Mims v. Mims
Citation | 286 S.E.2d 779,305 N.C. 41 |
Decision Date | 27 January 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 109,109 |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina |
Parties | Allen L. MIMS, Jr. v. Marsha P. MIMS. |
McDaniel & Heidgerd by L. Bruce McDaniel, Raleigh, for plaintiff appellant.
Gulley, Barrow & Boxley by Jack P. Gulley, Raleigh, for defendant appellee.
Plaintiff seeks by this action to be declared the sole beneficial owner of certain residential real estate. The deed to the realty was made to both parties as husband and wife, but it is undisputed that plaintiff furnished the entire purchase price from his separate estate. The principal question presented is whether the evidentiary showing before Judge Bailey entitles defendant to summary judgment. Judge Bailey believed it did and the Court of Appeals agreed. We disagree and reverse. We also carefully reconsider our old rules relating to presumptions of gift and resulting trust in transactions of this kind and determine that the presumptive gift rule should apply in all such cases not governed by the new Equitable Distribution Act. 2
These parties were married on 19 May 1973, separated on 5 June 1977, and divorced on 28 July 1978. On 3 December 1974 plaintiff purchased the real estate in question, which apparently was a residential house and lot purchased as a marital home. He filed this action on 19 August 1977, shortly after the parties' separation. Plaintiff sought equitable relief, praying for reformation of the deed on the ground of mutual mistake and a declaratory judgment that he is the sole owner of the property.
Defendant answered and counterclaimed denying most of plaintiff's material allegations and asserting laches as a defense to plaintiff's action. She moved for summary judgment, offering the pre-trial depositions of the parties and a copy of an "Offer to Purchase," which bears the purported signatures of both parties and contains a provision directing that the deed be made to both parties as husband and wife.
According to plaintiff's deposition, he did sign the "Offer to Purchase" which was executed on 16 November 1974. However, he testified, After the offer was accepted, plaintiff began to consider how he would finance the purchase. He Plaintiff did pay, he said, $69,000.00 cash for the property at the closing after having paid the $1,000.00 earnest money which accompanied the offer. He said,
According to defendant's deposition, she did not attend the closing and she did not discuss the purchase of the house "in detail prior to the closing." She said the plaintiff told her "he was paying for it but it was for us." Defendant testified that plaintiff did not claim sole ownership of the house until after the closing. "[W]henever we would get into an argument," she said, Defendant recalled no
In opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff relied on so much of the deposition testimony as was favorable to him. He also relied on his affidavit which was submitted to and considered by Judge Bailey. He swore in this affidavit, among other things, that the defendant's name
After the hearing, Judge Bailey allowed summary judgment for defendant on the ground that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
The Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff had alleged a claim for reformation of a deed on the ground of mutual mistake and that the evidence made before Judge Bailey demonstrates as a matter of law that plaintiff will not be able to make out such a claim at trial. The Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff's argument that he may be able to sustain his claim for a resulting trust because plaintiff has "neither alleged nor proved any type of trust."
We agree with the Court of Appeals, for reasons set forth infra, that the evidentiary showing on the summary judgment motion demonstrates as a matter of law that plaintiff will not be able to make out at trial a claim for mutual mistake. We believe, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in limiting plaintiff to this theory of recovery. Both the pleadings and the evidentiary showing on the motion for summary judgment indicate plaintiff may be able to obtain the relief he seeks at trial by proving the facts necessary to give rise to a resulting trust in his favor.
We will discuss, first, some principles pertaining to resulting trusts, their current viability, and their applicability to the instant case. Then we will demonstrate why the pleadings and evidentiary showing proffered by plaintiff entitle him to trial on the issue of whether defendant holds her interest in the contested property on resulting trust for him. Finally, we will explain why plaintiff's claim of mutual mistake and defendant's claim of laches are not germane to this action.
A resulting trust arises Teachey v. Gurley, 214 N.C. 288, 292, 199 S.E. 83, 86-87 (1938). 3 The trust is created in order to effectuate what the law presumes to have been the intention of the parties in these circumstances--that the person to whom the land was conveyed hold it as trustee for the person who supplied the purchase money. Waddell v. Carson, 245 N.C. 669, 97 S.E.2d 222 (1957); Bowen v. Darden, 241 N.C. 11, 84 S.E.2d 289 (1954); Avery v. Stewart, 136 N.C. 426, 48 S.E. 775 (1904); Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees, § 454 (2d ed. rev. 1977) (hereinafter "Bogert"). Cline v. Cline, 297 N.C. 336, 344, 255 S.E.2d 399, 404-05 (1979).
Under the common law a notable exception to this rule developed. "The rule that a resulting trust is raised in favor of the person who pays the purchase-money for land, though the title may be made to another, is subject to the qualification that where the person who pays the price is under a legal, or even, in some...
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REPUGNANT PRECEDENTS AND THE COURT OF HISTORY.
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