Minard v. Itc Deltacom Communications, Inc.

• Decision Date: 18 April 2006
• Docket Number: No. 04-30230.,04-30230.
• Parties: Melissa C. MINARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ITC DELTACOM COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

447 F.3d 352

Melissa C. MINARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ITC DELTACOM COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 04-30230.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 18, 2006.

Bryant Hollingsworth Graves (argued), Law Office of Bryant H. Graves, Baton Rouge, LA, for Minard.

Richard J.R. Raleigh, Jr. (argued), John Anthony Wilmer, Wilmer & Lee, Huntsville, AL, Leslie Ellen Ayres, Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana.

Before KING, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

DENNIS, Circuit Judge:

As the Supreme Court said in its recent pertinent decision in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006): "This case concerns the distinction between two sometimes confused or conflated concepts: federal-court `subject-matter' jurisdiction over a controversy; and the essential ingredients of a federal claim for relief."¹ Specifically, we are here called upon to decide whether the Family Medical Leave Act ("the FMLA" or "the Act") definition of an "eligible employee" (as not including those "at a worksite" having "less than 50 employees if the total number of employees ... within 75 miles of that worksite is less than 50") is a limit on the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction or instead is an essential ingredient of an FLMA claim for relief. The Supreme Court's holding in Arbaugh that Title VII's limitation of the definition of "employer" to include only those having "fifteen or more employees," was an element of a Title VII claim for relief, and thus non-jurisdictional, compels the same answer here: that is, the employee-numerosity requirement is an element of the claim, not a limit upon the federal-court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Consequently, we reverse the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's FMLA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings upon whether the employer should be equitably estopped to pursue a "non-eligible employee" coverage defense, viz., whether the employer's erroneous representation to the employee that she was an "eligible employee" under the FMLA was made with reason to believe that she would rely upon it and whether she reasonably relied on it to her detriment.

The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 entitles eligible employees to take up to 12 work weeks of unpaid leave annually for any of several reasons, including a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee.² Subject to exceptions not applicable to this case, any eligible employee who takes leave under § 2612 shall be entitled on return from such leave to be restored to the position of employment held when the leave commenced, or to be restored to an equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.³

The Act defines "eligible employee" as "an employee who has been employed (i) for at least 12 months by the employer . . . and; (ii) for at least 1,250 hours of service with such employer during the previous 12-month period," excluding any employee who is employed at a worksite at which, or within 75 miles of which, the employer employs less than 50 employees.⁴ An "employer" is defined as any person "engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year."⁵

The enforcement section of the Act provides that any employer who interferes with or discriminates against the exercise of an employee's rights shall be liable to any eligible employee affected for damages as specified by the Act and for such equitable relief as may be appropriate, including employment, reinstatement, and promotion.⁶ This section also expressly creates a right of action and provides for federal and state court subject-matter jurisdiction:

An action to recover the damages or equitable relief prescribed . . . may be maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of (A) the employees; or (B) the employees and other employees similarly situated.⁷

Background

The plaintiff-appellant, Melissa Minard, was employed by the defendant-appellee, ITC Deltacom Communications, at its Baton Rouge Field Sales Office. In May 2002, Ms. Minard requested leave pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act to undergo surgery to treat a serious medial condition. IRC granted Ms. Minard's request for FMLA leave in a written memorandum entitled "Request for Family or Medical Leave," which specifically stated that she was an "eligible employee" under the Family and Medical Leave Act and that she had "a right under the FMLA for up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave in a 12-month period."⁸ The memorandum also informed Ms. Minard that her requested leave would be counted against her annual FMLA entitlement.⁹ Ms. Minard took the granted leave, but on the day she was scheduled to return to work, ITC terminated her employment rather than restoring her to her former or an equivalent position as required by the Act. After its issuance of the memorandum, and after Ms. Minard had taken leave and undergone surgery, ITC discovered that Ms. Minard was not an eligible employee under the Act at the pertinent time because when she requested leave IRC employed less than 50 employees at or within 75 miles of the worksite at which she was employed. Ms. Minard filed suit under the FMLA on February 26, 2003. ITC answered that Minard was not an "eligible employee" under the FMLA. Ms. Minard amended her complaint to contend, in the alternative, that ITC is equitably estopped to deny that she was an eligible employee under the FMLA when she requested leave, because she relied to her detriment upon IRC's representation that she was at that time an eligible employee under the Act and therefore entitled to reinstatement upon returning from her medical leave.

ITC moved for summary judgment, on the ground that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because on the date Ms. Minard requested leave it employed less than 50 employees within 75 miles of the worksite where she was employed. Ms. Minard opposed the motion with evidence attempting to show that the prescribed workforce exceeded 50 employees at that time and, alternatively, that she had relied to her detriment upon ITC's representation that she was an eligible employee under the FMLA and entitled to the requested leave and subsequent reinstatement.

The district court granted ITC's motion for summary judgment. Without giving reasons the court's terse written ruling stated:

The Court finds that the defendant is not an employer within the meaning of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 and that the Act does not apply under the facts of this case. Likewise, the Court finds that the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply.¹⁰

Although the order states that the district court found that ITC was not an "employer" under the Act, we conclude that the court meant that Ms. Minard was not an "eligible employee" under the act. The parties' arguments and summary judgment evidence related to whether the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because ITC employed less than 50 employees within the prescribed worksite radius. Thus, we interpret the district court's ruling as implicitly determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Ms. Minard was not an eligible employee due to there being less than 50 employees within a 75 mile radius of her worksite on the day she requested leave.

Standard of Review

We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment, applying the same standard applicable to the district court's ruling on the motion.¹¹ Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."¹²

Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court, in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corporation, dba Moonlight Café, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006) recently clarified the distinction between the requirements for federal subject matter jurisdiction and the elements of a federal claim for relief. Arbaugh involved an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which makes it unlawful "for an employer . . . to discriminate," inter alia, on the basis of sex.¹³ The Act's jurisdictional provision empowers federal courts to adjudicate civil actions "brought under" Title VII.¹⁴ In a provision defining 13 terms used in Title VII,¹⁵ Congress limited the definition of "employer" to include only those having "fifteen or more employees."¹⁶ The question presented was whether the numerical qualification contained in Title VII's definition of "employer" affected federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction or, instead, delineated a substantive ingredient of a Title VII claim for relief.

The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff on her sexual harassment claim in the total amount of $40,000. After final judgment was entered on the verdict, the employer for the first time challenged the court's subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that it had fewer than 15 employees and therefore was not subject to suit under Title VII. Although recognizing that it was "unfair and a waste of judicial resources," the trial court granted the motion to dismiss because it believed that the 15-or-more employee requirement was jurisdictional.

The Supreme Court rejected that categorization and held that "the numerical threshold does not circumscribe federal-court ...