Minneapolis, St. Paul, & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co. v. Washburn Lignite Coal Co.

• Decision Date: 12 June 1918
• Citation: 168 N.W. 684,40 N.D. 69
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

168 N.W. 684

40 N.D. 69

MINNEAPOLIS, ST. PAUL, & SAULT STE. MARIE RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant, v. WASHBURN LIGNITE COAL COMPANY, Respondent

Supreme Court of North Dakota

June 12, 1918

Appeal from District Court, Burleigh County, W. L. Nuessle, J.

Affirmed.

John L Erdall (A. H. Bright, John E. Greene, and Dullam & Young, of counsel), for appellant.

The legislature of North Dakota by enactment fixed maximum interstate rates for the transportation of coal. Laws 1907 chap. 51.

This act was sustained by the decree of the supreme court of North Dakota. 19 N.D. 45; 26 N.D. 438.

The decree of the supreme court of North Dakota was reversed by the decree of the Supreme Court of the United States. 236 U.S. 585.

The case was brought and prosecuted by the attorney general of the state of North Dakota in his official capacity for and on behalf of all the people of the state. Under such circumstances all the people of the state are bound by the decision and judgment. State v. Villis, 19 N.D. 209 124 N.W. 706; Ashton v. Rochester, 123 N.Y. 187; McConkie v. Remley, 119 Iowa 512, 93 N.W. 505; Fullton v. Pomeroy, 111 Wis. 663, 87 N.W. 831; People v. Harrison, 253 Ill. 625, 97 N.E. 1092; McIntieer v. Williamson, 65 P. 244; State v Hartford St. R. Co., 56 A. 506; Bank of Kentucky v. Stone, 88 F. 383; Bear v. Brunswick County, 29 S.E. 719; Stone v. Winn, 176 S.W. 933; State v. Center Creek Min. Co., 171 S.W. 356; Kansas City Exposition Driving Park v. Kansas City, 74 S.W. 979; Orcutt v. McGilney, 147 N.W. 586; Worrell v. Landis, 141 P. 962; Hovek v. Shepherd, 147 S.W. 224; Central Bank & Trust Co. v. State, 76 S.E. 587; State ex rel. Forgues v. Superior Ct. 127 P. 313; Greenburg v. Chicago, 99 N.E. 1039; State v. C. B. & Q. R. Co., 93 N.E. 422; People v. Detroit G. H. & M. R. Co., 121 N.W. 533; Pierce v. Pierce, 122 S.W. 1147; Leet v. Gratz, 117 S.W. 642; Davis v. Davis, 124 N.W. 715; Spokane Valley Land & Water Co. v. Jones & Co., 101 P. 515; Freeman, Judgm. 4th ed. § 178; Black, Judgm. § 584; 23 Cyc. 1269.

This present action is instituted to recover the difference between the maximum rate fixed by the legislature (being the rate or carrying compensation received by appellant during the course of the litigation), and the reasonable rate for such transportation of coal. The United States Supreme Court's final decree entered in this litigation renders the rate invalid and unconstitutional not only during the period covered by the testimony, but up to and including the time of the decree. Missouri v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 241 U.S. 533.

The appellant is clearly entitled to recover such difference in rates. N. P. R. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585, 595; Reagan v. Farmers Loan & T. Co., 154 U.S. 362.

The law is well settled that when a judgment or decree is reversed, the law raises an implied obligation or agreement on the part of the person securing the judgment or decree, or the person benefiting thereby, to restore all that was obtained, directly or indirectly, by reason thereof. United States Bank v. Bank of Washington, 6 Pet. 817; 2 Salk. 587, 588; Tidd, Pr. 936, 1137, 1138; N.W. Fuel Co. v. Brock, 139 U.S. 216; Brown v. Detroit Trust Co., 193 F. 622; Zimmerman v. Bank, 56 Iowa 133; Thompson v. Reasoner, 122 Ind. 454; Flemmings v. Riddich, 5 Gratt. 272; Hier v. Brewing Co., 60 Neb. 320; Bellamy v. St. L. I. M. & S. R. Co., 220 F. 876.

The appellant here is not seeking to recover damages flowing from or connected with the injunction, but to recover undercharges to which we are entitled by law, independent of the injunction, and which we were temporarily restrained from recovering, by the injunction. Haebler v. Myers, 132 N.Y. 363; Pulteney v. Warren, 6 Ves. Jr. 73; Southern Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 196 F. 558; Tift v. Ry. Co., 123 F. 789, s. c. 138 F. 753; Love v. N. A. Co., 229 F. 103, 106.

"The rates fixed by the legislative assembly or Board of Railroad Commissioners shall remain in force pending the decision of the courts." N.D. Const. § 142.

This provision was doubtless intended simply to prevent a common carrier from applying a different rate from that fixed, pending the litigation. It was probably not intended to prevent an adjustment between the carrier and the shipper, after the litigation was ended, in accordance with the final judgment in such litigation.

A construction such as suggested would make the provision accord with the law as it is generally understood and administered, and would obviate any conflict with the Federal Constitution. Any other construction permits of taking property without due process of law. 236 U.S. 585; Fed. Const. § 1, 14th Amend.; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co., 154 U.S. 362.

The construction and the results for which defendant contends would be in conflict with other provisions of the Constitution.

"This Constitution and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any other state to the contrary, notwithstanding." U. S. Const. art. 6; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318, 319; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542; Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235, 244; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657; Mobile & O. R. Co. v. Tennessee, 153 U.S. 486; Loughlin v. McCauley, 186 Pa. 517, 48 L.R.A. 1; Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483.

Miller, Zuger, & Tillotson, for respondent.

There can be no coercion where, by a decree of the court, one is compelled to comply with a valid law. By the first decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, the law in question and the rates fixed thereunder were upheld. One cannot say that he involuntarily and against his will complied with a valid law.

The rates existing during the time of the litigation, down to the date of the institution of the second action, were the legal and lawful rates, and the rates or charges accepted and published by plaintiff as its schedule of rates for such transportation and plaintiff voluntarily accepted such rates as its full compensation for such services.

It is therefore clear that plaintiff's reason for performing the services alleged for the compensation received was not because it was coerced into doing so, by the first decree of the United States Supreme Court, nor was it because of lack of adequate remedy to protect itself; and if not coerced and not lacking of a remedy to protect itself, it must of necessity have been its voluntary act. But even if plaintiff was coerced, and suffered damage as alleged, still a recovery at law is not warranted, because, if any damages followed by reason of such course, they would be damages arising from the act of the court, and damages of such a nature are damnum absque injuria, for which there is no redress. Russell v. Farley (U. S.) 26 L.Ed. 1060.

There were no conditions imposed at the time the injunction was obtained, nor did the Supreme Court make any provision as to future recovery. Missouri v. C. B. & Q. R. Co., 241 U.S. 533, 60 L.Ed. 1148.

Plaintiff cannot recover under this form of action.

It might have recovered in an action on the bond had one been properly brought. Russell v. Farley, supra; 2 Sutherland, Damages, 2d ed. §§ 520, 521; Hayden v. Keith (Minn.) 20 N.W. 195.

BIRDZELL, J. CHRISTIANSON, J. (concurring specially). ROBINSON, J. (dissenting).

OPINION

BIRDZELL, J.

This is an action to recover the difference between the statutory rate upon certain coal shipments and an alleged reasonable rate. It arose upon the following facts:

In the year 1907, the legislature of North Dakota passed a statute prescribing a schedule of maximum rates to be charged for hauling lignite coal. When the law went into effect the carriers declined to comply with it, whereupon an action was brought to enjoin the continued violation. In this action, the carriers were unsuccessful. State ex rel McCue v. Northern P. R. Co., 19 N.D. 45, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1001, 120 N.W. 869, and Northern P. R. Co. v. North Dakota, 216 U.S. 579, 54 L.Ed. 624, 30 S.Ct. 423. A supersedeas having been obtained, the statutory rate was not put into operation until after the decree of the United States Supreme Court, in March, 1910. The case was later reopened in accordance with the terms of the decree and additional evidence taken. It was then determined by this court that the statutory rates were reasonable, but it was ultimately held by the United States Supreme Court that the rates were confiscatory. State ex. rel. McCue v. Northern P. R. Co., 26 N.D. 438, 145 N.W. 135; Northern P. R. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585, 59 L.Ed. 735, L.R.A.1917F, 1148, P.U.R.1915C, 277, 35 S.Ct. 429, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 1. The portion of the complaint which states the alleged cause of action is as follows: "That the plaintiff at the time said shipments moved, and until the 11th day of June, 1915, by reason of the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States and the decree entered in the supreme court of the state in the year 1910, aforesaid, without its consent and against its will, was coerced and forced to accept and transport for the defendant all of said shipments upon payment to the plaintiff of the rates and charges prescribed in said chapter 51. That from and after the 11th day of June, 1915, when final judgment was entered in the supreme court of the state in said state case as aforesaid, plaintiff became entitled to recover from the defendant the difference between said lawful and reasonable rates and the rates prescribed by said chapter 51 heretofore paid by the defendant, amounting in all to the sum of $...