Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Wheeler
| Citation | 16 N.W. 698,31 Minn. 121 |
| Parties | Minneapolis Mill Company v. Samuel H. Wheeler and others |
| Decision Date | 25 September 1883 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Minnesota (US) |
Appeals by defendants from an order of the district court for Hennepin county, refusing a new trial after a trial before Lochren, J., and a jury.
Order affirmed.
Koon & Keith, for appellants, cited, among other cases, Nash v Minneapolis Mill Co., 24 Minn. 501.
Levi & Cray, for respondent.
The plaintiff had constructed and was operating a canal for the use of its water-power through its land on the west bank of the Mississippi river, in the city of Minneapolis, extending for a considerable distance below its dam in the river. The defendants were the owners of a mill and site upon the canal under a grant derived from the plaintiff, which included "a right of way across the canal in front of and adjacent to said premises, and to erect and maintain a bridge across said canal." Over the canal, in front of the mill, the grantors of defendants had erected a bridge or platform for convenient access thereto, and the same passed to the defendants as appurtenant to the mill, on the conveyance thereof to them, and they were maintaining the same at the time of the injury complained of in this case. The canal was in like manner occupied by other mills below the defendants', and similar platforms or bridges were built above and below that of the defendants, so as to constitute one continuous platform, bordering on a public street, and open for travel as one thoroughfare along and in front of the several mills. A portion of such platform was built and maintained by the plaintiff and a portion thereof by mill-owners, and the same was necessary for the transaction of business by them, and important also for the successful and profitable use and enjoyment of its property by the plaintiff. By the terms of the grant under which defendants claim, plaintiff and the owners of other mills on the canal enjoyed a right of way over the bridge in question in common with defendants.
On the fourth day of November, 1881, one Vinton, who was engaged in hauling stone and material for the repair of defendants' mill, went upon the bridge in question, in front of the mill with his team and loaded wagon, when the same gave way, in consequence of its weak and decayed condition, precipitating his horses and wagon into the canal, whereby he was damaged in the amount claimed, as is admitted, and without fault on his part. The plaintiff settled and paid Vinton such damages without suit, and now brings this action against defendants for indemnity.
The evidence tends to show that the bridge was suffered to remain in disrepair through negligence, and we cannot doubt that, as between plaintiff and defendants, the duty to repair the same devolved upon the latter. Whether plaintiff was also liable is a question, perhaps, not entirely free from difficulty, but such liability was assumed in argument by both parties. It is predicated upon the fact of plaintiff's ownership and control of the canal on its own land, which it had caused or permitted to be covered and converted into a highway or thoroughfare open for travel, and hence a place of danger unless securely bridged or protected. Plaintiff had granted the right of way enjoyed by defendants, and, in order to render it available, the right to bridge the canal. Further than this, plaintiff's ownership, possession, and control of the premises remained, together with the obligations incident thereto. We think the trial court was right, therefore, in holding that the situation of these premises, as respects public travel, and the relation of the plaintiff thereto, were such that it would properly be regarded as culpably negligent if it failed to take reasonable precautions to prevent accident under the circumstances. Nash v. Minn. Mill Co., 24 Minn. 501; Carleton v. Franconia Iron & S. Co., 99 Mass. 216; Gibbs v. Trustees, 3 Hurl. & N. 164, 176.
2. The defendants were also liable because of their agency in maintaining the bridge, and their negligence in not closing or repairing it. As long as they kept it open, they were bound to keep it in repair. And, as respects both the plaintiff and the defendants, the rule to be applied in this case is that "if...
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