Ministries v. Alabama, 2:15-cv-02193-LSC

• Decision Date: 01 March 2017
• Docket Number: 2:15-cv-02193-LSC
• Parties: GREATER BIRMINGHAM MINISTRIES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF ALABAMA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

GREATER BIRMINGHAM MINISTRIES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF ALABAMA, et al., Defendants.

2:15-cv-02193-LSC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

March 1, 2017

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

On December 6, 2016, Plaintiffs, Greater Birmingham Ministries, the Alabama State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("the Alabama NAACP"), Giovana Ambrosio, Debra Silvers, Elizabeth Ware, and Shameka Harris, filed a Second Amended Complaint against Defendants, the State of Alabama ("the State"), Robert J. Bentley in his official capacity as Governor of Alabama ("the Governor"), Steven T. Marshall in his official capacity as Alabama's Attorney General ("the Attorney General"),¹ John Merrill in his official capacity as Alabama's Secretary of State ("the Secretary ofState"), and Stan Stabler in his official capacity as the Secretary of the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency ("the ALEA Secretary").² (Doc. 112.)

Plaintiffs seek to invalidate all or parts of section 17-9-30 of the Alabama Code (Alabama's "Photo ID Law"), which requires voters to "provide valid photo identification to an appropriate election official prior to voting," subject to some exceptions. Ala. Code § 17-9-30(a). Plaintiffs claim that the Photo ID Law violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("VRA"), 52 U.S.C. § 10301,³ because it was conceived or operates to abridge or deny the right to vote on account of race,color, or language minority status (Count One of the Second Amended Complaint), and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see U.S. Const., amends. XIV & XV, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because it was purposefully enacted or operates to deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race or color (Counts Three and Four). Plaintiffs also claim that § 17-9-30(e) of the law, which states that a prospective in-person voter without the required photo ID may still cast a regular ballot if two election officials present at the polling place "positively identify" that person, violates the prohibition on tests or devices enumerated in Section 201 of the VRA, 52 U.S.C. § 10501⁴ (Count Two).

Plaintiffs request a declaratory judgment and an injunction enjoining enforcement of the Photo ID Law. Additionally, new to their First and Second Amended Complaints is a request that this Court require the State, the Governor,and the ALEA Secretary to return thirty-one partially-closed ALEA offices, where individuals may purchase driver's licenses and non-driver ID cards, to full hours of operation.

This opinion addresses the Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint jointly filed by the State, the Governor, the Attorney General, and the ALEA Secretary. (Doc. 117.) These defendants argue that they are not proper parties to this case because (1) Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to seek relief against them, and (2) they have sovereign immunity to Plaintiffs' claims and do not fall within the exception to sovereign immunity under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).⁵ This opinion does not address the Secretary of State's separately-filed Motion to Dismiss (doc. 124), in which he concedes that he is a proper defendant and (in large part) attacks the Second Amended Complaint on its merits.⁶

For the reasons stated below,⁷ the joint motion to dismiss will be granted and all claims against the State, the Governor, the Attorney General, and the ALEA Secretary will be dismissed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Both the standing and sovereign immunity arguments raised by Defendants are jurisdictional ones, so in that respect this motion is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Stalley v. Orlando Reg'l Healthcare Sys., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008) (standing); Tomberlin v. Clark, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1213, 1222(N.D. Ala. 2014) (sovereign immunity). "[W]hen a defendant properly challenges subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) the district court is free to independently weigh facts, and . . . . 'satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.'" Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 925 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). The burden of proof on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is on the party averring jurisdiction. Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446 (1942).

Plaintiffs assert that because Defendants have launched a "facial" attack on their complaint by failing to append affidavits or other evidence to support their motion, this Court must look only to the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint, which are presumed to be true. See Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1981).⁸ The following discussion is based upon the facts alleged in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, presumed to be true. Because the Court dismisses this action based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it is not necessary to address Defendants' alternative argument that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Therefore, theCourt's discussion is limited to those facts that are relevant to subject matter jurisdiction.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiffs Lack Article III Standing to Pursue Claims Against the Governor, the Attorney General, and the ALEA Secretary

"Standing is a doctrine that 'stems directly from Article III's "case or controversy" requirement,' and thus it 'implicates our subject matter jurisdiction.'" Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 974 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Norton, 324 F.3d 1229, 1242 (11th Cir. 2003)). As a "threshold jurisdictional question," then, standing "must be addressed prior to and independent of the merits of a party's claims." Id. (quoting Dillard v. Baldwin Cnty. Comm'rs, 225 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir. 2000)). To establish that a case or controversy exists between a plaintiff and each defendant, the plaintiff must establish three elements as to each defendant: (1) an injury in fact—that is, an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—in other words, the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendants, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court; and (3) a likelihood, as opposed to a merely speculative chance,that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision of the court. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62 (1992). Failure to establish any one of the three standing elements deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear the suit. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998).

In suits such as this one, where "the plaintiff seeks a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a state statute and an injunction against its enforcement, a state officer, in order to be an appropriate defendant, must, at a minimum, have some connection with enforcement of the provision at issue." Socialist Workers Party v. Leahy, 145 F.3d 1240, 1248 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). This is so because only when there is a "causal connection between" an officer's "responsibilities and any injury that the plaintiffs might suffer," does an injunction against that officer "redress" the plaintiffs' asserted injuries. Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 919 (9th Cir. 2004); accord Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139, 1145 (10th Cir. 2013).⁹

These principles mean that Plaintiffs have Article III standing¹⁰ to pursue their claims against only the Secretary of State but not the other officer defendants. Plaintiffs seek an injunction prohibiting "Defendants" from "conducting any elections using the Photo ID Law." [Doc. 112 ¶ 195.] But the Governor, the Attorney General, and the ALEA Secretary do not conduct elections. It is the Secretary of State who is "the chief elections official in the state" and is required to "provide uniform guidance for election activities." Ala. Code § 17-1-3(a). The Photo ID Law makes him, and not the other officer defendants, the officer with "rule making authority for the implementation of [the Photo ID Law] under the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act." Id. § 17-9-30(o). The law further makes him the officer who must "inform the public regarding the requirements of [the Photo ID Law] through whatever means deemed necessary." Id. § 17-9-30(n).

1. Plaintiffs Lack Article III Standing to Pursue Claims Against the Governor

Plaintiffs maintain that the Governor is a proper defendant because he "is a constitutional officer who is vested with the supreme executive power of the State." [Doc. 112 ¶ 46.] But courts have allowed a federal claim for an injunction against a state law to proceed against only the official who is responsible for enforcing the law, not additional state officers who merely have a responsibility toenforce state laws more generally. As the Eleventh Circuit explained in addressing these issues under the Eleventh Amendment,

A governor's 'general executive power' is not a basis for jurisdiction in most circumstances. If a governor's general executive power provided a sufficient connection to a state law to permit jurisdiction over him, any state statute could be challenged simply by naming the governor as a defendant. Where the enforcement of a statute is the responsibility of parties other than the governor (the cabinet in this case), the governor's general executive power is insufficient to confer jurisdiction.

Women's Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937, 949-50 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).¹¹ Accord Snoeck v. Brussa, 153 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[A] generalized duty to enforce state law or general supervisory power over the persons responsible for enforcing the challenged provision will...