Forest County v. Goode
| Decision Date | 01 July 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-3592,96-3592 |
| Citation | 219 Wis.2d 654,579 N.W.2d 715 |
| Parties | FOREST COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Appellant, State of Wisconsin, Intervenor, v. Wesley S. GOODE, Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs by John F. Hovel, Susan A. Philpott and Kravit & Gass, S.C., of counsel, Mark C. Darnieder of Darnieder, West & Davis, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by John F. Hovel.
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by Michael J. Gableman, Assistant Forest County Corporation Counsel, with whom on the brief was Fred W. Kawalski, Forest County Corporation Counsel.
For the intervenor the cause was argued by Maryann Sumi, Assistant Attorney General with whom on the brief was Lorraine C. Stoltzfus, Assistant Attorney General and James E. Doyle, Attorney General.
¶1
In this case we are asked to determine whether a circuit court retains equitable power to deny injunctive relief after a zoning ordinance violation has been proven. Forest County instituted enforcement proceedings under Wis. Stat. § 59.69(1) against Wesley S. Goode for noncompliance with a zoning ordinance. The County requested assessment of forfeitures and an injunctive order compelling Goode to relocate his house to comply with a 50-foot setback requirement of Forest County Zoning Ordinance § 5.03.10. The Circuit ¶2 In a split decision, 1 the court of appeals reversed the circuit court's order denying injunctive relief after holding that Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11) (1995-96) 2 does not give a circuit court equitable power to deny injunctive relief after a zoning ordinance violation has been proven. Next, the court of appeals unanimously reversed the circuit court's calculation of the forfeiture amount. Goode seeks review only of the court of appeals' reversal of the order denying injunctive relief.
Court for Forest County, Robert A. Kennedy, Judge, denied the County's request for an injunction but imposed a forfeiture against Goode. The County appealed from both orders of the circuit court.
¶3 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11) gives the county or an owner of real estate within the district affected by the zoning regulation the option of asking a circuit court sitting in equity for injunctive relief as a remedy for a zoning ordinance violation. However, we also conclude that the legislature did not intend to eliminate the traditional equitable powers of the court through § 59.69(11). Accordingly, we hold that when a circuit court is asked to grant injunctive relief for a proven zoning ordinance violation, § 59.69(11) does not eliminate the circuit court's equitable power to deny injunctive relief in a particular case. In this case, the circuit court erroneously failed to take sufficient evidence and failed to weigh the proper equitable considerations. We therefore affirm the court of appeals' decision reversing the order of the circuit court and remanding for further proceedings.
¶4 Goode owns two adjoining lakefront lots on Ground Hemlock Lake in Forest County. In 1993 he decided to tear down an existing structure on one of the lots, and construct a new residence on the entire property. In June of 1993, Dawn Schmidt, the Forest County zoning administrator, met with Goode at the property and together they roughly measured and staked a distance of 50 feet from the ordinary high water mark (OHWM), as required by Forest County Zoning Ordinance § 5.03.10. Goode obtained a building permit to construct the new house 50 feet from the OHWM of Ground Hemlock Lake. 3
¶5 Goode hired Dan Stampfl to assist in constructing the new residence. Stampfl retained Flannery Trucking to perform the excavation work. Prior to excavation, Stampfl and Flannery observed the stakes Goode placed on the property after making his own measurements. After the excavation but prior to pouring the concrete footings and cement walls, Stampfl remeasured and restaked the property. In March of 1994, a citizen contacted Schmidt to report that there might be a problem with the setback at Goode's property. Schmidt returned to the residence in May of 1994 and measured the distance from the house to the OHWM. She learned that the distance from the northern corner of the home to the OHWM was only 35 feet rather than the required 50 feet. On May 19, 1994, Schmidt advised Goode by letter that the location of his residence violated the 50-foot setback requirement of ordinance § 5.03.10. Goode responded that the violation was unintentional and requested to meet with the zoning committee. Goode requested a variance for the property, which the committee denied. The County initiated this enforcement action, requesting forfeitures and an injunction requiring Goode to comply with the setback requirements.
¶6 Following a trial in September of 1996, the circuit court denied the County's request for injunctive relief, finding that Goode's violation was unintentional, the cost to move the ¶7 The court of appeals, with Judge Hoover dissenting, reversed and remanded. The court of appeals concluded that the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11) "does not ... create a discretionary standard for the trial court to follow in determining whether injunctive relief is warranted." Forest County, 215 Wis.2d at 223, 572 N.W.2d 131. On that basis, the court of appeals held that it was an improper exercise of the circuit court's discretion to deny the County's request for an injunction requiring compliance with the 50 foot setback requirement. See id. at 226, 572 N.W.2d 131. 5 The court of appeals reasoned that "the legislative decision to allow municipalities to pursue injunctive relief to effectuate compliance with the ordinance implies entitlement to the relief sought upon meeting the burden of proof." Id. at 227, 572 N.W.2d 131. Hence, the court of appeals concluded that the County was entitled to injunctive relief.
house would be very high, and no property owners in the area would be harmed by allowing the house to remain where it was. 4 The circuit court imposed a forfeiture against Goode at a per diem rate of $35, for a total of $8,540, plus $814.58 in court costs. The circuit court calculated the forfeiture using 244 days, the number of days from the notice of the violation (the May 19, 1994, letter from the county zoning administrator) until the County filed the complaint (January 18, 1995). The County appealed
¶8 In the court of appeals' view, a circuit court's refusal to grant injunctive relief under Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11) would judicially usurp the legislative function. Specifically, denial of injunctive relief would, according to the court of appeals, nullify the decision of the body legislatively vested with the authority to make variance determinations. See id. at 227, 572 N.W.2d 131. In addition, the court of appeals reasoned that a refusal to grant injunctive relief here would infringe upon the public's right to have zoning ordinances enforced, would increase the dangerous cumulative effects of zoning violations, and would allow persons to "purchase" zoning variances by allowing forfeitures as a remedy in some cases. See id. at 228-29, 572 N.W.2d 131.
¶9 The court of appeals then turned to the County's claim that the circuit court erred in calculating the forfeitures. Forest County's Ordinance § 20.05.1 states: "Any person who violates this ordinance shall be subject to a fine up to $200.00, plus costs of prosecution ... Each day the violation continues shall be considered a separate offense." Relying upon Village of Sister Bay v. Hockers, 106 Wis.2d 474, 317 N.W.2d 505 (Ct.App.1982), the court of appeals determined that Goode's forfeiture should not be based upon 244 days, but upon the 861 days between the filing of the complaint until the time of trial. See Forest County, 215 Wis.2d at 229-230, 572 N.W.2d 131.
¶10 Accordingly, the court of appeals remanded the case to the circuit court for a determination, in its discretion, of the per diem forfeiture to be imposed for the period of 861 days. See id. at 230, 572 N.W.2d 131. Goode seeks review only of the court of appeals' reversal of the circuit court's order denying injunctive relief. We granted the State's request to intervene in this review.
¶11 The County brought this enforcement action under Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11). That section reads:
PROCEDURE FOR ENFORCEMENT OF COUNTY ZONING ORDINANCE. The board shall prescribe rules, regulations and administrative procedures, and Whether the circuit court has equitable power to deny injunctive relief once a zoning ordinance violation is proven under § 59.69(11) is a question of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation is a question of law we review independently, benefiting from the analysis of the circuit court and the court of appeals. See Aiello v. Village of Pleasant Prairie, 206 Wis.2d 68, 70, 556 N.W.2d 697 (1996); Town of Clearfield v. Cushman, 150 Wis.2d 10, 19, 440 N.W.2d 777 (1989). Ascertaining legislative intent is the goal of statutory interpretation. See State v. Setagord, 211 Wis.2d 397, 406, 565 N.W.2d 506 (1997). We begin with the plain language of the statute itself. See id. We do not look beyond the plain language of the statute to ascertain its meaning if the legislative intent is clear. See id.
provide such administrative personnel as it considers necessary for the enforcement of this section, and all ordinances enacted in pursuance thereof. The rules and regulations and the districts, setback building lines and regulations authorized by this section, shall be prescribed by ordinances which shall be declared to be for the purpose of promoting the public health, safety and general welfare. The ordinances shall be enforced by appropriate forfeitures. Compliance with such ordinances may also be enforced by injunctional...To continue reading
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