Miners v. Cargill Communications, Inc., 96-1985

• Decision Date: 09 May 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-1985,96-1985
• Citation: 113 F.3d 820
• Parties: , 6 A.D. Cases 1229, 10 NDLR P 1 Annie MINERS, Appellant, v. CARGILL COMMUNICATIONS, INC., a Minnesota corporation, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 820

113 F.3d 820

65 USLW 2775, 6 A.D. Cases 1229, 10 NDLR P 1

Annie MINERS, Appellant, v. CARGILL COMMUNICATIONS, INC., a Minnesota corporation, Appellee.

No. 96-1985.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 12, 1996.

Decided May 9, 1997.

George Antrim, III, Minneapolis, MN, argued (Jean E. Boos, on the brief), for Appellant.

Christopher J. Harristhal, Bloomington, MN, argued (C. Erik Hawes, on the brief), for Appellee.

Before BOWMAN and HEANEY, Circuit Judges, and STROM, ¹ District Judge.

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

Annie Miners appeals from a district court order granting summary judgment to her former employer, Cargill Communications, Inc. (Cargill) on her claim of employment discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and dismissing without prejudice her claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn.Stat. §§ 363.01-363.14, and for breach of contract. Miners claims Cargill fired her because it regarded her as being an alcoholic. Cargill responds that it fired Miners for violating a company policy that prohibited drinking and driving. In the alternative, Cargill claims that even if it regarded Miners to be an alcoholic, its offer of treatment for that condition was an appropriate accommodation of her disability, the refusal of which justified her termination. We hold that summary judgment was improvidently granted and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

Miners worked as promotions director for REV 105, a radio station owned by Cargill. Her employment contract permitted Cargill to terminate Miners only if she failed to substantially perform her obligations under the contract or failed to adhere to company policy. Miners was responsible for organizing the radio station's promotional events, which were held primarily in nightclubs and bars. Cargill gave Miners a company van to drive in connection with those responsibilities.

During Miners' employment, Cargill maintained policies regarding employee consumption of alcohol. On May 2, 1995, the company issued a memorandum to all employees prohibiting consumption of alcoholic beverages while working at company events and announcing that violating the policy would be grounds for dismissal. ² Cargill contends that it also disseminated an unwritten company policy prohibiting drinking alcohol and driving company vehicles and that Miners learned of the policy at department-head meetings. Cargill acknowledges, however, that Miners could not attend all of the meetings at which Cargill claims to have disclosed the rule.

In May 1994, Mark Lang became Miners' supervisor. Lang had reason to be particularly sensitive to issues of drug or alcohol abuse because he had received treatment for chemical dependency in Florida in 1987 and again in Minneapolis in 1989 and remains enrolled in substance abuse rehabilitation programs.

A month prior to Lang's arrival, Miners failed to report to work one morning. She later explained to the station's management that she had been out drinking the night before. Management noted the incident by memorandum in her personnel file. Lang saw this entry after becoming Miners' supervisor.

A year later, REV 105 management became suspicious that Miners had been drinking prior to driving the company van. This suspicion prompted them to hire Dan Seman, a private investigator, to follow Miners. On June 6, 1995, Seman observed Miners drinking alcoholic beverages at several Minneapolis bars and then driving away in the company van. Again, on the evening of June 8, Seman observed Miners consuming alcohol at several bars with other Cargill employees and some of the station's advertising clients. Miners, who weighed approximately 250 pounds, admits that she drank five alcoholic beverages that night over the course of at least six hours, during which time she also consumed food. ³ After observing Miners drinking, Seman called Lang. Miners left the bar with a friend and proceeded to the parking ramp where the van was parked. Lang was waiting at the parking lot when Miners arrived and demanded the keys to the van. Miners surrendered the keys and Lang drove away in the van.

The next day, Cargill's president, John Kuehne, informed Miners that her actions the previous night constituted grounds for termination. He offered her the opportunity to attend a chemical dependency treatment program "[d]ue to the possibility that [Miners] may be an alcoholic." (Appellant's App. at 21 (Kuehne Aff. p 7).) He told Miners that she must either enter and complete the program with no loss in pay or job position or be fired. After considering her options for several days, Miners rejected the offer of treatment. Cargill immediately fired her. At no point did Miners admit to being an alcoholic.

Miners brought an action against Cargill claiming the company violated the ADA and sections of the Minnesota Human Rights Act by firing her because it regarded her as an alcoholic. Cargill alleged in its answer and by affidavits that it fired Miners because she broke a company rule by drinking before driving a company vehicle, thereby violating the terms of her contract. Miners asserts that Cargill's explanation for firing her is a pretext for its discriminatory motivation: its perception that she was an alcoholic. In support, Miners contends that she was never informed of the rule she purportedly violated, that other Cargill employees who were assigned company vehicles consumed alcohol before driving the vehicles and were not fired, and that Cargill's offer of treatment demonstrates that the management thought she was an alcoholic.

Cargill moved for summary judgment. The district court granted Cargill's motion for summary judgment on Miners' ADA claim, stating in substance that Cargill "gave an honest explanation" for Miners' termination. ⁴ In addition, the court noted that the private investigator's report "could, and did, lead to a fear of tort liability for Cargill." Because of its decision with respect to the ADA claim, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Miners' state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice. We reverse.

II.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1340 (8th Cir.1994). District courts may grant motions for summary judgment where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [ ] the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P 56(c). Summary judgment is appropriate only where the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Thus, the moving party must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact remain to be resolved. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In determining whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment, the court must resolve all controversies in favor of the non-moving party, take the non-movant's evidence as true, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of that party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). In opposing a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant may not rest on allegations or denials in its pleadings but must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. at 2514.

In the employment discrimination context, a plaintiff must present a prima facie case to survive a defendant's motion for summary judgment. To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that she was a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA, that she was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, and that she suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Price v. S-B Power Tool, 75 F.3d 362, 365 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 274, 136 L.Ed.2d 197 (1996).

Once a plaintiff has made out her prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The burden of production then shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer's proffered reason is a pretext for unlawful discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2747-48, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). After the burden of production has shifted back to the plaintiff, the evidence produced to show a prima facie case and the "inferences drawn therefrom may be considered by the trier of fact on the issue of whether the [employer's] explanation is pretextual." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n. 10, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1095 n. 10, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).

Without deciding whether Miners presented a prima facie case of discrimination, the district court held that she had not produced evidence sufficient for a jury to find that Cargill's proffered reason for firing her was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. In our view, Miners both presented a prima facie case under the ADA and offered sufficient evidence of pretext to survive summary judgment.

Miners made out a prima facie case of discrimination under ADA. First, she introduced evidence sufficient to establish that Cargill regarded her as being an alcoholic, thus making her disabled within the meaning of the ADA. ⁵ Cargill offered Miners the choice between entering a chemical-abuse treatment program or being fired, and Lang was aware that Miners had missed a day of work as a result of her drinking on a previous evening. Second, Miners presented ample evidence from which a jury could conclude that she was...