Minaya v. Massachusetts Credit Union Share Ins. Corp.
Decision Date | 28 August 1984 |
Citation | 467 N.E.2d 874,392 Mass. 904 |
Parties | Jose MINAYA et al. 1 v. MASSACHUSETTS CREDIT UNION SHARE INSURANCE CORPORATION. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
John P. McGloin, Lynn, for plaintiffs.
Michael P. Marnik, Lynn, for defendant.
Before WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and LYNCH, JJ.
In this action, the plaintiffs allege that their dwellings were destroyed by a fire proximately caused by the dangerous and hazardous conditions maintained by the defendant on an adjacent property. The defendant's answer was a denial, and an affirmative defense that, on the date of the fire, September 9, 1982, the owner of the property was the city of Lynn, because, on August 13, 1982, a final decree in the city's tax lien case against the defendant had been recorded. In its answer, the defendant claimed that it "was not in control, did not own nor have any interest in the premises" on the date of the fire. The defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings. Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(c), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). A Superior Court judge allowed the defendant's motion, and we granted the plaintiffs' application for direct appellate review. We reverse.
The effect of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is "to challenge the legal sufficiency of the complaint." Burlington v. District Attorney for the N. Dist., 381 Mass. 717, 717-718, 412 N.E.2d 331 (1980). See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States, 490 F.Supp. 328, 329 n. 1 (E.D.N.Y.1980) (). "For purposes of the court's consideration of the [rule 12(c) ] motion, all of the well pleaded factual allegations in the adversary's pleadings are assumed to be true and all contravening assertions in the movant's pleadings are taken to be false." 5 C.A. Wright & A.R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1368, at 691 (1969).
The essence of the complaint is that the defendant's property was in a dangerous and hazardous condition, and that the condition of the property created a nuisance for which the defendant was liable. The plaintiffs assert that "[a]s a direct and proximate result of the nuisance created or allowed to exist by the defendant and the negligence, or intentional acts of the defendant as aforesaid, the plaintiff[s'] personal property and [that] of the plaintiff[s'] famil[ies] [was] damaged and destroyed by fire, all to the plaintiff[s'] damage."
The parties do not dispute the fact that on the date of the fire, September 9, 1982, the defendant did not own the property because on August 13, 1982, the city of Lynn had recorded a final decree in its tax lien case against the defendant. The complaint, however, does allege that the defendant continued to maintain the nuisance "for several days" after the city recorded its tax lien.
The narrow issue before us is whether the fact that title to the property was in the city of Lynn insulates the defendant from any liability. We conclude that it may not, and therefore we remand for further proceedings.
A transfer of ownership of land does, in most cases, relieve the prior owner of liability for dangerous conditions existing on the land. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 352 (1965). There is, however, an exception to this general principle which, on the pleadings before us, may apply to the instant case.
The (emphasis supplied). W. Prosser, Torts § 64, at 413 (4th ed. 1971). The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 840A (1977) states that a transferor of land "upon which there is a condition involving a nuisance for which he would be subject to liability if he continued in possession remains subject to liability for the continuation of the nuisance after he transfers the land ... until the vendee or lessee has had reasonable opportunity to discover the condition and abate it." See id., § 373 ( ). See also O'Connor v. Altus, 67 N.J. 106, 114, 335 A.2d 545 (1975) (). Cf. Walter v. Wagner, 225 Ky. 255, 258, 8 S.W.2d 421 (1928) () .
Further, "[p]ublic policy in a civilized community requires that there be someone to be held responsible for a private nuisance on each piece of real estate, and, particularly in an urban area,...
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