United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wiley
| Decision Date | 04 January 2019 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO. 2:16-CV-386 |
| Parties | UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. BRIEANE N. WILEY., et al., Defendants. MARY L. SELLERS, Counter-Plaintiff, v. UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Counter-Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on six motions filed by Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff Mary Sellers:
(1) Motion for Protective Order and to Establish Sequence of Discovery Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 [DE 33], filed July 6, 2018. Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant United Automobile Insurance Company responded on July 20, 2018, and Sellers replied on July 27;
(2) Motion to Compel Answers and Production to First Set of Interrogatories and Related Document Production [DE 35], filed July 9, 2018. United responded on July 23, 2018, and Sellers replied on July 30, 2018;
(3) Motion to Compel Truthful and Complete Answers and Production Responsive to Second Set of Interrogatories and Related Document Production [DE 37], filed July 9, 2018. United responded on July 23, 2018, and Sellers replied on July 30, 2018; (4) Motion to Compel Responses to First Set of Requests for Production of Documents [DE 39], filed July 9, 2018. United responded on July 23, 2018, and Sellers replied on July 30, 2018;
(5) Motion to Compel Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition Testimony of UAIC and Related Relief [DE 41], filed July 10, 2018. United responded on July 24, 2018, and Sellers replied on July 31, 2018; and
(6) Third Agreed Motion to Extend Case Management Deadlines [DE 58], filed December 20, 2018.
On June 28, 2013, Defendant Brieane Wiley's car rear-ended the vehicle of Defendant Mary Sellers, injuring Sellers and her husband, Joshua. Sellers and her husband sued Wiley in state court. Wiley was insured by United Automobile Insurance Company, but United did not defend the claim in court, and a default judgment was entered against Wiley. After the parties stipulated to a range of combined damages between $772,877 and $883,797 for both Plaintiffs, the court entered a judgment of $795,037 for Mary Sellers and $12,000 for Joshua Sellers ($807,037 in total), and Wiley assigned her claims against United to Mary Sellers. United has brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Wiley in the state court action, arguing in part that Wiley did not properly notify United of the lawsuit and failed to cooperate with United's lawyer. Mary Sellers filed counterclaims against United, including allegations of fraud, negligence, and breach of contract. Sellers has now filed five motions to compel discovery, and seeks to extend the discovery schedule.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) permits discovery "regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevance is "construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case." Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947)). A party objecting to the discovery request bears the burden of "show[ing] why [that] particular discovery request is improper." McGrath v. Everest Nat. Ins. Co., 625 F. Supp. 2d 660, 670 (N.D. Ind. 2008). The Court has broad discretion when deciding discovery matters. Thermal Design, Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of Heating, Refrigerating & Air-Conditioning Eng'rs, Inc., 755 F.3d 832, 837 (7th Cir. 2014); Rennie v. Dalton, 3 F.3d 1100, 1110 (7th Cir. 1993)).
Sellers seeks a protective order precluding United from deposing her regarding the underlying state court judgment. Although United's response brief does not directly state what information it seeks from Sellers, the Court assumes that Sellers would be asked to testify to bad faith or collusion relating to the parties' stipulation, or to the reasonableness of the damages awarded. United argues that the state court judgment was a consent judgment, which binds an insurer only if it is not "the product of bad faith or collusion and . . . falls somewhere within a broad range of reasonable resolutions of the underlying dispute." Carpenter v. Lovell's Lounge & Grill, LLC, 59 N.E.3d 330 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Sellers argues that the judgment was not a consent judgment, because although the parties entered a stipulation as to the range of damages, the state court made the final determination of damages based on the evidence before it.
A consent judgment is an agreement between the parties settling the underlying dispute, which is entered as a judgment by the court. Minix v. Canarecci, 956 N.E.2d 62, 68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Hanover Logansport, Inc. v. Robert C. Anderson, Inc., 512 N.E.2d 465, 469 (Ind. Ct. App.1987); Stenger v. LLC Corp., 819 N.E.2d 480, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)). The entry of a consent judgment is therefore a "ministerial duty," recording the agreement of the parties, and does not represent the judgment of the court. Siegel v. Williams, 818 N.E.2d 510, 514 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting State ex rel. Prosser v. Ind. Waste Sys., Inc., 603 N.E.2d 181, 186 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Mercantile Nat. Bank of Ind. v. Teamsters Union Local No. 142 Pension Fund, 668 N.E.2d 1269, 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)).
In the state court case, the parties stipulated that The court's order on damages stated that the parties
The court's order was not a consent judgment. The court specifically stated that it evaluated the evidence in arriving at a final judgment, and it made factual findings that were not contained in the stipulation, such as Sellers's life expectancy at the time of the collision. United points to the parties' agreement that damages "shall" be within the stipulated range, but the court was not required to interpret that as a consent judgment, and did not do so. The court's factual findings and evaluation of the evidence are inconsistent with a "ministerial" consent judgment that simply records the agreement of the parties.
Sellers also seeks an order precluding her deposition on any other topic until United has completed its responses to Sellers's first sets of interrogatories and requests for production. United does not identify any other topics on which it would depose Sellers or state why the deposition needs to happen before United fully produces preliminary written discovery. Because Sellers herself responded to discovery prior to deposing United's witnesses, and because United's responses to the requests are deficient for the reasons described below, the Court will order that Sellers not be deposed until United has fully responded to Sellers's first sets of interrogatories and requests for production.
Sellers moves to compel additional answers to numerous interrogatories and related requests for production. In its response brief, United included information responsive to some of Sellers's requests, and the Court finds that United's response brief, and the promises to produce contained therein, provide sufficient responses to Interrogatories and Related Requests for Production 2, 3, 14, 22, 23, and 24. The Court reminds the parties that discovery generally should not be filed, see Northern District of Indiana Local Rule 26-2(a)(1), and instructs United to provide all responses to Sellers in the form required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(b). The Court finds as follows with regard to the remaining requests in Sellers's motion:
Interrogatory 4 and Related Request for Production 4: Sellers requests that United describe its procedures for processing notices of claims and suits. United responds that such notices are "taken in by the customer service department and assigned to the appropriate adjuster." Given that the issues in this case include whether United received appropriate notice from Wiley of the suit against her, United's response is inadequate. Although United argues that the handling of the claims was "discussed" in a deposition, that does not excuse its obligation to respond to the interrogatory. United is instructed to respond in fulsome detail regarding how notices of claims and lawsuits are handled, including initial notices, subsequent notices, and the receipt of relevant legal papers. As to Related Request for Production 4, seeking documents relating to those same procedures, United is instructed to produce any available documents responsive to the request.
Interrogatory 5 and Related Request for Production 5: Sellers requested the identity of persons involved with establishing or implementing the procedures in Interrogatory 4. United responds with reference to individuals involved with the Wiley claim. To the extent not already named, United should identify any individuals involved in establishing or implementing the policies generally.
In regard to Related Request for Production 5, Sellers seeks personnel files, performance reviews, and written policies related to any individuals identified in response to Interrogatory 5. United initially failed to object, but in its response brief, states that it objects to the production of personnel files as...
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