Minnegren v. Nozar

• Decision Date: 24 October 2016
• Docket Number: B264219
• Citation: 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 655,4 Cal.App.5th 500
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Sassa MINNEGREN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Joshua B. NOZAR, Defendant and Respondent.

4 Cal.App.5th 500

208 Cal.Rptr.3d 655

Sassa MINNEGREN, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.Joshua B. NOZAR, Defendant and Respondent.

B264219

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Filed October 24, 2016

AlderLaw, Michael Alder, Stephen K. McElroy, Mary L. Caruso, and Joanna R. Allen, Los Angeles, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Wesierski & Zurek, Arpineh Yeremian, Irvine, and Lynne Rasmussen, for Defendant and Respondent.

ASHMANN–GERST

, Acting P.J.

A jury concluded that respondent Joshua B. Nozar (Nozar) was not negligent in connection with a two-car collision in which appellant Sassa Minnegren (Minnegren) was injured. Minnegren appeals from the judgment, contending that the special verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence and the trial court erred when it denied her motion for new trial.¹

She also appeals from the denial of her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV).

In essence, Minnegren asks us to take the verdict away from the jury and determine the evidence established that Nozar was negligent as a matter of law. But long-standing and consistent precedent teach that negligence is a question of fact where, as here, there is evidence that a driver exercised at least some care and therefore might have acted reasonably even if his or her action ultimately led to a car collision. The judgment and order are affirmed.

FACTS

The Collision

On September 1, 2010, Nozar drove a Range Rover to college for a 9:30 a.m. class and could not find parking in a campus parking lot. Sometime between 9:20 a.m. and 9:45 a.m., he exited the parking lot and drove southbound on 10th Street looking for a place to park. He proceeded to the intersection of 10th Street and Broadway. While 10th Street was controlled by a stop sign going southbound and going northbound, Broadway was not controlled by a stop sign, and he knew motorists on Broadway had the right-of-way. Nozar saw a parking space on the street on the opposite side of the intersection. At the same time, Minnegren was driving eastbound on Broadway in a small car. When Nozar proceeded into the intersection, Minnegren hit him.

The Lawsuit

Minnegren sued Nozar for negligence.²

Trial

Two eyewitnesses to the collision, Magdalena Edwards (Edwards) and Christopher Tragos (Tragos), were the first to testify.

According to Edwards, she was driving westbound on Broadway and saw the Range Rover on 10th Street. Initially, she said she “saw a car ... that was waiting at the stop sign,” but later she said it was “clear” to her that it was not going to stop at the stop sign.³ Edwards saw the Range Rover “shoot” out from 10th Street and collide with another car. Upon stopping, Edwards heard Nozar repeatedly tell Minnegren, “I'm sorry.” When a police officer arrived, Edwards reported that the way Nozar had been driving was “very scary” because he accelerated through the intersection without stopping at the stop sign.

Tragos explained that on the morning of September 1, 2010, he was patronizing a cafe located at the intersection of 10th Street and Broadway. Regarding the accident, he saw a Range Rover that “rolled fast” through a stop sign. Then it was “accelerating extremely fast through the intersection,” and he heard a “very loud acceleration[.]” When it was about 75 percent of the way through the intersection, a small car veered to the right in an attempt to avoid a collision. It hit the Range Rover's passenger side door.

Next to testify was Santa Monica Police Officer Stella Padilla. She received a radio call at 9:45 a.m. regarding the collision and responded to the scene to investigate. She asked Nozar whether he stopped at the stop sign, and he said that he did. Further, he stated that when he went into the intersection, he did not see any cars “coming down the roadway.” Subsequently, Officer Padilla spoke to Tragos, Edwards and Minnegren. Officer Padilla concluded that the collision was caused by Nozar failing to yield at the stop sign, and that Nozar was “the party at fault.” In addition, Officer Padilla concluded that Nozar's speed was an associated factor in the collision.

Minnegren's counsel called Nozar to the witness stand for cross-examination pursuant to Evidence Code section 776

. Nozar testified that he stopped at the stop sign, behind the limit line, for about five seconds. On the heels of that, he was asked if he looked left and right. He stated, “I mean, I looked. I looked at the car coming. I thought to myself is that far enough? Yes. I looked to the right. Looked at [the] car ... coming, is that far enough for me to get through? Yeah. I think so.” According to Nozar, he “gradually went ... through an intersection just how you normally would.” His acceleration was minimal. Later, he testified that he “went at a moderate speed.”

Nozar was asked if he saw Minnegren's car driving down Broadway. He stated, “I saw her coming—well, when I got to the stop sign, I looked at her. I thought she was [far] enough [away] ... for me to get through the intersection safely, and I looked to the right. I saw the other car. I thought it was [far] enough [away] for me to get through, and I went there.”

The following colloquy ensued between Minnegren's counsel and Nozar:

“Q You know that and agree that [Minnegren] had the right-of-way that morning[,] did she not?

“A Yes, she did.

“Q You never saw her before the collision, did you?

“A Did I—like, I saw her car, but I didn't know it was actually hers until after the collision.

“Q Okay. So you did know that she was on the roadway?

“A Yes.

“Q You did know she was approaching?

“A Mmm–Hmm. [¶] ... [¶]

“Q You had the ability to judge her speed, didn't you?

“A Yes, I did.

“Q So you had some sense of how she was closing on that intersection?

“A I tried to judge it, yes.

“Q And you made a bad judgment; is that right?

“A I did make a bad—

“Q You pulled out in front of a car that was too close, and it was a hazard?

“A Unfortunately, it was.

“Q So you caused a collision?

“A Um, I would say I did cause it but not intentionally. I tried my best to make a judgment call. Unfortunately, it was ... wrong.

“Q So at the very least, sir, you'll admit to us now that you negligently drove your car that morning, assuming that you stopped at that stop sign?

“A No. I did not negligently drive my car when I came to the stop sign. I looked left to right. I thought—I looked at the distance and the speed of the car on both sides. I thought that I would—that I would be able to clear it, but I didn't. I'm only human. I made a mistake.”

Later, Minnegren's counsel asked if Nozar saw a car coming down the street when he entered the intersection. He stated: “I had—when I—yeah. I mean, I didn't see her car coming. Otherwise, I would have—I don't remember, but I don't remember—no. Actually, I do remember. I didn't see her car coming.” Nozar admitted that he did not see Minnegren make an evasive maneuver. The only time he saw Minnegren's car was when he was at the stop sign. Minnegren's counsel asked if it was fair to say Nozar was not looking in Minnegren's direction after he “took off.” He replied by stating, “I mean, yes. That's fair.”⁴

Judgment

The jury rendered a special verdict in favor of Nozar. The trial court entered judgment on the special verdict.

Posttrial Motions

Minnegren filed a notice of intention to move for a new trial, and filed motions for a new trial and JNOV based on insufficiency of the evidence. The trial court denied both motions.

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

Minnegren contends that the judgment must be reversed because the judgment is not supported by substantial evidence.

A. Standard of Review.

When engaging in substantial evidence review, our power is circumscribed as follows: we must determine whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the judgment. (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873–874, 197 Cal.Rptr. 925

(Bowers ).)

The courts have defined substantial evidence to be evidence of ponderable legal significance, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value. (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 907

.) Inferences constitute substantial evidence, but only if they are the product of logic and reason. Speculation or conjecture alone is not substantial evidence. (Ibid . )

B. Negligence Principles.

To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant had a duty of care that he or she breached, and that there is causal connection between that breach and damages. (Conroy v. Regents of University of California (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1250, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 203 P.3d 1127

.) While the

existence of a duty of care is a question of law, breach of that duty and resulting damage are questions of fact. (Shively v. Dye Creek Cattle Co. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1620, 1627–1628, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 238

(Shively ).)

Authorities define the duty of care with varying language that is simply the same concept in different dress. Long ago, Fouch v. Werner (1929) 99 Cal.App. 557, 564, 279 P. 183

stated: “ ‘Negligence is either the omission of a person to do something which an ordinarily prudent person would have done under given circumstances or the doing of something which an ordinarily prudent person would not have done under such circumstances. It is not absolute or to be measured in all cases in accordance with some precise standard but always relates to some circumstance of time, place and person....’ ” Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a) provides: “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.” The instruction set forth by Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions No. 401 provides, inter alia: ...