Su Min Kim v. Am. Honda Motor Co.
| Decision Date | 07 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 4:19-CV-00332 |
| Parties | SU MIN KIM and JI HUN KIM, Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Pending before the Court are Defendant's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Dkt. #138) and Defendant's Motion for New Trial (Dkt. #139). Having reviewed the motions, responses, and applicable law, the Court finds that both motions should be DENIED.
On June 30, 2018, Ji Hun Kim (“Ji Hun”) was driving a 2014 Honda CR-V in the eastbound direction on Warren Parkway in Frisco, Texas. Ji Hun was accompanied by his sister, Su Min Kim (“Su Min”), who was riding in the front passenger seat of the CR-V. At the same time, Trae Michael Hubbard (“Hubbard”) was driving northbound on Dallas Parkway in a 2009 Toyota Scion. When Hubbard reached the intersection of Warren Parkway and Dallas Parkway, he ran a red light and T-boned the passenger side of the Plaintiffs' CR-V.
Su Min due to being positioned on the side of the CR-V that was struck by Hubbard's Scion, was the “near-side” occupant to the collision. However Su Min did not suffer any “nearside” impact injuries. Rather, her injuries arose from “far-side” of the CR-V. When Hubbard struck the CR-V, the force of the collision caused Ji Hun's upper body to shift towards Su Min, resulting in a head-to-head contact between the two. As a result of this far-side impact Su Min “sustained severe, debilitating, and permanent injuries to her brain, skull, face, and left eye” (Dkt. #84 at p. 1). On May 7, 2019, Plaintiffs sued Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“Honda”), asserting various theories of design defect premised on strict liability (Dkt. #36; Dkt. #65).[1]Plaintiffs alleged Su Min's injuries occurred because of a defective occupant restraint system that failed to restrain the far-side occupant's movement during the collision, thus creating an unreasonable risk of “far-side impact injuries” to the near-side passenger.
On May 17, 2022, the Court granted Honda's motion to designate Hubbard as a responsible third party pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 33.004 (Dkt. #72). The case then proceeded to trial, which began on June 6, 2022. On June 17, 2022, the jury returned its verdict (Dkt. #122). The jury found that there was a design defect in the 2014 Honda CR-V at the time it left the possession of Honda that was a producing cause of the injuries in question. The jury also found that the negligence of Hubbard was a proximate cause of the injuries in question. In apportioning fault between Hubbard and Honda, the jury found Honda twenty-three percent (23%) responsible and Hubbard seventy-seven percent (77%) responsible.
The jury awarded Su Min a total of $21,180,808.74 in damages, consisting of the following:
The jury also awarded Ji Hun $250,000.00 in damages for bystander mental anguish sustained in the past.
On June 28, 2022, the Court entered final judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict (Dkt. #133). Pursuant to the jury's apportionment of fault between Honda and Hubbard,[2]the Court ordered that Su Min would recover from Honda $1,651,586.01 for actual damages sustained in the past along with pre- and post-judgment interest on that amount, and $3,220,000.00 for actual damages in the future along with post-judgment interest on that amount. The Court further ordered that Ji Hun would recover from Honda $57,500.00 for actual damages in the past along with pre-and post-judgment interest on that amount.
During trial, Honda moved for directed verdict, arguing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Plaintiffs' strict products liability claim because there was no evidence: (1) that the CR-V was unreasonably dangerous; (2) that a safer alternative design existed; and (3) that any alleged defect in the 2014 Honda CR-V was a producing cause of the Plaintiffs' injuries (Dkt. #109). The Court orally denied the motion in full. On July 25, 2022, Honda filed the present renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (Dkt. #138) and motion for new trial (Dkt. #139). On August 19, 2022, Plaintiffs filed responses to both motions (Dkt. #146; Dkt. #147). On September 8, 2022, Honda filed its replies (Dkt. #152; Dkt. #153).
After “a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial,” the court may “grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party” so long as “the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1). Upon a party's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law following a jury verdict, the Court should properly ask whether “the state of proof is such that reasonable and impartial minds could reach the conclusion the jury expressed in its verdict.” Am. Home Assurance Co. v. United Space All., 378 F.3d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 2004); FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a). “A JMOL may only be granted when, ‘viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence points so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the court believes that reasonable jurors could not arrive at any contrary conclusion.'” Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Dresser-Rand Co. v. Virtual Automation, Inc., 361 F.3d 831, 838 (5th Cir. 2004)).
Fifth Circuit precedent requires a court be “especially deferential” to a jury's verdict. The court must not reverse the jury's findings unless substantial evidence does not support those findings. Baisden v. I'm Ready Prods., Inc., 693 F.3d 491, 499 (5th Cir. 2012). “Substantial evidence is defined as evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions.” Threlkeld v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 211 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 2000). A motion for judgment as a matter of law must be denied “unless the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelming in the movant's favor that reasonable jurors could not reach a contrary conclusion.” Baisden, 693 F.3d at 498 (citation omitted). However, “[t]here must be more than a mere scintilla of evidence in the record to prevent judgment as a matter of law in favor of the movant.” Arismendez v. Nightingale Home Health Care, Inc., 493 F.3d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 2007).
In evaluating a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a court “cannot substitute other inferences that [the court] might regard as more reasonable.” E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Further, “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). “[T]he court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that ‘evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that the evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.'” Id. at 151 (citation omitted).
Under Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a new trial can be granted to any party to a jury trial on any or all issues “for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a). “A new trial may be granted, for example, if the district court finds the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the damages awarded are excessive, the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was committed in its course.” Smith v. Transworld Drilling Co., 773 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1985). However, “[u]nless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting or excluding evidence - or any other error by the court or a party- is grounds for granting a new trial . . . At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights.” FED. R. CIV. P. 61.
To be entitled to a new trial, the movant must show that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence, not merely against the preponderance of the evidence. Taylor v. Seton Healthcare, No. A-10-CV-650, WL 2396880, at *2 (W.D. Tex. June 22, 2012) (citing Dresser-Rand Co. v Virtual Automation, Inc., 361 F.3d 831, 838-39 (5th Cir. 2004); Shows v. Jamison Bedding, Inc., 671 F.2d 927, 930 (5th Cir. 1982)). A jury verdict is entitled to great deference. Dresser-Rand Co., 671 F.2d at 839. “Weighing the conflicting evidence and the inferences to be drawn from that evidence, and determining the relative credibility of the witnesses, are the province of the jury, and its decision must be accepted if the record contains any competent and substantial evidence tending fairly to...
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