Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. Beebe
| Decision Date | 11 January 1889 |
| Citation | 41 N.W. 232,40 Minn. 7 |
| Parties | Minnesota Loan & Trust Co., Guardian, v. Franklin Beebe and others |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
The plaintiff, as guardian of Robert Chambers, a lunatic, brought this action in the district court for Hennepin county against the defendants, who are the sureties upon the bond given by a former guardian, to recover moneys of the ward collected by the former guardian and not accounted for. The action was tried by Young, J., without a jury, and judgment ordered for plaintiff. Defendants appeal from an order refusing a new trial.
Order affirmed.
E. W Rossman, for appellants.
William J. Hahn, for respondent.
This is an action by the plaintiff, as guardian of Robert Chambers, an insane person, upon the bond of his former guardian, to recover money due his estate. The principal question is as to the constitutionality of the provisions of "An act to authorize the organization and incorporation of annuity, safe-deposit, and trust companies," (Laws 1883, c. 107, § 9, subd. 4,) granting to such corporations power to act as trustee, assignee, receiver executor of a will, administrator of an estate, guardian of the person or estate of a minor, or guardian of the estate of any lunatic, imbecile, etc., and authorizing any probate or other court to appoint and commission any such corporation, authorized to do business in this state, as such trustee, etc., in all cases where such court could lawfully appoint and commission a natural person and providing that in such cases no bond, oath, or other qualification should be necessary to enable such corporation to accept such appointment.
The contention of counsel seems to be that the legislature has no right to grant to any corporation the power to act in any such fiduciary capacity. His argument deals in much criticism and denunciation of the statute some of which might have some weight if addressed to the legislature, but he entirely fails to point out any provision of the constitution with which it conflicts. The sum of his argument is that such a statute is in derogation of the common law, or conflicts with prior statutes, and is impolitic. But none of these considerations go to the question of the validity of the act. With our preconceived ideas on the subject, it might seem somewhat inappropriate to intrust the person of a minor to the custody of a corporation; but perhaps experience will prove that the objections to this are largely artificial and imaginary. But this question does not arise in this case. While the statute authorizes these corporations to act as guardians of both the persons and estates of minors, it only authorizes them to act as guardians of the estates of insane persons. This action pertains solely to the estate of the ward, and the fact that the probate court has assumed to appoint the plaintiff guardian of both his person and estate will not, although unauthorized as to the former affect the validity of the appointment as guardian of the estate. To the appointment of corporations, organized for that special purpose, under well-guarded statutes, to the position of trustee of a trust, executor of a will, administrator or guardian of an estate, or other place of trust, involving the custody and management of property only, there can be no possible objection on either constitutional grounds or considerations of policy. The common-law grounds upon which it was held that corporations could not act in any of these fiduciary capacities were purely artificial. The reason given by Blackstone why a corporation aggregate could not act as an executor or administrator is that it could not take the necessary oath; but even at common law, in England, this technical difficulty was evaded by the corporation naming an agent, called a "syndic," to whom letters were issued. Moreover, it is, of course, entirely competent for the legislature to dispense altogether with an oath in such cases. Another reason often assigned why a corporation could not act as a trustee was that, as a court of equity often enforced a trust by laying hold of the conscience of the trustee, therefore, inasmuch as a corporation has no conscience, it is not qualified to act as trustee. The reason most commonly given why a...
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