Minnesota Microwave, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 42867

• Decision Date: 24 September 1971
• Docket Number: No. 42867,42867
• Citation: 291 Minn. 241,190 N.W.2d 661
• Parties: , 91 P.U.R.3d 156 MINNESOTA MICROWAVE, INC., Appellant, v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minnesota Telephone Association, intervenor, Respondent, Northwestern Bell Telephone Company, intervenor, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 661

190 N.W.2d 661

291 Minn. 241, 91 P.U.R.3d 156

MINNESOTA MICROWAVE, INC., Appellant, v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, State of Minnesota, Respondent, Minnesota Telephone Association, intervenor, Respondent, Northwestern Bell Telephone Company, intervenor, Respondent.

No. 42867.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Sept. 24, 1971.

Syllabus by the Court

A private company which provides, under contract, unidirectional, closed-circuit, microwave facilities for the transmission of educational television signals is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission as a 'telephone company' or as a supplier of 'telephone service' within the purview of Minn.St. 237.01.

Dorsey, Marquart, Windhorst, West & Halladay and Jan D. Stuurmans, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., John R. Kenefick, Asst. Sol. Gen., Michael L. Schwab, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for Public Service Comm.

Fisher, Johnson, Evans & Buttrick and Wayne C. Serkland, St. Paul, for Minn. Telephone Assn.

Allan L. Grauer, Garfield E. Lovaas, and Ronald L. Slyter, Minneapolis, for N.W. Bell Tel. Co.

Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and NELSON, MURPHY, PETERSON, and KELLY, JJ.

OPINION

NELSON, Justice.

Appeal from an order of the District Court of Ramsey County affirming an order of the Public Service Commission holding that appellant, Minnesota Microwave, Inc., is subject to the jurisdiction of that commission as a supplier of telephone service.

A statement of the pertinent facts is as follows: On December 3, 1968, appellant, a Minnesota corporation with its principal office at Willmar, Minnesota, applied to the Public Service Commission for a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing its installation and operation of a microwave television transmission system to transmit educational television materials from the Minneapolis compus of the University of Minnesota to terminals in Rochester, Minnesota. It was anticipated that such service would be supplied to the University of Minnesota as a subscriber on an annual contract basis. The system as planned would involve a series of antennae and relays between Minneapolis and Rochester and would be unidirectional in that no information will be communicated back from Rochester. The system would involve no use of telephone poles, lines, or equipment for the transmission furnished from point to point, although the subscriber would have to use coaxial cables, not owned or supplied by appellant, to convey the material transmitted to and from the terminals of appellant's system.

After the application had been filed and a hearing thereon scheduled, appellant requested that the hearing be indefinitely postponed, having decided to take the position that the Public Service Commission was without jurisdiction over the proposed microwave facilities and services. Accordingly, appellant filed a motion with the commission for a hearing to determine whether the commission had jurisdiction, and a hearing on the matter was held with several parties participating as intervenors. The commission ruled that it had jurisdiction, and appellant appealed to the district court as provided in Minn.St.1969, § 216.24, and Minn.St. 216.25. No further evidence was submitted to the district court, and the matter was decided on the basis of oral argument, briefs, and the record made before the Public Service Commission. The trial court affirmed the commission.

The question presented on this appeal is whether a private company which provides, under contract, unidirectional, closed-circuit, microwave facilities for the transmission of educational television signals is subject to the jurisdiction of the Minnesota Public Service Commission as a 'telephone company' or a supplier of 'telephone service' within the purview of Minn.St. 237.01.

It is our conclusion that the ruling of the district court should be reversed and the question of what regulation, if any, should be applied to suppliers of uniderectional, closed-circuit television facilities should be left to the legislature.

Minn.St. 237.02 provides that the Railroad and Warehouse Commission (now the Public Service Commission by virtue of § 216A.05, subd. 4) is vested with the same jurisdiction and supervisory power over 'telephone companies' doing business in this state as it has over railroad and express companies. 'Telephone company' is defined by § 237.01 as follows:

'The term 'telephone company,' as used in this chapter, means and applies to any person, firm, association or any corporation, private or municipal, owning or operating any telephone line or telephone exchange for hire, wholly or partly within this state, or furnishing any telephone service to the public.'

The Public Service Commission concluded that the term 'telephone service' as used in the above statute 'is a broad term that must be construed in the light of developments in the art of telephony. The transmission of television signals is one of the advancements in this field. This Commission's jurisdiction is not limited to the state of the art of telephony as it existed in 1915 when regulatory authority was delegated to it by the legislature of this state.' The commission therefore concluded:

'The common carrier video and audio transmission service proposed by Applicant constitutes intrastate 'telephone service' over which the Commission has jurisdiction * * *.'

The scope of the term 'telephone service' as used in the above statute has not been previously considered by this court. Moreover, it appears that the particular question involved in this case has not been confronted in other jurisdictions. Hence, to determine whether the commission and the district court correctly interpreted the statute requires some extended analysis. It appears that the commission has given the term an overly broad interpretation, however--one which if allowed to stand could produce some anamolous results not contemplated by the legislature.

It should be noted at the outset that the scope of review in appeals from decisions of the Public Service Commission is now controlled by the Administrative Procedure Act, Minn.St. 15.0425. Minneapolis Van & Warehouse Co. v. St. Paul Terminal Warehouse Co., 288 Minn. 294, 180 N.W.2d 175; Quinn Distributing Co. Inc. v. Quast Transfer, Inc., 288 Minn. 442, 181 N.W.2d 696. That statute authorizes any reviewing court to reverse or modify any agency decision where such finding, inferences, conclusion, or decisions are:

'(a) In violation of constitutional provisions; or

'(b) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or

'(c) Made upon unlawful procedure; or

'(d) Affected by other error of law; or

'(e) Unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; or

'(f) Arbitrary or capricious.'

The reviewing court will not disturb findings of fact made by administrative agencies unless it appears from the entire record that the finding is unsupported by substantial evidence. Quinn Distributing Co. Inc. v. Quast Transfer, Inc., Supra.

Intervenor Minnesota Telephone Association urges that the commission's conclusion was one of fact and therefore entitled to be respected on review unless unsupported by substantial evidence. That argument, however, gives an overly broad view of what are questions of fact, for the ultimate question here involved is the interpretation of a statute. Intervenor's approach, if followed, would mean that in nearly every case of statutory interpretation the administrative ruling would effectively be insulated from judicial review unless manifestly arbitrary and capricious. Instead, it is clear that whether appellant is supplying 'telephone service' is a question of law to be determined on the basis of the operative facts determined by the commission. Indeed, the commission itself recognized this distinction and treated as a 'conclusion of law' rather than as a 'finding of fact' its determination that appellant's proposal would constitute 'telephone service.'

Intervenors also urge that even if the agency's conclusion is treated as one of law, it is nonetheless entitled to great weight in construing the statute as an administrative interpretation of a statute as contemplated in § 645.16(8). While it is undoubtedly true that administrative interpretations may in certain instances be entitled to great weight, it is clear that such is not here the case. The statutory language here under consideration is not exceedingly technical in nature, such that only specialized agencies may be thought able to understand it. Instead, the statute is phrased in common terms, and thus affords no good reason for deferring to administrative expertise for its interpretation. Moreover, the fact that the question now before this court is one which the agency has not had occasion to consider prior to the instant case weights against placing much weight on the commission's interpretation. Recently, in In re Minnesota Power & Light Co., 289 Minn. 64, 70, 182 N.W.2d 685, 689, Mr. Chief Justice Knutson observed:

'It is contended by appellant that the commissioner's interpretation of the statute is entitled to weight. Ordinarily that is true if the interpretation construes an ambiguous statute and, particularly, if the interpretation is longstanding. In re Estate of Abbott, 213 Minn. 289, 296, 6 N.W.2d 466, 469. But here neither of these factors is present. The language of the statute is not ambiguous, and the ruling was challenged almost immediately.'

In the instant case, since the administrative interpretation is not a longstanding one and the statutory language not ambiguous, it is clear that this court is under no obligation to respect the administrative interpretation, particularly where such interpretation is one which operates to expand the jurisdiction of the agency rendering such interpretation. ¹ Thus, this court is faced with a pure question of law involving statutory interpretation, one which...