Minn. Debenture Co. v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 27 January 1905
• Citation: 102 N.W. 381,94 Minn. 150
• Parties: MINNESOTA DEBENTURE CO. v. JOHNSON.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

94 Minn. 150

102 N.W. 381

MINNESOTA DEBENTURE CO.

v.JOHNSON.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 27, 1905.

Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; A. M. Harrison, Judge.

Action by the Minnesota Debenture Company against Rasmus Johnson. Verdict for plaintiff, and from an order denying a new trial defendant appeals. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A judgment is conclusive only against parties thereto and their privies. As to strangers, it is evidence only of its entry, and not of any fact on which it was based.

2. To constitute one the privy by estate of another, it must appear that he succeeded after the bringing of the action by which he is sought to be concluded to an estate or interest held by the party to the judgment.

3. The rule that a judgment is admissible in evidence against all the world, as a link in a party's chain of title, does not apply to all judgments. It applies more particularly to judgments in partition proceedings, probate decrees, actions to foreclose mortgages or liens, and to all judgments which operate proprio vigore to transfer title, or such as render valid a disclosed link, which, without the judgment, would be defective or invalid.

4. Such rule does not apply to ordinary judgments in actions to determine adverse claims, which do not purport to transfer title, or render valid an otherwise defective link in the chain of title.

5. In an action in ejectment, plaintiff, to support its claim of ownership, traced title to the land in controversy from the general government to one George F. Dean, and, to show title in itself, offered in evidence a judgment in an action brought by it against Dean to determine adverse claims, in which action this defendant, who was at the time of its commencement, and when the judgment therein was rendered, in the actual possession of the land, was not a party; and it was not shown that he was the privy of Dean. The judgment did not purport to transfer the Dean title to plaintiff, nor render valid a disclosed defective link in the chain of title. It is held that the judgment was not competent evidence of title in plaintiff as against this defendant.

Savage & Purdy, for appellant.

Tryon & Booth, for respondent.

BROWN, J.

Action in ejectment. The facts are as follows: To sustain the allegations of the complaint that plaintiff was the owner of the land in controversy, and entitled to its possession, plaintiff offered in evidence the record of a patent from the United States to one Moffett; the record of a deed from Moffett and wife to one Joseph Dean; the final decree of distribution of the probate court of Hennepin county in the matter of the estate of Joseph Dean, deceased, assigning and decreeing the property to William E. Dean and other heirs; the record of a deed from the heirs of Joseph Dean to George F. Dean; and a judgment in an action brought by this plaintiff against George F. Dean and others, entered on the 4th of February, 1899-and rested its case. Whereupon defendant offered to prove that he was in the actual possession and occupancy of the property in question at the time of the commencement of the action in which the judgment just referred to was rendered, and has since that time continuously remained in the possession of the same. The offer was objected to by plaintiff, and the objection sustained by the trial court, unless defendant would disclose the nature of the title held by him. Defendant declined to include in his offer anything further than to show his actual possession of the land at the time of the commencement of the action referred to, and during its pendency, whereupon defendant rested his case, and the court instructed the jury to return a verdict for plaintiff. Defendant subsequently moved for a new trial, which the court denied, and he appealed.

The merits of the controversy respecting the title to the land are not now before the court. The question presented narrows down to whether plaintiff, by its evidence, made a case for recovery against defendant. The contention of plaintiff is that the judgment in the action against Dean established at least a prima facie title superior to the rights arising in defendant's favor from his possession of the land, while defendant insists that the Dean judgment is not evidence against him of any right or title in plaintiff, and that his actual possession at the time the judgment was rendered, and continuous occupancy since, are superior to any title shown to be in plaintiff. We think defendant's contention is technically correct, and that the trial court erred in excluding the offer to show his possession.

The action is one in ejectment, and plaintiff must recover, if at all, upon the strength of its own title, and not upon the weakness of that of defendant. The burden of proof in such actions is upon plaintiff, and defendant may ‘fold his arms and await the establishment of plaintiff's title.’ 10 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 532. If plaintiff fails in his proof of title, he cannot recover, however weak or defective defendant's title may be. Plaintiff's title in the case at bar is founded wholly upon the judgment against Dean. It does not exhibit any independent title, nor any right nor interest which the judgment converted into a title. It is clear that the judgment, unless it operated to transfer the Dean title to plaintiff, or is a link in the chain of title, is not evidence against defendant. The judgment was rendered in an action against Dean and others to determine adverse claims to the land, the complaint in which alleged that plaintiff was the owner of the property, and that defendant Dean and others claimed some right, title, or interest therein, and that such claim was wholly void and without foundation. While the action was brought against Dean and ‘all unknown parties claiming an interest in the land,’ the judgment rendered by the court was limited to the rights of defendants expressly named therein. It did not purport to adjudicate the rights of any unknown parties, and defendant was not bound thereby as an unknown party.

It is elementary that a judgment is conclusive only against the parties thereto and their privies. As to strangers, it is evidence only of its entry, and not of any fact on which it was based. Brown v. Kohout, 61 Minn. 113, 63 N. W. 248;Harper v. East Side Syndicate, 40 Minn. 381, 42 N. W. 86;Hartman v. Weiland, 36 Minn. 223, 30 N. W. 815; County of Olmstead v. Barber, 31 Minn. 256, 17 N. W. 473, 944. Defendant was not a party to that action, is not bound by it as such, and it does not appear that he holds possession of the land as a privy of Dean. To constitute one the privy of another in cases of this kind, it must appear that he succeeded, subsequent to the bringing of the action by which he is sought to be concluded, to an estate or interest held by the party to the judgment. 24 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 746. In order that the judgment may be evidence against defendant as a privy of Dean, it must appear, therefore, that after the commencement of that action he succeeded to the title of Dean, or holds possession under or through him. Carroll v. Goldschmidt, 83 Fed. 508, 27 C. C. A. 566;Blew v. Ritz, 82 Minn. 530, 85 N. W. 548. This does not appear, and, if it was a fact, the burden was upon plaintiff to show it.

But it is urged by plaintiff that the judgment amounted to a link in the chain of title; that it, in effect, operated to transfer the Dean title to plaintiff; and that, under the recording act, it was competent evidence, and superior to the rights of defendant arising from mere possession. The cases of Hall v. Sauntry, 72 Minn. 420, 75 N. W. 720,71 Am. St. Rep. 497, and Berryhill v. Smith, 59 Minn. 285, 61 N. W. 144, are relied upon to support the position. Neither case is, however, in point. The rule that a judgment is admissible in evidence against all the world as a link in a party's chain of title does not apply to all...