Mink v. Genmar Industries, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 August 1994
• Docket Number: No. 92-3100,92-3100
• Citation: 29 F.3d 1543
• Parties: Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,014 George MINK, individually, for Use and Benefit of Insurance Company of North America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENMAR INDUSTRIES, INC., etc., Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph Riddick HENDRICK, III, J.R.H. Racing, Inc., d/b/a Hendrick Motor Sport, Hendrick Motor Sport, Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1543

29 F.3d 1543

Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,014

George MINK, individually, for Use and Benefit of Insurance

Company of North America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENMAR INDUSTRIES, INC., etc., Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph Riddick HENDRICK, III, J.R.H. Racing, Inc., d/b/a

Hendrick Motor Sport, Hendrick Motor Sport,

Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellees.

No. 92-3100.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Aug. 30, 1994.

Susan K. Burkhart, David Batten, Cranfill, Sumner & Hartzog, Raleigh, NC, for Mink.

F. Steven Herb, Robert Cyril Widman, Nelson, Hesse, Cyril, Smith, Widman, Herb, Causey & Dooley, Sarasota, FL, for Genmar Industries, Inc.

Carl R. Nelson, Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal & Banker, P.A., Tampa, FL, for 3rd party plaintiffs.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before ANDERSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and ATKINS ^*, Senior District Judge.

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

In this case, we address whether maritime law applies to an action arising out of injuries sustained by a passenger of a pleasure craft.

II. FACTS

On November 28, 1986, appellant George Mink was injured while riding as a passenger on board a Wellcraft Scarab, a 38-foot pleasure craft that was being operated at a high rate of speed on the navigable waters of the United States in the Gulf of Mexico off of Sarasota, Florida. As a result of the accident, Mink suffered serious personal injuries.

There was an oral agreement ¹ entered into between Genmar Industries ("Genmar") and an entity associated with Joseph R. Hendrick, J.R.H. Racing, Inc., Hendrick Motor Sports, or Hendrick Management Corporation ("Hendrick"), ² pursuant to which a Wellcraft vessel built by Genmar would be provided in consideration of being displayed at car dealerships and at automotive races as a form of advertising for Genmar. The boat was painted to match the color and design of Hendrick's racing automobiles.

Hendrick travelled to Florida with his family to inspect the Scarab. Hendrick instructed Mink to drive a specially modified truck from Charlotte to Sarasota which would be used to take the Scarab back to Charlotte upon its delivery. Upon the group's arrival, Genmar's agent, Pruitt, provided instructions and demonstrations to Hendrick. The Scarab was taken to a Hyatt hotel/marina in Longboat Key where Hendrick's family and his companions were staying. Mink, together with his daughter, accompanied Pruitt, Hendrick, Hendrick's daughter, and Chuck Mack, the boat's paint designer, on a ride in the boat.

As the Scarab cruised through the Gulf of Mexico at approximately 80 miles per hour, Pruitt demonstrated to Hendrick the operation of the engines and the boat's trim. Mink, who had never been on a boat before, had difficulty locating a secure position on the boat. The boat had two seats with a semicircular shape designed to protect the driver and one passenger beside the driver. Mink had stood behind Pruitt and Hendrick, holding onto the cushioned back of one of those seats. There was no handrail which Mink could have used from this position. Mink, in attempting to find a secure position for himself and the two minor girls, could not maintain his balance and was slammed to the deck of the boat. He hit the deck of the Scarab with such force that he crushed a vertebrae, rendering him a paraplegic.

Almost four years later, on November 30, 1990, Mink filed an action in a Florida circuit court against Genmar, the manufacturer of the powerboat. On January 17, 1991, Genmar filed a notice of removal based upon diversity. Genmar subsequently filed for dismissal and filed a third-party complaint against Joseph R. Hendrick and Hendrick Motor Sports ("Hendrick"), seeking indemnity or contribution. In his amended complaint filed March 19, 1991, Mink brought claims of negligent design and manufacture, negligent operation, products liability, and breach of implied warranty. He requested a jury trial. Specifically, Mink alleges that Genmar failed to provide adequate handholds or seats for passengers or other sufficient protection for the passengers.

The district court granted Genmar's motion to dismiss the amended complaint and entered judgment on September 21, 1992, dismissing the case as time-barred by the three year maritime statute of limitations, 46 U.S.C. app. Sec. 763a. The issue before us is whether Mink's suit falls within the scope of the substantive maritime law or falls outside of it so that state law remains competent to provide a remedy. For the reasons that follow, we conclude Mink's suit falls within the scope of the substantive maritime law. Thus, we affirm.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Maritime Jurisdiction

As noted, the injury to Mink occurred while a vessel was being navigated on navigable waters. We readily conclude that the instant case falls well within the admiralty jurisdiction. This case satisfies both the traditional locality test for determining admiralty jurisdiction, and also the more recently articulated maritime nexus test, i.e., that the wrong must bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. See Sea Vessel, Inc. v. Reyes, 23 F.3d 345 (11th Cir.1994). The common formulation of the locality test was articulated by the Supreme Court in The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 36, 18 L.Ed. 125 (1866): "Every species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance." Thus, to satisfy this test, a tort need occur only on navigable waters, which clearly occurred in this case. ³

Turning to the maritime nexus inquiry, we readily conclude that this case has a maritime nexus. We must determine whether the " 'potential hazard to maritime commerce arises out of activity that bears a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.' " Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 362, 110 S.Ct. 2892, 2995-96, 111 L.Ed.2d 292 (1990) (quoting Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 675 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 2654, 2658 n. 5, 73 L.Ed.2d 300 (1982)). This case clearly poses a potential hazard to maritime commerce. In undertaking this inquiry, we "must assess the general features of the type of incident involved to determine whether such an incident is likely to disrupt commercial activity." Sisson, id., 497 U.S. at 363, 110 S.Ct. at 2896. Mink argues that in the instant case there was no actual disruption of maritime commerce. However, as noted in Sisson, "[t]he jurisdictional inquiry does not turn on the actual effects on maritime commerce" nor upon "the particular facts of the incident in th[e] case." Id.; Sea Vessel, Inc. v. Reyes, 23 F.3d at 350 and n. 8. Rather, eschewing a fact specific inquiry, the law requires that we examine the "general features" of this type of incident. In this case, the appropriate characterization is no more specific than injury to a passenger in proximity to the operator on a vessel during navigation in navigable waters. ⁴ Thus, although there was no actual disruption of maritime commerce in the instant case, there clearly was a potential disruption. Mink could have fallen forward, striking the pilot or controls, thus directly interfering with the navigation of the craft and potentially causing an accident with another craft. Or, the disruption of a serious passenger injury within such intimate confines could have distracted the pilot and indirectly interfered with the navigation of a vessel. We readily conclude that there was a potential hazard to maritime commerce.

We also conclude that the potential hazard to maritime commerce "arises out of activity that bears a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity." As indicated above, and focusing as we must on the general nature of the activity, the relevant activity is the navigation of a vessel on navigable waters. ⁵ Obviously, this is the very paradigm of traditional maritime activity. Sisson, 497 U.S. at 368, 110 S.Ct. at 2899 (Scalia, J. concurring).

Mink argues that neither the locality test nor the nexus test is satisfied because the alleged design defect, e.g., failure to include handrails, occurred upon land. Both logic and precedent compel rejection of Mink's argument. The defect could not have manifested itself, and the injury could not have occurred until the vessel was actually operated as a vessel in navigation. Thus, logically, the tort is a maritime tort. Moreover, precedent overwhelmingly indicates this result. The Supreme Court so held in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 106 S.Ct. 2295, 90 L.Ed.2d 865 (1986). There, a defective part was installed in a vessel causing injury while the vessel was sailing on the high seas. The court concluded that such a case would clearly fall within the admiralty jurisdiction, and that products liability of that type was part of the general maritime law. 476 U.S. at 863-65, 106 S.Ct. at 2298-99. ⁶ Numerous cases from our sister circuit courts of appeal have also held that products liability actions involving pleasure craft in navigation fall within the admiralty jurisdiction. See Hassinger v. Tideland Electric Membership Corp., 781 F.2d 1022 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1004, 106 S.Ct. 3294, 92 L.Ed.2d 709 (1986) (defective mast); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Radio Corp., 618 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.1980) (defective steering gyro); Jones v. Bender Welding & Mach. Works, 581 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir.1978) (defective design caused damage to fishing vessel); Jig The Third Corp. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 519 F.2d 171 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954, 96 S.Ct. 1429, 47 L.Ed.2d 360 (1976) (negligent design of shrimp boat); Richards v. Blake Builders Supply, Inc., 528 F.2d 745 (4th Cir.1975) (explosion on pleasure craft); Anderson v. Whittaker Corp., 692 F.Supp. 764 (W.D.Mich.1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 894 F.2d 804 (6th Cir.1990) (products...