Minarik, In re

• Decision Date: 03 February 1999
• Docket Number: No. 97-8146,97-8146
• Citation: 166 F.3d 591
• Parties: In re John Paul MINARIK, Petitioner.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 591

166 F.3d 591

In re John Paul MINARIK, Petitioner.

No. 97-8146.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued June 17, 1998.

Decided Feb. 3, 1999.

Vincent R. Baginski (Argued), Pittsburgh, PA, for Petitioner.

Russell K. Broman (Argued), Office of the District Attorney, Pittsburgh, PA, for Respondents.

Before: STAPLETON, SCIRICA and McKEE, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:

We have before us John Minarik's second petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. It was tendered to the District Court after the enactment of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") and transferred to this Court pursuant to the provisions of that act. Minarik's first § 2254 petition was filed prior to AEDPA's passage. We must decide whether the gatekeeping provisions made applicable to "second or successive petitions" by 28 U.S.C. § 2244 as amended by AEDPA should be applied in Minarik's case. We conclude that such application would have no impermissible retroactive effect and, accordingly, that AEDPA's modified version of § 2244 requires us to deny him permission to proceed with his successive petition.

I.

On February 7, 1971, Minarik killed his former fiancee with an ax. In October 1971, Minarik pleaded guilty to the murder. The Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas convicted Minarik of first degree murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Minarik did not pursue a direct appeal. In 1977, Minarik filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Court of Common Pleas granted the motion. That decision, however, was ultimately overturned by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and Minarik was not permitted to withdraw his plea. Commonwealth v. Minarik, 493 Pa. 573, 427 A.2d 623 (Pa.1981).

In 1981, Minarik filed his first federal habeas corpus petition alleging two grounds for relief. First, Minarik claimed that he had not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered his guilty plea because (1) the trial court failed to explain the requisite mental state required for first degree murder, and (2) he had no memory of the events surrounding the murder. Second, Minarik claimed that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's reversal of the Court of Common Pleas' decision allowing Minarik to withdraw his guilty plea violated his due process and equal protection rights. An extensive evidentiary hearing was held to examine the circumstances surrounding Minarik's guilty plea. Two significant sources of testimony highlighted the hearing. First, expert witnesses testified about the possible effects of mixing alcohol and Triavil, an anti-depressant prescription drug that Minarik had been taking at the time of the murder. Second, Minarik's trial counsel, Ralph J. Cappy, testified that he had thoroughly discussed all of the elements of, and defenses to, the first degree murder charge with Minarik before he entered his plea. According to Cappy, Minarik insisted upon pleading guilty against his advice. The District Court denied Minarik's petition and this Court affirmed.

On April 24, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). 110 Stat. 1214. AEDPA substantially revised the law governing federal habeas corpus codified in chapters 153 and 154 of Title 28. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-66. AEDPA contains "gatekeeping" provisions that establish new procedural and substantive standards governing "second or successive" habeas petitions. Id. § 2244. Procedurally, the AEDPA amendments require petitioners to file a motion in the appropriate Court of Appeals requesting an order authorizing the District Court to consider their "second or successive" application. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(A). A three judge panel of the Court of Appeals may grant such a motion only where the petitioner establishes a prima facie case that the application satisfies AEDPA's new substantive standards regarding "second or successive" petitions. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(C). Notably, the new substantive standards governing the allowance of second or successive applications are more rigorous than the pre-AEDPA standard developed by the courts interpreting the prior version of § 2244. See James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 28.3a, at 271 (Supp.1997)("[AEDPA] sharply narrow[ed] the (already extremely narrow) circumstances in which new-claim successive petitions are permitted").

On October 6, 1997, following another unsuccessful bid for post conviction relief in state court, Minarik filed a second federal habeas corpus petition, the subject of this appeal, stating three grounds for relief. First, Minarik claims that his trial counsel's failure to discover the availability of an involuntary intoxication defense deprived him of effective assistance of counsel. Second, Minarik repeats his contention that he did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily enter his guilty plea. Third, Minarik claims that the state court violated his Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment rights when it refused to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding his claim that trial counsel disregarded his request to file a direct appeal.

Because Minarik had filed a previous habeas petition in 1981, the District Court transferred Minarik's second petition to this Court to permit us to perform our new gatekeeping function under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Discerning a possible retroactivity problem, we requested that the parties brief the issue of whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244's "second or successive" petition provisions, as amended by AEDPA, apply in a case where the first petition was filed prior to AEDPA's enactment.

II.

Two Supreme Court decisions guide our retroactivity analysis in this case. First, we must consider Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994), the landmark case which establishes the analytical framework governing retroactivity issues. Second, we must consult the Court's more recent decision in Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997), where it provided additional guidance regarding Landgraf retroactivity analysis in a case involving AEDPA.

In Landgraf, the Court considered whether provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that provided expanded rights to recover compensatory and punitive damages in Title VII suits, and the right to a jury trial in cases involving claims for such damages, could be applied to cases pending when the Act took effect. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 247, 114 S.Ct. 1483. The Court found in its case law a strong historical presumption against the retroactive application of statutes:

[T]he presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted. For that reason, the principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal. In a free dynamic society, creativity in both commercial and artistic endeavors is fostered by a rule of law that gives people confidence about the legal consequences of their actions.

Id. at 265-66, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (citations omitted). The Court noted that several constitutional provisions manifest similar anti-retroactivity principles. ¹ Recognizing the "limited scope" of the constitutional restrictions, however, the Court indicated that, absent a violation of such a constitutional provision, the traditional anti-retroactivity presumption permits retroactive application only where "Congress first makes its intention clear [so as to leave no question] that Congress itself has determined that the benefits of retroactivity outweigh the potential for disruption or unfairness." Id. at 268, 114 S.Ct. 1483. The Court then announced a two part test for statutory retroactivity problems:

When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the court's first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules. When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the court must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result.

Id. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483.

Finally, the Landgraf Court identified three categories in which "application of new statutes passed after the events in suit is unquestionably proper" even "absent specific legislative authorization." Id. at 273, 114 S.Ct. 1483. First, "when the intervening statute authorizes or affects the propriety of prospective relief, the application of the new provision is not retroactive." Id. at 273, 114 S.Ct. 1483. Second, courts may apply statutes "conferring or ousting jurisdiction, whether or not jurisdiction lay when the underlying conduct occurred or when the suit was filed." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274, 114 S.Ct. 1483. Third, "[c]hanges in procedural rules may often be applied in suits arising before their enactment without raising concerns about retroactivity." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 275, 114 S.Ct. 1483.

Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the 1991 Act's damages provisions could not be applied to cases pending at the time of enactment because Congress failed to provide an "explicit command" regarding retroactivity and applying the new damages provisions would have a "genuine...