Minix v. Canarecci

• Decision Date: 08 September 2011
• Docket Number: No. 71A04–1009–CT–591.,71A04–1009–CT–591.
• Citation: 956 N.E.2d 62
• Parties: Cathy MINIX, Individually, as Mother and Natural Guardian of Gregory Zick, deceased, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Gregory Zick, Appellant/Cross–Appellee,v.Sheriff Frank CANARECCI, Jr., et al., Appellees,andMemorial Home Care, Inc., et al., Appellees/Cross–Appellants,andMadison Center, Inc., et al., Appellees/Cross–Appellants.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

956 N.E.2d 62

Cathy MINIX, Individually, as Mother and Natural Guardian of Gregory Zick, deceased, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Gregory Zick, Appellant/Cross–Appellee,

v.Sheriff Frank CANARECCI, Jr., et al., Appellees,andMemorial Home Care, Inc., et al., Appellees/Cross–Appellants,andMadison Center, Inc., et al., Appellees/Cross–Appellants.

No. 71A04–1009–CT–591.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Sept. 8, 2011.

Sean E. Kenyon, Kevin G. Kerr, Hoeppner Wagner & Evans LLP, Merrillville, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.James F. Groves, David E. Ballard, Lee, Groves & Zalas, South Bend, IN, Attorneys for Appellees Sheriff Frank Canarecci, Jr., et al.Robert J. Palmer, May Oberfell Lorber, Mishawaka, IN, Attorney for Appellees Memorial Home Care, Inc., et al.Jason A. Scheele, Rothberg Logan & Warsco LLP, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorney for Appellees Madison Center, Inc., et al.

OPINION

MATHIAS, Judge.

In the first of these consolidated interlocutory appeals, Cathy Minix, (“Minix”) appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of St. Joseph County Sheriff Frank Canarecci, Jr. (“the Sheriff”) on Minix's wrongful death claim. On cross-appeal, Memorial Health Care, Inc. and several named employees (collectively, “Memorial”), and Madison Center, Inc. and its employee, Christine Lonz (collectively, “Madison”) challenge the trial court's denial of their motion for summary judgment on Minix's medical malpractice and wrongful death claims. With respect to the trial court's grant of the Sheriffs motion for summary judgment, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. With respect to the trial court's denial of Madison and Memorial's motion for summary judgment, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

Following the suicide of her eighteen-year-old son, Gregory Zick (“Zick”), while in custody at the St. Joseph County Jail, Minix brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana against the Sheriff and multiple other defendants, including Memorial and Madison (together, “the Medical Providers”), who contract with the county to provide medical and mental health services to jail inmates. On behalf of Zick's estate, Minix alleged that the defendants violated Zick's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by displaying deliberate indifference to his risk of suicide. Minix also asserted several Indiana state-law claims, including a medical malpractice claim against the Medical Providers and claims under Indiana's Child Wrongful Death Statute (“the CWDS”) against the Medical Providers and the Sheriff in his official capacity.

The federal court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on all of the federal claims except for the § 1983 deliberate indifference claim against the Sheriff in his official capacity. Thereafter, all state law claims remained pending. Then, on May 19, 2009, the Sheriff made an offer of judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68.¹ The language of the offer provided that the Sheriff “offer[ed] to allow judgment against him in his official capacity in the sum of Seventy-five Thousand ($75,000.00) Dollars” without specifying whether it referred to the federal claim, the state claim, or both. Appellees' App. p. 226.

Minix filed a notice of her acceptance of the offer on May 29, 2009. The next day, Minix filed a motion asking the federal court to enter final judgment on the federal official-capacity claim and to relinquish pendent jurisdiction over all pending state-law claims. On June 18, 2009, the federal district court entered an order directing the clerk to enter judgment against the Sheriff “in his official capacity” and then, having resolved all of the federal claims, declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Minix's state-law claims and therefore dismissed all of those claims without prejudice. Appellant's App. pp. 231, 228. The Sheriff subsequently paid the full amount of the judgment.

On March 12, 2009, Minix filed a complaint against the Medical Providers in St. Joseph Circuit Court asserting claims for medical malpractice and wrongful death under the CWDS. On July 17, 2009, Minix filed a separate complaint in St. Joseph Superior Court asserting a wrongful death claim against the Sheriff in his official capacity under the CWDS. These actions were subsequently consolidated in the St. Joseph Superior Court.

On December 4, 2009, Memorial filed a motion for summary judgment, in which Madison joined, alleging that any liability on their part was satisfied by the judgment entered against the Sheriff in federal court. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion on May 11, 2010. On July 2, 2010, the Sheriff filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the CWDS claim asserted in Minix's state court action was barred by principles of res judicata due to the entry of judgment against him in federal court. The Sheriffs motion was granted on August 20, 2010. In light of the trial court's entry of summary judgment in the Sheriffs favor, the Medical Providers renewed their motion for summary judgment, which the court again denied on August 23, 2010.

On that same date, Minix filed a motion asking the trial court to certify its interlocutory order granting summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff to allow for immediate appeal. On August 26, 2010, the Medical Providers filed a joint motion asking the trial court to certify its interlocutory order denying their motion for summary judgment to allow for immediate appeal. The trial court granted both motions, and this court accepted jurisdiction of both appeals and consolidated them for appellate review.²

Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Our standard of review is well settled:

Our analysis proceeds from the premise that summary judgment is a lethal weapon and that courts must be ever mindful of its aims and targets and beware of overkill in its use.... When reviewing an entry of summary judgment, we stand in the shoes of the trial court. We do not weigh the evidence but will consider the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. All doubts as to a factual issue must be resolved in the nonmovant's favor. A trial court's grant of summary judgment is “clothed with a presumption of validity,” and the appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous. Nevertheless, we must carefully assess the trial court's decision to ensure the nonmovant was not improperly denied his day in court.

Rogier v. Am. Testing & Eng'g Corp., 734 N.E.2d 606, 613 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (citations omitted).

Here, the trial court entered findings and conclusions in support of its grant of the Sheriffs motion for summary judgment and its denial of the Medical Providers' motion for summary judgment. While the entry of specific findings and conclusions offers insight into the reasons for the trial court's decision on summary judgment and facilitates appellate review, such findings and conclusions are not binding on this court. Ashbaugh v. Horvath, 859 N.E.2d 1260, 1264–65 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). We may affirm a trial court's grant of summary judgment based on any theory supported by the designated materials. Estate of Kinser v. Ind. Ins. Co., 950 N.E.2d 23, 26 (Ind.Ct.App.2011).

I. The Sheriffs Motion for Summary Judgment

Minix argues that the trial court erred in concluding that her CWDS claim against the Sheriff was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The principles surrounding res judicata are well-developed in the law.

The doctrine of res judicata bars the litigation of a claim after a final judgment has been rendered in a prior action involving the same claim between the same parties or their privies. The principle behind this doctrine, as well as the doctrine of collateral estoppel, is the prevention of repetitive litigation of the same dispute. The following four requirements must be satisfied for a claim to be precluded under the doctrine of res judicata: 1) the former judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; 2) the former judgment must have been rendered on the merits; 3) the matter now in issue was, or could have been, determined in the prior action; and 4) the controversy adjudicated in the former action must have been between the parties to the present suit or their privies.

MicroVote Gen. Corp. v. Ind. Election Comm'n, 924 N.E.2d 184, 191 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (citations omitted).

In his motion for summary judgment, the Sheriff argued that Minix's wrongful death claim against him in his official capacity is barred by the doctrine of res judicata because Minix raised an identical state-law, official-capacity claim in the federal action and the federal court entered judgment in her favor on that claim. According to the Sheriff, because his offer of judgment simply stated that he offered to allow judgment against him “in his official capacity” and Minix's acceptance mirrored that language, the trial court's subsequent entry of judgment against the Sheriff must necessarily encompass all official-capacity claims brought against him in the federal action, including the state-law claim under the CWDS. The trial court agreed, and in granting the Sheriff's motion for summary judgment, made the following relevant findings and conclusions:

2. All of the claims presently pending in this case against [the Sheriff] brought by plaintiffs, Cathy Minix, Individually, as Mother and Natural Guardian of Gregory Zick, deceased, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Gregory Zick, have been brought against the Sheriff in his official capacity.

3. [Minix's] claims in this case are identical to the state law claims that were asserted against [the Sheriff], in his official capacity, in [Minix's] federal case in the ...