Mills v. United States

• Decision Date: 29 January 2014
• Docket Number: No. 12–35589.,12–35589.
• Citation: 742 F.3d 400
• Parties: Carey Clayton MILLS, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America; Sally Jewell, Secretary of the Department of the Interior; Julia Dougan, Acting State Director, Alaska State Office; Mark Fullmer, Supervisor Land Transfer Specialist, Division of Land Alaska State Office; Robert W. Schneider, District Manager, Fairbanks District Office; Lenore Hepler, Field Manager, Eastern Interior Field Office; Scott Wood; Doyon Limited; Hungwitchin Corporation, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

742 F.3d 400

Carey Clayton MILLS, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.UNITED STATES of America; Sally Jewell, Secretary of the Department of the Interior; Julia Dougan, Acting State Director, Alaska State Office; Mark Fullmer, Supervisor Land Transfer Specialist, Division of Land Alaska State Office; Robert W. Schneider, District Manager, Fairbanks District Office; Lenore Hepler, Field Manager, Eastern Interior Field Office; Scott Wood; Doyon Limited; Hungwitchin Corporation, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 12–35589.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Aug. 15, 2013.

Filed Jan. 29, 2014.

Carey Mills, San Antonio, TX, (argued), pro se Plaintiff–Appellant.

Ignacia S. Moreno, Assistant Attorney General, Dean K. Dunsmore, Mark R. Haag, and Robert P. Stockman (argued), Attorneys, Environmental & Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Federal Defendants–Appellees.

James D. Linxwiler (argued) and Josh Van Gorkom, Guess & Rudd P.C., Anchorage, AK, for Defendant–Appellee Doyon, Limited.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska, Ralph R. Beistline, Chief District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 4:10–cv–00033–RRB.

Before: ALEX KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, and MARSHA S. BERZON and SANDRA S. IKUTA, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

This appeal raises the question whether an individual seeking access to his state mining claims over real property owned by the federal government and third parties can bring an action asserting a right-of-way over such real property. We conclude that Mills's claims against the federal government are barred by sovereign immunity, but that the district court erred in concluding that his claims against Doyon Limited and Hungwitchin Corporation were barred by principles of prudential standing. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the district court's dismissal of this action.

I

Carey Mills has an ownership interest in two state mining claims on state-owned land. According to Mills, “the only economically feasible and environmental[ly] friendly transportation route” to access these claims is over the Fortymile Station–Eagle Trail (the Fortymile Trail or the Trail), a trail that runs from a point approximately eight miles south of Eagle, Alaska (a city near the United States–Canada border in eastern Alaska), across various federal and nonfederal lands.

Alaska has enacted legislation asserting it has a right-of-way to the Fortymile Trail under a federal statute commonly referred to as R.S. 2477, which had been codified at 43 U.S.C. § 932 but was repealed in 1976. See43 U.S.C. § 932 (repealed 1976). R.S. 2477 stated that “[t]he right of way for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is granted.” Id. R.S. 2477 has been construed as presenting a free right-of-way “ ‘which takes effect as soon as it is accepted by the State.’ ” Lyon v. Gila River Indian Cmty., 626 F.3d 1059, 1077 (9th Cir.2010) (quoting Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 882 (D.C.Cir.1973)).¹ The state statute provides that Alaska “claims, occupies, and possesses each right-of-way granted under” R.S. 2477, and lists the Fortymile Trail among the rights-of-way that “have been accepted by public users and have been identified to provide effective notice to the public of these rights-of-way.” Alaska Stat. § 19.30.400(a), (c)- (d).

The defendants in this action have varying property interests in the land crossed by the Trail. First, the Trail crosses federal land that is subject to 15 unpatented federal mining claims owned by Scott Wood.² The United States and Wood have different property interests in these parcels: the United States owns the legal title to the land, Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 336, 83 S.Ct. 379, 9 L.Ed.2d 350 (1963), while Wood has exclusive possessory rights to use of the surface within the area of the claim. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 86, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985). Second, the Trail crosses land that is subject to the interests of Doyon Limited and Hungwitchin Corporation, two Alaska Native Corporations that hold patents issued by the federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in 2008. ³ For most of these lands, Hungwitchin holds the patent for the surface estate and Doyon holds the patent for the subsurface estate. Doyon claims it also holds title to the surface estate in some portion of these lands.

Mills first attempted to obtain access to the Fortymile Trail administratively by filing an application with the BLM. In November 2009, Mills applied to the BLM for a right-of-way for the construction, maintenance, and use of an access road from Taylor Highway to his mining claim across the land subject to Wood's unpatented mining claims. The BLM denied this application on the ground that it lacked the authority to approve a right-of-way, and its decision was upheld on administrative appeal. Mills subsequently asked the BLM to amend the conveyances to Doyon and Hungwitchin to include a reservation of an easement for the Fortymile Trail. Again, the BIA denied the request in March 2010 on the ground that it lacked the legal authority to do so. Mills has not appealed either of these administrative decisions, and they are not before us.

In April 2010, in response to Mills's inquiry, the State confirmed that it was the owner of the right-of-way to the Fortymile Trail.

In November 2010, Mills, proceeding pro se, filed this action raising numerous claims against the federal government, Wood, Doyon, and Hungwitchin on the ground that he was entitled to use the Trail for access to his state mining claims. Mills sought a declaration that he is entitled to a right-of-way to access his state mining claims on the Fortymile Trail both under R.S. 2477 and because he has an easement by implication or necessity, and that the real property interests claimed by Wood, Doyon, and Hungwitchin (collectively, the non-federal defendants) are subject to this right-of-way.

In considering Mills's claims, the district court concluded that legal title to any R.S. 2477 right-of-way was vested in Alaska. Accordingly, the court held that Mills had no independent property interest in the Fortymile Trail and instead was merely attempting to enforce the rights of Alaska. Because the state was not a party to the suit, but was “the party in the best position to assert its own rights,” the district court tentatively granted Mills's motion to join Alaska as a party. After Alaska objected, both under the Eleventh Amendment and because it had not yet decided whether to file a quiet title action against the federal government to confirm the state's title to the Fortymile Trail right-of-way, the district court dismissed Mills's joinder motion.

After allowing Mills to amend his complaint twice, the district court dismissed Mills's claims against all defendants. As relevant here, the district court dismissed certain claims against Hungwitchin and Doyon on the ground that Mills lacked prudential standing to bring an action seeking to establish a right-of-way under R.S. 2477. Further, the district court dismissed certain claims against the United States pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on sovereign immunity grounds. Finally, the district court dismissed Mills's claim that he was entitled to a right-of-way under a provision of the General Mining Law, 30 U.S.C. § 41. ⁴ Mills timely appealed these issues, and has continued to proceed pro se.

II

We review de novo a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Viewtech, Inc. v. United States, 653 F.3d 1102, 1103–04 (9th Cir.2011). Suits against the government are barred for lack of subject matter jurisdiction unless the government expressly and unequivocally waives its sovereign immunity. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994); Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir.2011).

The Quiet Title Act (QTA), 28 U.S.C. § 2409a, allows a plaintiff to name the United States as a defendant in a civil action “to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest.” ⁵Id. § 2409a(a). This statute “ ‘provide[s] the exclusive means by which adverse claimants [can] challenge the United States' title to real property,’ ” Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2199, 2207, 183 L.Ed.2d 211 (2012) (quoting Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 286, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 (1983)), and applies to claims against the United States for rights of access, easements, and rights-of-way, as well as those involving fee simple interests. See McMaster v. United States, 731 F.3d 881, 900 (9th Cir.2013); Alaska v. Babbitt, 38 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir.1994) (collecting cases). Therefore, Mills's claim against the United States for a right of access over the Fortymile Trail must proceed, if at all, under the QTA.⁶

In construing the scope of the QTA's waiver, we have read narrowly the requirement that the title at issue be “disputed.” See Alaska v. United States, 201 F.3d 1154, 1164–65 (9th Cir.2000). For a title to be disputed for purposes of the QTA, the United States must have adopted a position in conflict with a third party regarding that title. See id. In Alaska v. United States, we held that the title to a riverbed underlying the Black River was not disputed because the government had not expressly asserted a claim with respect to that real property. See id. Even though the United States did not disclaim its interest to the riverbed, and reserved the right to make a claim to the riverbed in the future, we reasoned that “whatever dispute there may be, it has not yet occurred,” and concluded that “[a] title cannot be said to be ‘disput...