Milwaukee v. Kilgore
| Decision Date | 07 June 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-0949.,92-0949. |
| Citation | 532 N.W.2d 690,193 Wis.2d 168 |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
| Parties | (90-CV-004581) CITY OF MILWAUKEE, Plaintiff-Respondent-(In T. Ct.)-Appellant, v. Chet N. KILGORE, Defendant-Appellant-(In T. Ct.)-Respondent-Petitioner, Matthew J. TREWHELLA, Scott B. Patterson, Ralph N. Ovadal, Daoud Faraj, Robert C. Braun, Wayne E. Rohde and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, v. Ronald R. FIEDLER, Secretary, Department of Transportation of State of Wisconsin, Honorable William J. Panagis, Honorable Stanley A. Miller and Honorable James A. Gramling, Jr., Judges of Municipal Court of City of Milwaukee and City of Milwaukee, Defendants-Appellants. |
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For the defendant-appellant-(In T.Ct.)-respondent-petitioners and plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners there were briefs by Richard F. Tyson, Baileys Harbor and George E. Rice, Muskego, of counsel, and oral argument by Richard F. Tyson and George E. Rice.
For the plaintiff-respondent-(In T.Ct.)-appellantrespondent and defendants-appellants there was a brief by Rudolph M. Konrad, deputy city attorney, Grant F. Langley, city attorney, Stephen J. Nicks, assistant attorney general and James E. Doyle, Jr., attorney general and oral argument by Susan E. Lappen, assistant city attorney.
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Claire Silverman, assistant legal counsel, Madison, for the League of Wisconsin Municipalities.
This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, Trewhella v. Fiedler, 185 Wis. 2d 499, 517 N.W.2d 689 (Ct. App. 1994), which reversed a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, John E. McCormick, circuit judge. The petitioners, all members of the class of individuals who have had their drivers' licenses suspended for failure to pay fines imposed for non-traffic related municipal ordinance violations, seek review of a court of appeals decision which reversed the trial court's conclusion that municipal court judges have no statutory authority to order such suspensions and, if they do, that the statutes involved are unconstitutional. Although we affirm the decision of the court of appeals because we, too, conclude there is statutory authority for the municipal courts' practice of suspending drivers' licenses to compel payments of fines issued for non-traffic offenses, and because we conclude that the grant of power to municipal courts is constitutional, we do so on grounds not relied upon by the court of appeals.
The underlying facts are undisputed. Petitioners were all found guilty by City of Milwaukee municipal judges of city ordinance violations for either disorderly conduct or trespass; they were each ordered to pay fines;1 at the time of sentencing, each was informed that failure to pay the fine in 60 days would result in suspension of their driver's license until the fine was paid, but not to exceed five years. None of the petitioners paid the fines nor did they seek to avoid suspension of their operating privileges for good cause or because of indigency. No one contends that they were not warned in accordance with the provisions in the statute. Each petitioner received an order of suspension from the Department of Transportation stating that their license had been suspended for five years for failure to pay their fine; the orders of suspension further provided that the period of suspension "can be reduced by payment of the forfeiture."
Petitioner Kilgore appealed to the circuit court for a trial de novo of his conviction for disorderly conduct in violation of sec. 106-1, Milwaukee Code of Ordinances. Petitioners Trewhella, Patterson, Ovadal, Faraj, Braun, and Rohde commenced a class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C secs. 1983 and 1988 against the Secretary of Transportation, three municipal judges and the City of Milwaukee for declaratory judgment of the unconstitutionality of the suspensions and the statutes which authorized them. These cases were consolidated.
On motion for summary judgment Defendant-Appellant Kilgore and plaintiffs Trewhella, et al., moved the circuit court for declaratory judgment, and for mandatory and prohibitory permanent injunctions against further suspension orders, for failure to pay a fine imposed for a non-traffic related offense. Petitioners argued that suspensions authorized under secs. 800.092 and 800.095,3 Stats., are unlawful when applied to coerce payment of fines imposed for nontraffic related offenses because such suspensions are expressly prohibited by sec. 343.30(5), which provides in part: "No court may suspend or revoke an operating privilege except as authorized by this chapter or chs. 48, 345 or 351 or s. 161.50."4 Petitioners further argued that such suspensions violate the due process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment, and the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, secs. 1 and 6 of the Wisconsin Constitution. By Order, dated January 9, 1992, the circuit court granted petitioner's motion for summary judgment concluding: (1) secs. 800.09 and 800.095, Stats., were unlawful when applied to non-traffic related offenses because the legislature failed to amend sec. 343.30(5) to include ch. 800 suspensions; (2) under sec. 755.045, Stats.,5 municipal courts are without jurisdiction to suspend drivers' licenses because jurisdiction is exclusive to actions and proceedings arising under municipal ordinances; (3) ch. 800 suspensions are improper debt collection measures; (4) ch. 800 suspensions are an unreasonable exercise of police power because there is a disproportion between the offenses charged, the harm to the public, the maximum amount of the fines authorized under the ordinances, and the duration and severity of the five-year license suspensions; (5) ch. 800 suspensions are excessive penalties in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and (6) ch. 800 suspensions constitute an unlawful delegation of power to municipal courts in violation of Article IV, sec. 14 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The circuit court ordered reinstatement of the driver's license of each petitioner and ordered the Secretary of the Department of Transportation to reinstate the drivers' licenses of all similarly situated persons. In addition, the Secretary and the Milwaukee municipal judges were enjoined from suspending drivers' licenses for nonpayment of forfeitures imposed for non-traffic related offenses. By stipulation, to avoid substantial expense to the Department of Transportation,6 the mandate was partially stayed; the Secretary agreed to reinstate on application by any member of the class that person's driver's license. Judgment was entered on March 30, 1992. Thereafter, the city, the municipal judges, and the Secretary filed a joint appeal. On May 17, 1994, the court of appeals reversed on all issues, concluding that: (1) the legislature intended to include, but inadvertently omitted, sec. 800.09 and 800.095 from the list of exceptions provided in sec. 343.30(5) authorizing driver license suspensions;7 (2) the statutory grant of authority is constitutional; and, (3) municipal courts have jurisdiction to suspend drivers' licenses as authorized by secs. 800.09 and 800.095.8 We granted review.
Petitioners argue the circuit court correctly held that, ch. 800 suspensions are excessive penalties9 in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and that there is no relationship, rational or otherwise, between the offenses for which they were fined and the suspension of their drivers' licenses. According to petitioners, the goal of statewide traffic safety, which they allege to be the sole purpose for suspending drivers' licenses, is not furthered when applied to persons who fail, as they did, to pay fines imposed for violations of non-traffic related municipal ordinances such as disorderly conduct and trespass. Petitioners contend that when the only purpose of a license suspension is, as here, to coerce payment of fines imposed for non-traffic related offenses, such purpose constitutes an unlawful use of the police power as a collection measure. Nor, they contend, are the suspensions equivalent to an order of contempt, because to label them as such, "confuses money judgments with disobedience to court orders or injunctions." Petitioner's Brief at 23.
Additionally, petitioners argue that, because the language of sec. 343.30(5), Stats., is plain and unambiguous, the statute should be given effect without resort to judicial construction. Petitioners ask this court to find that the prohibitory language in sec. 343.30(5), supersedes the express grant of authority in ch. 800. In further support for its plain meaning argument, petitioners point to a series of legislative amendments to sec. 343.30(5), which, through time, have expanded the authority of courts to suspend a driver's license, but which do not include reference to ch. 800 suspensions. The omission, they conclude, is presumed to be intentional and, therefore, the only means available to the state to collect unpaid fines for municipal ordinance violations is the civil judgment procedure set forth in sec. 800.095(7), Stats. This section provides:
USE OF ORDINARY CIVIL REMEDIES. In addition to the procedures under this section, a municipality may enforce the judgment in the same manner as for a judgment in an ordinary civil action.
Respondents, City of Milwaukee, Secretary of the Department of Transportation, and the Milwaukee municipal court judges named in this action, agree with the court of appeals' conclusion that, ch. 800 suspensions satisfy the rational basis test, i.e., secs. 800.09 and 800.095, Stats., are reasonably related to accomplishing a legitimate state interest. Respondents contend...
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