Skf Usa Inc. v. U.S.

Decision Date22 March 2000
Docket NumberNo. 99-08-00473.,Slip Op. 00-28,99-08-00473.
Citation94 F.Supp.2d 1351
PartiesSKF USA INC. and SKF GmbH, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant, The Torrington Company, Defendant-Intervenor.
CourtU.S. Court of International Trade

David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General; David M. Cohen, Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Velta A. Melnbrencis, Assistant Director; David R. Mason, Office of the Chief Counsel for Import Administration, United States Department of Commerce, for defendant, of counsel.

Stewart and Stewart Terence P. Stewart, Wesley K. Caine, Geert De Prest and Lane S. Hurewitz, Washington, DC, for the Torrington Company.

OPINION

TSOUCALAS, Senior Judge.

Plaintiffs, SKF USA Inc. and SKF GmbH (collectively "SKF"), move pursuant to USCIT R. 56.2 for judgment upon the agency record challenging various aspects of the Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration's ("Commerce") final determination, entitled Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews ("Final Results"), 64 Fed.Reg. 35,590 (July 1, 1999).

Specifically, SKF contends that Commerce erred in: (1) conducting a duty absorption inquiry under 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(4) (1994) for the ninth administrative review of the applicable antidumping duty order; (2) determining that it applied a reasonable duty absorption methodology and that duty absorption had in fact occurred; (3) using aggregate data of all foreign like products under consideration for normal value ("NV") in calculating profit for constructed value ("CV") under 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(2)(A) (1994); and (4) excluding below-cost sales from the CV profit calculation.

Commerce responds that it properly: (1) conducted a duty absorption inquiry under § 1675(a)(4); (2) used a reasonable methodology and determined that duty absorption existed; (3) calculated CV profit pursuant to § 1677b(e)(2)(A); and (4) excluded below-cost sales from the CV profit calculation. The Torrington Company ("Torrington") presents arguments similar to those of the defendant.

The Court will address each of these arguments in turn.

BACKGROUND

On May 15, 1989, Commerce published antidumping duty orders on antifriction bearings (other than tapered roller bearings) and parts thereof ("AFBs") imported from several countries, including Germany. See Antidumping Duty Orders: Ball Bearings, Cylindrical Roller Bearings and Spherical Plain Bearings and Parts Thereof From the Federal Republic of Germany, 54 Fed.Reg. 20,900. This case concerns the ninth administrative review of the antidumping duty order on AFBs from Germany for the period of review ("POR") covering May 1, 1997 through April 30, 1998. See Final Results, 64 Fed. Reg. at 35,590. In accordance with 19 C.F.R. § 351.213 (1998), Commerce initiated the ninth review on June 29, 1998. See Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews and Request for Revocation in Part, 63 Fed.Reg. 35,188. On February 23, 1999, Commerce published the preliminary results of the ninth review. See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews and Partial Rescission of Administrative Reviews ("Preliminary Results"), 64 Fed. Reg. 8790. Commerce published the Final Results on July 1, 1999. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 35,590.

Since the administrative review at issue was initiated after December 31, 1994, the applicable law in this case is the antidumping statute as amended by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act ("URAA"), Pub.L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (effective Jan. 1, 1995).

JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a) (1994) and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1994).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court will uphold Commerce's final determination in an antidumping administrative review unless it is "unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (1994).

I. Substantial Evidence Test

Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)). Substantial evidence "is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence." Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966) (citations omitted). Moreover, "[t]he court may not substitute its judgment for that of the [agency] when the choice is `between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo.'" American Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, 8 CIT 20, 22, 590 F.Supp. 1273, 1276 (1984) (quoting Penntech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18, 22-23 (1st Cir.1983) (quoting, in turn, Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488, 71 S.Ct. 456)).

II. Chevron Two-Step Analysis

To determine whether Commerce's interpretation and application of the antidumping statute is "in accordance with law," the Court must undertake the two-step analysis prescribed by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Under the first step, the Court reviews Commerce's construction of a statutory provision to determine whether "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." Id. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778. "To ascertain whether Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, [the Court] employ[s] the `traditional tools of statutory construction.'" Timex V.I., Inc. v. United States, 157 F.3d 879, 882 (Fed.Cir.1998) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778). "The first and foremost `tool' is the statute's text, giving it its plain meaning. Because a statute's text is Congress's final expression of its intent, if the text answers the question, that is the end of the matter." Id. (citations omitted). Beyond the statute's text, the tools of statutory construction "include the statute's structure, canons of statutory construction, and legislative history." Id. (citations omitted); but see Floral Trade Council v. United States, 23 CIT ___, 41 F.Supp.2d 319, 323 n. 6 (1999) (noting that "[n]ot all rules of statutory construction rise to the level of a canon, however") (citation omitted).

If, after employing the first prong of Chevron, the Court determines that the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the Court becomes whether Commerce's construction of the statute is permissible. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Essentially, this is an inquiry into the reasonableness of Commerce's interpretation. See Fujitsu Gen. Ltd. v. United States, 88 F.3d 1034, 1038 (Fed.Cir.1996). Provided Commerce has acted rationally, the Court may not substitute its judgment for the agency's. See IPSCO, Inc. v. United States, 965 F.2d 1056, 1061 (Fed.Cir.1992); see also Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed.Cir.1994) (holding that "a court must defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute even if the court might have preferred another"). The "[C]ourt will sustain the determination if it is reasonable and supported by the record as a whole, including whatever fairly detracts from the substantiality of the evidence." Negev Phosphates, Ltd. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 12 CIT 1074, 1077, 699 F.Supp. 938, 942 (1988) (citations omitted). "In determining whether Commerce's interpretation is reasonable, the Court considers, among other factors, the express terms of the provisions at issue, the objectives of those provisions and the objectives of the antidumping scheme as a whole." Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., v. United States, 22 CIT ___, ___, 15 F.Supp.2d 807, 813 (1998).

DISCUSSION
I. Commerce's Duty Absorption Inquiry
A. Background

During an administrative review initiated two or four years after the "publication" of an antidumping duty order, Commerce, if requested by a domestic interested party, "shall determine whether antidumping duties have been absorbed by a foreign producer or exporter subject to the order if the subject merchandise is sold in the United States through an importer who is affiliated with such foreign producer or exporter." 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(4).1 Commerce shall notify the International Trade Commission ("ITC") of its findings regarding such duty absorption for the ITC to consider in conducting a five-year ("sunset") review under 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c), see 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(4), and the ITC will take such findings into account in determining whether material injury is likely to continue or recur if an order were revoked under § 1675(c), see 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)(1)(D).

On May 29, 1998 and July 29, 1998, Torrington requested that Commerce conduct a duty absorption inquiry pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(4) with respect to various respondents, including SKF, to determine whether antidumping duties had been absorbed during the POR. See Final Results, 64 Fed.Reg. at 35,600. SKF and other respondents objected to such an inquiry, maintaining that Commerce was without statutory authority to conduct a duty absorption inquiry for the subject review. See id.

In the Final Results,...

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