Mindis Metals v. Oilfield Motor & Control

• Decision Date: 29 January 2004
• Docket Number: No. 14-02-01040-CV.,No. 14-02-01050-CV.,14-02-01040-CV.,14-02-01050-CV.
• Citation: 132 S.W.3d 477
• Parties: MINDIS METALS, INC. d/b/a Mindis Recycling, Appellant v. OILFIELD MOTOR & CONTROL, INC., Appellee. and In re Mindis Metals, Inc. d/b/a Mindis Recycling, Relator.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

132 S.W.3d 477

MINDIS METALS, INC. d/b/a Mindis Recycling, Appellant v. OILFIELD MOTOR & CONTROL, INC., Appellee. and In re Mindis Metals, Inc. d/b/a Mindis Recycling, Relator.

No. 14-02-01040-CV.

No. 14-02-01050-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

January 29, 2004.

Rehearing Overruled April 22, 2004.

Gary S. Freed, Atlanta, GA, Todd J. Zucker, Houston, for appellant.

Tanya Nicole Garrison, Jeffery K. Work, Katy, for appellees.

Panel consists of Justices EDELMAN, SEYMORE, and GUZMAN.

SUBSTITUTE OPINION

CHARLES W. SEYMORE, Justice.

Appellee's/Relator's Motion for Rehearing is overruled. The original opinion issued on April 17, 2003 is withdrawn, and the court issues this substitute opinion.

Mindis Metals, Inc. d/b/a Mindis Recycling filed a petition for writ of mandamus and an appeal following the trial court's order vacating a domesticated foreign judgment. We consolidated these proceedings. We deny the petition for writ of mandamus. We reverse and render, reinstating the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1996, Mindis, a Georgia company, purchased some machinery from OMC Controls, Ltd. ("Controls"), OMC Motor & Control Services, Inc. ("OMC Services"), and Oilfield Motor & Control, Inc. ("Oilfield") [collectively, "the defendant-sellers"], all Texas companies. Mindis contends the machinery was defective and the defendant-sellers refused to honor their warranty. In 1998, Mindis sued the three defendant-sellers in Georgia state court for breach of contract and breach of express and implied warranties. Mindis sought to recover the sums it expended repairing the machinery. An attorney representing the three defendant-sellers filed an answer. After extensive discovery, the Georgia court permitted the defendant-sellers' counsel to withdraw from the case.

In February 2001, the Georgia court entered summary judgment against all three defendant-sellers on liability and set a date for trial on unliquidated damages. At the first trial setting in August 2001, new defense counsel, acting only for Oilfield, requested and obtained a sixty-day continuance. At the second trial setting in November 2001, new counsel for Oilfield announced that OMC Services had filed for bankruptcy. At that time, the attorney stated that he did not represent any defendant-seller; however, he requested a continuance on behalf of the two non-bankrupt defendant-sellers and departed when it was denied. The trial judge allowed Mindis to proceed against Oilfield and Controls. On November 20, 2001, Mindis obtained a judgment in the amount of $116,653.88, jointly and severally, against Oilfield and Controls. Oilfield appealed the Georgia judgment; however, no supersedeas bond was purchased and filed in Georgia.

Meanwhile, Mindis duly domesticated the Georgia judgment in Texas by filing a notice and authenticated copy in the Harris County District Clerk's office. Less than thirty days later, Oilfield filed a Motion to Vacate the Judgment.¹ After it was overruled by operation of law, Oilfield filed a Supplemental Motion to Vacate. Subsequently, while the trial court retained plenary power, it vacated the domesticated judgment without stating a reason for its ruling. Mindis then filed a petition for writ of mandamus and this appeal. After oral argument, Mindis filed its Supplement to Petition for Writ of Mandamus informing us that the Georgia appeal has been dismissed "as abandoned."²

II. MANDAMUS OR APPEAL?

Because the vehicle for challenging an order vacating a domesticated foreign judgment is unclear, Mindis filed both a petition for writ of mandamus and an appeal. In its first issue, Mindis suggests that mandamus is appropriate because the order is interlocutory, and, thus, not appealable.³ See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex.1992) (holding mandamus will not issue if there is an adequate remedy by appeal).

Our sister courts have reviewed orders vacating domesticated foreign judgments both as mandamus proceedings and as appeals. Compare In re Jackson Person & Associates, Inc., 94 S.W.3d 815 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, orig. proceeding); Corporate Leasing Int'l, Inc. v. Bridewell, 896 S.W.2d 419 (Tex.App.-Waco 1995, orig. proceeding); Trinity Capital Corp. v. Briones, 847 S.W.2d 324 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1993, orig. proceeding); Merritt v. Harless, 685 S.W.2d 708 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1984, orig. proceeding) with Brown's Inc. v. Modern Welding Co., 54 S.W.3d 450 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.) (affirming trial court order denying petition for domestication and vacating Washington state judgment); Lawrence Sys., Inc. v. Superior Feeders, Inc., 880 S.W.2d 203 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1994, writ denied) (affirming order of trial court vacating and rendering null and unenforceable Oklahoma court order); Minuteman Press Int'l, Inc. v. Sparks, 782 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ) (reversing trial court's refusal to give full faith and credit to New York judgment); Strick Lease, Inc. v. Cutler, 759 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, no writ) (affirming stay of execution of Pennsylvania judgment for lack of in personam jurisdiction). We conclude that an appeal, rather than a mandamus proceeding, is the better vehicle for reviewing the order in this case.

With a few mostly statutory exceptions, an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment or order. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex.2001). A judgment or order is final for purposes of appeal if it disposes of all parties and all issues in a case, so that no further action is required by the trial court, except as necessary to carry out the decree. See id.; Harper v. Welchem, Inc., 799 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ) (citing Wagner v. Warnasch, 156 Tex. 334, 338, 295 S.W.2d 890, 892 (1956)). The finality of a judgment or order is controlled by its substance, not its label or form. See Mathes v. Kelton, 569 S.W.2d 876, 878 n. 3 (Tex. 1978); Int'l Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Spray, 468 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tex.1971); Quanaim v. Frasco Rest. & Catering, 17 S.W.3d 30, 36-37 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000 pet. denied); Ferguson v. Naylor, 860 S.W.2d 123, 129 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1993, writ denied); see also In re Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, 85 S.W.3d 201, 205 (Tex.2002) (citing Qwest Communications Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 336 (Tex.2000)).

Here, Mindis sought to enforce the Georgia judgment in Texas pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act ("UEFJA") by filing an authenticated copy with the Texas court. See generally Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 35.001-.008 (Vernon 1997). The judgment became enforceable as a Texas judgment on the date it was filed. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 35.003; Walnut Equip. Leasing Co., Inc. v. Wu, 920 S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tex.1996). It was subject to the same defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying a judgment as a judgment of the Texas court. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 35.003(c).

A motion contesting enforcement of a foreign judgment operates as a motion for new trial. See Moncrief v. Harvey, 805 S.W.2d 20, 23 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, no writ) (analogizing motion to vacate to motion for new trial with respect to filing deadlines and appellate timetables). Ordinarily, an order granting a new trial is interlocutory, and not appealable. See Cummins v. Paisan Constr. Co., 682 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex.1984). However, an order that denies enforcement of a foreign judgment is not necessarily interlocutory in the same manner as a traditional order granting a new trial and/or vacating a judgment. A new "trial" is not possible because there was no Texas trial in the first place; the filing of the foreign judgment comprises both an original petition and a final judgment. See Walnut Equip. Leasing, 920 S.W.2d at 286. Obviously, a Texas court cannot order a new trial to take place in the foreign jurisdiction.

Here, the trial court did not order a "new trial" in terms of returning the parties to their positions before the Georgia judgment was rendered.⁴ It simply ruled that "the foreign Judgment filed by Mindis is not entitled to full faith and credit and is not enforceable in the State of Texas and that the filing of the foreign judgment is of no consequence or effect." Once the trial court ruled that the Georgia judgment was not enforceable in Texas, it terminated the outstanding claims and rights of all parties to this UEFJA proceeding, and there remained nothing for it to adjudicate. Accordingly, the order vacating the judgment was final for purposes of appeal. See Reading & Bates Constr. Co. v. Lloyd, 1995 WL 662623, at *1 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 9, 1995, orig. proceeding) (not designated for publication) (stating order refusing to recognize foreign judgment was final and appealable because relator brought the action solely for recognition and enforcement of the judgment).

Further, a creditor seeking to enforce a foreign judgment by filing a common-law action may appeal an adverse ruling. See, e.g., McElreath v. McElreath, 162 Tex. 190, 345 S.W.2d 722 (1961).⁵ Similarly, a creditor seeking to enforce a foreign judgment under the UEFJA should be allowed to appeal an adverse ruling. In addition, a debtor may appeal the denial of a motion to vacate a judgment in a UEFJA proceeding because a "judgment" remains in place. See, e.g., Walnut Equip. Leasing, 920 S.W.2d at 285; Cash Register Sales & Serv. of Houston, Inc. v. Copelco Capital, Inc., 62 S.W.3d 278 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.). Allowing a creditor also to appeal an adverse order in a UEFJA proceeding promotes parity to creditors.

Accordingly, the trial court's order vacating the domesticated Georgia judgment is appealable. We overrule Mindis's first issue and deny its petition for writ of mandamus.

III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY VACATING THE DOMESTICATED FOREIGN JUDGMENT?

Mindis's second and third issues constitute its...