Milton v. State
Decision Date | 13 April 1898 |
Citation | 40 Fla. 251,24 So. 60 |
Parties | MILTON v. STATE. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Error to circuit court, Hillsboro county; Barron Phillips, Judge.
Thomas Milton was convicted of murder, and brings error. Reversed.
Syllabus by the Court
1. An indictment for murder, complete in form in alleging the offense and the mortal wound inflicted, and further stating of which said mortal wound the deceased then and there, in the county named, did languish, and languishing did live until a date mentioned, less than a year from the time when the wound was inflicted, upon which last day the deceased, in the county stated, did die, sufficiently alleges that the death of the deceased was caused by the wound inflicted.
2. Previous declarations of an accused, evincing a purpose to kill a deceased, made at a time not too remote from the occurrence, may be shown as bearing on the question of intent to kill and the animus of the accused towards the deceased.
3. Under a count in an indictment alleging that the accused made an assault upon a third party with intent to murder him, and then and there shot and killed the deceased, it is competent to show that the third party, at the time and in the same occurrence, was shot, and also the character of the assault upon him.
4. The state summoned a witness, but did not examine her, and she was placed on the stand for the accused. On cross-examination the state attorney asked if she had been convicted of any crime in this state. This question was objected to on the ground that the state could not impeach her own witness. Held, that the state was not precluded from asking the question; and, further, that the mere summoning of a witness for the state, without any examination, did not entitle the accused to treat the witness as one examined and vouched for by the state.
5. The accused offered to prove the character for lewdness of a witness summoned by the state, but who had not been examined at the time. Held, without intimating that such testimony was proper under any circumstances in a like case, that the offered testimony was entirely irrelevant and immaterial.
6. Every fact from which the jury may legitimately deduce innocence or guilt is proper to be submitted to them; and though the relevancy or materiality of a fact standing alone may not be apparent, yet when, taken in connection with other facts proven, its proper bearing appears, the jury should be allowed to consider it.
7. Under chapter 4400, Acts 1895, a defendant in a criminal case can voluntarily testify as other witnesses, under the rules governing witnesses generally, but cannot since said act make a sworn statement without the right of cross-examination by the state.
8. Rulings of the trial court refusing to give instructions asked must be excepted to at the time of refusal, and an exception to such rulings in a motion for new trial is too late.
9. It is not error for the trial court to omit to inform the jury that a majority of their number may recommend the accused to the mercy of the court.
10. In civil jurisprudence, when a man does a thing by permission of law, not by license, and, after proceeding lawfully part way abuses the permission given him, he may be deemed a trespasser from the beginning; but in criminal law such rule does not prevail, as no man is punishable criminally for what was not criminal when done, even though he afterwards adds either the act or the intent, yet not the two together.
Martin L. Mershon, for plaintiff in error.
William B. Lamar, Atty. Gen., for the State.
Writ of error from the Sixth judicial circuit for Hillsboro county, the conviction being for murder in the first degree. The indictment upon which plaintiff in error was arraigned and convicted contained two counts, reading, with usual beginning and the signature of prosecuting officer omitted, as follows:
The sufficiency of the indictment was questioned by demurrer and motion in arrest of judgment, on the ground of a failure to allege that the death of the deceased was caused by the wound inflicted. The alleged defect in the indictment is in the latter part of both counts, where it is stated, immediately after the description of the wound, 'of which said mortal wound she, the said Georgie McGraw, then and there, in the county of Hillsborough...
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Maloy v. State
...Causes (2d Ed.) 399. See, also, Hart v. State, 38 Fla. 39, 20 So. 805; Green v. State, 40 Fla. 191, text 199, 23 So. 851; Milton v. State, 40 Fla. 251, 24 So. 60; v. State, 41 Fla. 547, 26 So. 713; Wilson v. State, 47 Fla. 118, 36 So. 580. There is an assignment of error that 'the court err......
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Clinton v. State
...given by this statute of testifying as a witness, he thereby puts himself on the same footing as any other witness. See Milton v. State, 40 Fla. 251, 24 So. 60, authorities there cited; Copeland v. State, 41 Fla. 320, 26 So. 319; Pittman v. State, 51 Fla. 94, 41 So. 385; Maloy v. State, 52 ......
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Thompson v. State
... ... the defendant's financial condition, to his injury. Any ... legal evidence from which the jury may legitimately deduce ... innocence or guilt is admissible, if, when taken with other ... evidence in the case, its relevancy appears. See Milton ... v. State, 40 Fla. 251, 24 So. 60; Mobley v ... State, 41 Fla. 621, 26 So. 732; Reynolds v ... State, 52 Fla. 409, 42 So. 373 ... Where ... the larceny of money is at issue, evidence tending to show ... that the defendant had no money before a larceny and ... considerable ... ...
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Whitten v. State
...41 So. 385, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 509; Wallace v. State, 41 Fla. 547, 26 So. 713; Copeland v. State, 41 Fla. 320, 26 So. 319; Milton v. State, 40 Fla. 251, 24 So. 60; Wood State, 31 Fla. 221, 12 So. 539. Neither can error be predicated upon the court's failure to caution a defendant when he is......