accept reckless pleas without probation ..." and that "Judge Poole ... will require the filing of a reckless driving citation an amended information charging reckless driving prior to accepting any negotiated dispo[sition]."
After learning of these communications, Petitioners moved to disqualify Judge Poole. They each alleged that they had a well-founded fear that they would not receive a fair trial because the judge had prejudged all DUI cases and limited the discretion of the State Attorney's Office in plea negotiations. Petitioners asserted that the judge's email created the appearance "that the Court and the State are part of the same ‘team’ and the Court has an interest in the prosecution of DUI's."
Judge Poole denied the motions to disqualify. He addressed the motions filed by Mills, Nolan-Williams, and Camp (and eight other defendants) in an omnibus order. Judge Poole addressed the motions filed by Garcia and O'Neill Wilhelm in separate orders. In the omnibus order and the order on Garcia's motion, the trial judge cited Bush v. Schiavo , 861 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) and found that "[a] trial court's statement of its interpretation of the law is legally insufficient to create ... a well-founded fear of prejudice or bias, or of not receiving a fair and impartial trial." As to the motion filed by O'Neill Wilhelm, the trial judge did not make the same finding, but denied the motion with a citation to Bush v. Schiavo .
Petitioners then sought writs of prohibition in the circuit court. They argued that the circuit court should quash Judge Poole's order denying disqualification because they alleged a legally sufficient basis to establish an objectively reasonable fear of judicial bias. Petitioners claimed that the email showed that Judge Poole was unwilling to exercise judicial discretion in DUI cases and sought to limit the State Attorney's Office's ability to exercise its prosecutorial discretion.
The circuit court denied the petitions in separate, but nearly identical opinions. First, the court considered whether Petitioners met their burden under Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.330(d)(1) to show that disqualification was required. The circuit court examined whether Petitioners had alleged and shown that they had an objectively reasonable fear that they would not receive a fair trial based on specific allegations of prejudice or bias of the trial judge. The circuit court found that Petitioners did not make the required showing.
As for the claim that Judge Poole's email offering his legal interpretation of section 316.656 created an objectively reasonable fear of bias, the circuit court found:
In formulating that interpretation, Judge Poole did not reference any specific cases pending in his court. Instead, Judge Poole merely offered his general understanding of a particular statute's meaning. Such generic statutory analysis does not demonstrate that Judge Poole has prejudged the facts of all DUI cases or that he has personally adopted a doctrinaire position on DUI charging and sentencing.
And as to Judge Poole's reference to the law review article by Judge Grube, the circuit court similarly concluded that the county court's actions were not sufficient to create an objectively reasonable fear of bias:
Read literally, Judge Poole's e-mail is simply a synopsis of the article's recommendations. Even if one interprets Judge Poole's e-mail as advocating sub silentio that Nassau County adopt Judge Grube's recommendations, such advocacy is at best aspirational. Judge Poole did not mandate that the State Attorney's Office implement the proposed reforms; rather, Judge Poole at most requested the State Attorney's Office to be cognizant of potential best practices in DUI diversion programs.
Petitioners now seek certiorari review of the circuit court's decision denying their petitions for writs of prohibition.
Our supreme court has consistently held that as a case ascends "the judicial ladder, review should become narrower, not broader." See Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs , 658 So. 2d 523, 530 (Fla. 1995). And so, when a district court reviews a decision by a circuit court acting in its appellate capacity, it is not at liberty to conduct a de novo review of the county court's decision two tiers below. See Fla. Parole Comm'n v. Taylor , 132 So. 3d 780, 783 (Fla. 2014). Rather, the scope of review is narrow; the district court considers only whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and applied the correct law, or put differently, departed from the essential requirements of law. See Custer Med. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co. , 62 So. 3d 1086, 1092 (Fla. 2010). Thus, a district court should grant certiorari relief only when the circuit court, acting in its appellate capacity, has violated "a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice." Combs v. State , 436 So. 2d 93, 96 (Fla. 1983).
Petitioners do not allege that the circuit court failed to afford them due process. Instead, they argue that the circuit court did not apply the correct law. We disagree.
The circuit court began its analysis of the prohibition petitions by considering the standards governing disqualification.
The court found that before the county court judge had to disqualify under rule 2.330(d)(1), Petitioners needed to allege facts...
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