Minneapolis Ry. Terminal Co. v. Minn. Debenture Co.

• Decision Date: 01 August 1900
• Citation: 83 N.W. 485,81 Minn. 66
• Parties: MINNEAPOLIS RY. TERMINAL CO. v. MINNESOTA DEBENTURE CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

81 Minn. 66

83 N.W. 485

MINNEAPOLIS RY. TERMINAL CO.

v.MINNESOTA DEBENTURE CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug. 1, 1900.

Appeal from district court, Hennepin county; E. B. Elliott, Judge.

Action by Minneapolis Railway Terminal Company against the Minnesota Debenture Company. Judgment ordered for defendant. From an order denying a new trial, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A certain map or plat, made by the county surveyor of Hennepin county, by order of the county auditor, in accordance, as claimed, with the provisions of Gen. St. 1894, § 1626, known as ‘Auditor's Subdivision No. 32,’ and filed and recorded in the office of the register of deeds for said county, May 1, 1886, held valid, and sufficiently definite and certain, as to the location of the platted property, to be a basis for the proceedings against a tract of land thereon designated as lot 1.

2. Before introducing said plat in evidence, it was not necessary to show that the conditions existed which will, under the terms of said section 1626, authorize the auditor to act.

3. Stewart v. Colter, 18 N. W. 98, 31 Minn. 385, and subsequent cases, followed, as to the sufficiency of using a well-known and commonly reputed description of said property in tax proceedings.

4. That the tract designated and described in all of the proceedings as one parcel was in fact two, owned by different persons, might have been a defense if presented when application for judgment was made, but, under the circumstances shown here, that fact is not available as a defense in a collateral attack upon a judgment against the tract as one parcel. C. W. Bunn, L. T. Chamberlain, and Samuel Whaley, for appellant.

C. J. Tryon, for respondent.

COLLINS, J.

Action in ejectment tried by the court without a jury. On findings of fact, judgment was ordered in defendant's favor, and the appeal is from an order denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial. Defendant's possession of the premises was sufficient to justify and support the order for judgment, unless the plaintiff established its title at the trial, and, as a consequence, its paramount right to possess and occupy. To state the main points in the controversy, basing such statement on the proofs, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover unless it had acquired title through certain condemnation proceedings instituted in its behalf in the year 1887; nor was it so entitled if it had thereafter lost its rights through certain tax proceedings for the year 1892, whereby it was claimed by defendants the title had passed to one Gould in the year 1898; nor was it so entitled if it had, subsequent to the condemnation proceedings, lost its rights by means of certain other and later tax proceedings for the 1893 taxes, through which, it was contended by defendant, the title had finally been vested in itself. To put it in the language of counsel, plaintiff could not succeed if defendant's 1893 tax title be found goods, or if the Gould tax title be valid, or if plaintiff's title as originally obtained be defective and insufficient.

1. As we regard the case, it is unnecessary for us to consider the several objections made to the various muniments of title on which plaintiff relied in support of its claim that the late Henry T. Welles was the owner of the land in dispute at the time of the commencement of the condemnation proceedings, nor is it necessary that we should pass upon the contention of counsel that plaintiff failed to acquire title to these premises through such proceedings; for we are of the opinion that, in so far as has been shown by the record now before us, the tax proceedings were regular and valid, and they operated to transfer the title from the fee owner, and to vest it in one or the other of the parties mentioned in the tax certificates. As between these parties, we are not required to decide.

2. In the complaint, the land, a triangular tract, was described by metes and bounds, its southerly line being 81.39 feet upon First street South, in the city of Minneapolis; its westerly line, at right angles with its aforesaid southerly line, 77.5 feet along Third avenue South extended; and its other, connecting the two before mentioned by a curved line about 113 feet in length. A plat of this tract of land was attached to, and made a part of, the complaint, on which plat appeared the lines of the street and avenue before mentioned, as well as the curved line between it and the abutting property, the right of way of the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Company. We mention this for the purpose of referring to the plat later on. Two objections only were made to the validity, of these tax proceedings,-one, that the description of the property contained in all of the proceedings, and found in each of the certificates of sale and in the notices of expiration of the period of redemption, was invalid; and the other, that, if the description was sufficient, the lands of two distinct owners had been assessed, taxed, proceeded against, and sold as one parcel. This, in itself, it was asserted, would render the entire proceeding abortive. The tract in controversy was described in all of the tax proceedings as lot 1, auditor's subdivision No. 32. If this description was sufficient under the tax laws, there is nothing whatever in the first-mentioned objection. To show that it was, there was introduced in evidence a map or plat of a tract of land which had been made by the county surveyor, and filed and recorded in the office of the register of deeds for Hennepin county, in which county the premises are situated, on the 1st day of May, 1886, more than one year prior to the initiation of the proceedings to condemn, and at least six years before the assessment for taxation, on which was rested the earliest of the before-mentioned tax certificates. This map or plat was prepared, as certified by the county surveyor, in accordance with section 108 of the general tax law of 1878 (Gen. St. 1894, § 1626), and by order of the county auditor. It is contended by plaintiff's counsel that the plat is invalid, defective, not authorized by law, and insufficient as a basis of a description of the land in question, several grounds for the contention being urged. It is argued (a) that there must be proof of the existence of the conditions which will, under the terms...