Young v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc.
| Decision Date | 19 December 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:96 CV 1890 DDN.,4:96 CV 1890 DDN. |
| Citation | 990 F.Supp. 748 |
| Parties | Robert YOUNG, Plaintiff, v. WARNER-JENKINSON CO., INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Robert J. Radice, Horas and Radice, L.L.C., St. Louis, MO, Kenneth E. Fleischmann, St. Louis, MO, for Robert Young.
James N. Foster, Jr., Partner, John B. Renick, Associate, Stephen B. Maule, McMahon and Berger, St. Louis, MO, for Warner-Jenkinson Company, Inc.
This matter is before the Court on defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 37)1 on plaintiffs second amended complaint (Doc. No. 31). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Oral argument was heard on this motion on October 2, 1997.
Plaintiff Robert Young commenced this action, alleging that defendant Warner-Jenkinson Co., his former employer, discriminated against him on the basis of race and disability, in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Mo.Rev. Stat. § 213.010 et seq.; and Mo.Rev.Stat. § 287.780, retaliation for exercising his rights under the Missouri workers' compensation laws.
Plaintiff alleges that he applied for several full-time regular positions with defendant's company but such employment was denied on the basis of race or disability or both, and that he was fired from his full-time temporary position with defendant's company because of race or disability, in retaliation for having filed a worker's compensation claim, or a combination thereof. Pl.Mem., Doc. No. 40, at 1.
The undisputed facts are as follows. Plaintiff is an African-American, hired by defendant on November 1, 1993 as a full-time but temporary employee. He was assigned to the maintenance department at defendant's plant in St. Louis. He suffered from no disability at the time of hiring. On March 17, 1994 plaintiff was seriously injured at work when an overhead door damaged his foot, ultimately requiring partial amputation. He filed a worker's compensation claim, agreeing to a compromise settlement in June 1994. He returned to work, with the aid of a prosthesis, in October 1994. He was medically released from work restrictions in March 1995. In April or May of 1995 he was diagnosed with diabetes. He was transferred to the dispersions department in August 1995. In December 1995 he was involuntarily discharged by defendant. Def. Mem., Doc. No. 37, 1-8; Pl.Mem., Doc. No. 40, 2-3. During plaintiff's employment, his supervisors included Ed Crumer, manager of employee relations at the plant (who replaced Andrew Hollimon, manager when plaintiff was hired); Jim Huck, manager of maintenance; Al Schneider, foreman of dispersions; and Dan Lauff, plant manager.
Defendant has moved for summary judgment on all counts. Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The nonmovant's evidence is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). However, in the employment discrimination context "summary judgments should be used sparingly." Chock v. Northwest Airlines, 113 F.3d 861, 862 (8th Cir. 1997); Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir.1994).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion or national origin. The order and allocation of proof in cases where there is no direct evidence of discrimination is governed by the three-stage burden shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) See Jetton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 121 F.3d 423, 425 (8th Cir.1997). This analysis is also used for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the ADA, and the MHRA. Roxas v. Presentation College, 90 F.3d 310, 315 (8th Cir.1996); Price v. S-B Power Tool, 75 F.3d 362, 364-65 (8th Cir.1996), cert denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 274, 136 L.Ed.2d 197 (1996); McLaughlin v. Esselte Pendaflex Corp., 50 F.3d 507, 510-11 (8th Cir.1995).
Initially, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination; if done, the burden shifts to the defendant employer, who must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, in order to rebut a presumption of discrimination; if done, the presumption drops, and plaintiff has the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision, i.e., may prove pretext. Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 14 F.3d 1305, 1309 (8th Cir.1994). However, at all times, the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuasion to show the adverse employment action was a result of intentional, unlawful discrimination. Kobrin v. University of Minnesota, 121 F.3d 408, 413-14 (Kobrin II)(8th Cir.1997). To succeed against a motion for summary judgment, plaintiff must present sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination by defendant to create a genuine issue of fact for trial. Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1337 (8th Cir.1996).
The following elements will establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in a Title VII analysis: (1) plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) plaintiff met applicable job qualifications; (3) despite qualifications, adverse employment action was taken against him; and (4) the action occurred in circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory motivation. Thomas v. Runyon, 108 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir.1997); Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 14 F.3d at 1308. To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, plaintiff must show that he 1) is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; 2) is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job (either with or without reasonable accommodation); and 3) has suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances from which an inference of unlawful discrimination arises. Price v. S-B Power Tool, 75 F.3d 362, 365 (8th Cir.1996); Poynton v. Special Sch.Dist. of St. Louis Co., 949 F.Supp. 1407, 1413 (E.D.Mo.1996).
Plaintiff claims that defendant refused to hire him for four jobs because of his race and/or disability. Plaintiff admits that defendant refused to hire him for six jobs before his injury, but not because of illegal discrimination. Pl.Mem., Doc. No. 40, at 12. Plaintiff argued at the hearing that the post-injury failure-to-hire claims mainly involved his disability but that race also played a part.
Under Title VII it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Under the ADA it is unlawful to discriminate against "a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
A plaintiff may prove disability by showing that he either (1) has a disability as defined under the ADA, (2) suffers from a history of such a disability, or (3) is perceived by his employer as having such a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C); Snow v. Ridgeview Medical Center, 128 F.3d 1201, 1205, 1206-07 n. 3 (8th Cir.1997). Disability is defined as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the plaintiff's major life activities; these include caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, working, sitting, standing or lifting. Id., at 1206 and 1206-07 n. 3. The inability to perform a single particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working; rather, the impairment must prevent the appellant from performing an entire class or broad range of jobs as compared to the average person possessing comparable training, skills and abilities. Id., at 1206; Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid Am., Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir. 1996). The availability and use of a mitigating measure, such as a prosthetic device, is not to be considered in the determination. Doane v. City Of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir.1997) (reh'g denied); Sicard v. City of Sioux City, 950 F.Supp. 1420, 1422-23 (N.D.Iowa, 1996).
Plaintiff asserts that he meets the prima facie requirements for both the racial discrimination and the disability discrimination claims. As an African-American, plaintiff is a member of a protected class. He applied for, and there is at least some evidence that he was qualified for several open positions. He was rejected for all of them. However, in three out of four of those cases, the positions were filled by African-Americans. Contrary to defendant s assertions (Def.Mot., Doc. No. 37 at 9), this last element is not dispositive of the racial discrimination claim. Rinehart v. City of Independence, 35 F.3d 1263, 1265-66 (8th Cir.1994) cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1096, 115 S.Ct. 1822, 131 L.Ed.2d 744 (1995) (...
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