Minnesota Linseed Oil Co. v. Montague

• Decision Date: 24 October 1884
• Citation: 21 N.W. 184,65 Iowa 67
• Parties: THE MINNESOTA LINSEED OIL COMPANY v. MONTAGUE & SMITH
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

21 N.W. 184

65 Iowa 67

THE MINNESOTA LINSEED OIL COMPANY v. MONTAGUE & SMITH

Supreme Court of Iowa, Dubuque

October 24, 1884

Appeal from Franklin District Court.

PLAINTIFF brought this suit to recover a sum of money which it claims to have deposited with defendants, to be paid out only on tickets issued by one Valentine, an agent of plaintiff, in the purchase of flaxseed, but which defendants, without authority, paid to said Valentine in payment of certain commissions. Defendants admit that the money was deposited with them, and that they paid it to Valentine for the purpose alleged by plaintiff, but deny that such payment was unauthorized, and allege that it was subsequently ratified by plaintiff. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff and defendants appeal. The cause has heretofore been in this court. See 59 Iowa 448.

REVERSED.

Richard Wilber, for appellants.

Blythe & Markley, for appellee.

OPINION

REED, J.

I.

It is alleged in the petition that the money was deposited with defendants upon a parol contract that it was to be paid out by them only on checks or tickets issued by Valentine, on the purchase of flaxseed. On the trial plaintiff offered in evidence certain letters written by its treasurer to defendants, covering remittances, and which, as plaintiff claims, contained certain specifications as to the manner in which the money remitted should be applied. Defendants objected to the introduction of these letters, on the ground that, as plaintiff had alleged that the contract under which the money was deposited with them was in parol, this written evidence was immaterial and irrelevant, and that it was not shown that the person who wrote them had any authority from plaintiff to give directions as to the manner in which said money should be disbursed. The objections were overruled, and the letters were read in evidence. We held, on the former appeal, that these letters were admissible. There has been no change in the issues since this ruling was made. The question of the admissibility of the evidence arises on the second trial precisely as it did on the first. When we have once definitely passed on a question in a case, our practice is to reconsider our ruling thereon in that case only on a rehearing, unless there have been such changes of the issues, or other circumstances of the case, as raise a new question as to the applicability of the former ruling to the case as thus made. Adams Co. v. Burlington & M. R. R Co., 55 Iowa 94, 2 N.W. 1054. Our former ruling on this question must therefore be regarded as final, so far as this case is concerned.

II. [The original arrangement under which the money was deposited with defendants was made with them by one Harkness, as agent for plaintiff. There was a conflict in the evidence as to the directions given by Harkness at this time as to the manner in which the money should be disbursed. Harkness testified that he directed defendants to pay out money only on tickets issued by Valentine, which should show actual purchases by him of flaxseed; while defendants both testified that the direction was that the money should be paid out generally in the business of purchasing flaxseed for plaintiff, in which Valentine was engaged, and that Harkness informed them at that time that Valentine was to be paid a commission of six cents per bushel on all the seed purchased by him. The evidence shows without conflict that Valentine was entitled under his arrangement with plaintiff, to receive as commissions on the purchases made by him the amount of money paid him by defendants. The defendants asked the court to give the following instruction, which was refused: "If the language used by plaintiff's agent in employing defendants, as plaintiff's disbursing agents, to pay off checks made by Valentine, and instructing them as to their duties as such disbursing agents, was fairly capable of two constructions or understandings, or was ambiguous in its meaning, the plaintiff is bound by the understanding which his language fairly and reasonably conveyed to defendants, provided defendants acted in good faith in carrying out such understanding thus fairly and reasonably conveyed to them by the language of plaintiff's agent." Defendants assign the refusal to give this instruction as error. The court on its own motion instructed the jury that, "if the language used by plaintiff's general agent in making the arrangement with defendants was ambiguous, or fairly admitted of more than one construction, that meaning is to be given in which they were understood by defendants, provided plaintiff's said general agent had reason to believe they were so understood by defendants." Omitting the qualification expressed in the last clause, this instruction presents the rule which is embodied in the instruction asked. With the qualification, however, it presents a very different rule. Under the instruction as given, defendants would be liable if they adopted and acted on a construction of the instructions of which they were fairly capable, but which was different from what was actually intended by the agent, and he did not know that they had adopted such wrong construction. This, it seems to us; would be to make the innocent party suffer for...