Mills v. U.S. Postal Service

• Decision Date: 02 September 1997
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 96-628L.
• Citation: 977 F.Supp. 116
• Parties: William MILLS, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

977 F.Supp. 116

William MILLS, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Defendant.

C.A. No. 96-628L.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

September 2, 1997.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Sean M. McAteer, Cranston, RI, for Plaintiff.

Anthony C. DiGioia, U.S. Atty.'s Office, Providence, RI, (Peter W. Gallaudet, Windsor, CT, of counsel), for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LAGUEUX, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff William Mills ("Mills") brings this complaint under the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 409, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b, against his former employer, the United States Postal Service ("the Postal Service"). Plaintiff argues that he entered into a resignation agreement as a direct result of defendant's coercion and misrepresentations, and that the agreement should therefore be voided. The principal question before this Court is whether Mills can bring an action against the Postal Service before exhausting available administrative remedies.

This matter is presently before the Court on defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.¹ For the following reasons, defendant's motion is granted.

I. Facts

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed. Mills worked for the Postal Service as a mail handler. On March 20, 1995, the Postal Service issued a "Notice of Proposed Removal," notifying Mills of its intention to seek his dismissal.² On April 6, 1995, the Postal Service issued a "Letter of Decision of Adverse Action (Removal)" concluding:

The evidence of record clearly indicates that you have failed to meet the requirements of your position and that you failed to obey a supervisor despite your being made fully aware of your responsibilities in the past through both corrective and progressive actions.

In the same letter, Mills was notified that his termination would become effective as of April 20, 1995.

At a meeting on April 14, 1995, Mills and the Postal Service entered into a last chance agreement ("LCA").³ The LCA afforded Mills the opportunity to continue working for the Postal Service under certain specified conditions. The LCA required, inter alia, that Mills enroll in the Employee Assistance Program ("EAP") for treatment. It was agreed that, if deemed appropriate by an EAP counselor, Mills would begin treatment within ten days of signing the LCA. Mills also was required to undergo random drug screens, the results of which would be reported to his plant manager. In addition, the agreement placed Mills on notice that any violation of the Postal Service Code of Ethical Conduct would be cause for immediate termination.

Mills signed each of the provisions of the LCA. In doing so, he expressly waived his right to appeal any subsequent decisions by his employer, concerning the LCA, or any violation of other applicable Postal Service regulations. Defendant, in turn, agreed to hold Mills' termination in abeyance for twelve months and to do the same with regard to a seven day suspension issued to Mills on November 23, 1994, subject to Mills' compliance with the LCA. If Mills complied with the provisions of the LCA for one year, the termination order would be permanently removed from his record. However, if he did not comply in full, the LCA would be canceled and the termination action would proceed.

On or about February 15, 1996, the Postal Service concluded that Mills had violated the LCA by failing to comply with the EAP program. On February 16, 1996, Mills and his union representative met with representatives of the Postal Service to discuss his alleged LCA violation. Mills was told that his LCA violation would not be reported if he entered into a resignation agreement and, therefore, he would still be eligible to receive disability benefits. Mills subsequently signed a resignation agreement in which he agreed not to seek reinstatement in the Postal Service. Since the resignation agreement cited health concerns, rather than an LCA violation, as the reason for his leaving the Postal Service, Mills' eligibility to receive disability benefits was preserved. The express language of the resignation agreement provided that there was no intimidation, coercion, or duress present with regard to plaintiff's signing of the agreement.

In the present action, Mills seeks rescission of the February 16, 1996 resignation agreement. Such a rescission would have the effect of re-instating him to his former position under the terms of the LCA. He asserts that during the negotiations surrounding the resignation agreement he was suffering severe emotional distress resulting from workplace conditions, harassment from co-workers, and recovery from substance abuse. Consequently, Mills argues that he lacked the necessary capacity to enter into the resignation agreement. He further claims that defendant used threats, misrepresentations and intimidation to coerce him into signing the resignation agreement. In addition, Mills avers that defendant's actions violated the Rehabilitation Act, in that defendant did not reasonably accommodate his substance abuse problem. Finally, Mills contends that he has been deprived of his employment and wages as well as his good name and reputation as a direct and proximate result of the execution of the resignation agreement.

The Postal Service, in turn, argues that because Mills has failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him, he may not presently seek rescission of the resignation agreement in federal court.

After hearing oral argument on defendant's motion to dismiss, the Court took the matter under advisement. The motion is now in order for decision.

II. Standard for Decision

Dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is proper where the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Dismissal on such grounds is appropriate only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see also 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (2d ed. 1990).

In considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all well-pleaded factual averments as true, and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor. See Negron-Gaztambide v. Hernandez-Torres, 35 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir.1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1149, 115 S.Ct. 1098, 130 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1995); Iacampo v. Hasbro Inc., 929 F.Supp. 562, 570 (D.R.I.1996). However, a court need only give the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences which appear reasonable. Id. "While a complaint need only set out a generalized statement of facts, there must be enough information to outline the elements of the pleaders' claim." Kadar Corp. v. Milbury, 549 F.2d 230, 233 (1st Cir.1977) (internal quotation omitted).

III. Analysis

Mills brings suit under the Little Tucker Act ("Little Tucker"), the Postal Reorganization Act ("PRA"), and the Rehabilitation Act. However, it is clear that Mills must first exhaust available administrative remedies afforded him under the Civil Service Reform Act ("CSRA")⁴, and/or the applicable collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") prior to bringing an action in this Court.

A. Civil Service Reform Act

Congress enacted the CSRA to replace the inconsistent procedures for administrative and judicial review of adverse employment actions against federal employees. See United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444-45, 108 S.Ct. 668, 672-73, 98 L.Ed.2d 830 (1988) (citing S.Rep. No. 95-969, p. 3 (1978)); Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768, 773-74, 105 S.Ct. 1620, 1624-25, 84 L.Ed.2d 674 (1985). Chapter 75 of the CSRA overhauled the traditional civil service system and created a detailed scheme for review of personnel actions taken by federal agencies. Id. The CSRA created a series of procedural devices, including an appeal to the Merit System Protection Board ("MSPB"), for federal employees affected by certain adverse personnel actions, including removal. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512, 7513(d). Congress created the MSPB to provide an initial administrative review of employment action before any judicial remedy may be sought.

Courts have recognized that the CSRA creates remedies by which covered federal employees may seek redress for improper employment actions. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 385, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 2414-15, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983); Roth v. United States, 952 F.2d 611, 614 (1st Cir.1991); Montplaisir v. Leighton, 875 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1989). Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that the CSRA's comprehensive scheme may in some cases preclude entirely a judicial remedy. See Fausto, 484 U.S. at 448-49, 108 S.Ct. at 674-75.⁵

In Fausto, for example, the plaintiff was a non-preference member of the Federal Fish and Wildlife Service who had been suspended without pay for thirty days. As a non-preference employee, he had no right to appeal an adverse employment action to the MSPB. He thus challenged his suspension in the Claims Court, seeking back pay under the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596, and the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491. Fausto, 484 U.S. at 443, 108 S.Ct. at 671-72. The Supreme Court held that despite his inability to seek administrative review of his termination, the CSRA nevertheless precluded him from seeking judicial review. Id.

The First Circuit clearly requires the exhaustion of administrative remedies provided for in the CSRA prior to allowing an aggrieved party to seek a judicial remedy. In Berrios v. Dep't of the Army, 884 F.2d 28, 30 (1st Cir.1989), plaintiff alleged that defendants, in failing to provide him with a hearing prior to removal from a governmental position, deprived him of his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the CSRA precluded plaintiff's...