Minnich v. MED WASTE, INC.

• Decision Date: 20 May 2002
• Docket Number: No. 25468.,25468.
• Citation: 564 S.E.2d 98,349 S.C. 567
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Jeffery MINNICH, Plaintiff, v. MED-WASTE, INC., and Incendere, Inc., Defendants.

349 S.C. 567

564 S.E.2d 98

Jeffery MINNICH, Plaintiff, v. MED-WASTE, INC., and Incendere, Inc., Defendants.

No. 25468.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard January 24, 2002.

Decided May 20, 2002.

Coming B. Gibbs, Jr., of Gibbs & Holmes, and Paul N. Urrichio, III, both of Charleston, for plaintiff.

Gray Thomas Culbreath, of Collins & Lacy, P.C., of Columbia, for defendants. Justice PLEICONES.

We accepted the following question on certification from the United States District Court:

Does the Firefighter's Rule bar an emergency professional, such as a firefighter, police officer, or public safety officer, who is injured as a result of performing his or her duties, from recovering tort-based damages from the party whose negligence caused the injury?

FACTS

The District Court made the following factual findings:

Jeffrey Minnich ("Plaintiff') was employed by the Medical University of South Carolina ("MUSC") as a public safety officer. While working in this capacity, Plaintiff assisted in loading medical waste from the premises of MUSC onto a tractor-trailer truck owned by Defendant Med-Waste, Inc. Plaintiff noticed the unoccupied truck begin to roll forward, toward a public street. Plaintiff ran to the truck, jumped inside, and stopped the truck.

Plaintiff alleges he suffered serious injuries, proximately caused by the acts or omissions of the defendants' employees, for which he seeks to recover damages. The defendants assert that Plaintiffs claims are barred by the firefighter's rule. The firefighter's rule is a common law doctrine that precludes a firefighter (and certain other public employees, including police officers) from recovering against a defendant whose negligence caused the firefighter's on-the-job injury.

ISSUE

Does the Firefighter's Rule preclude Plaintiffs recovery?

ANALYSIS

While a number of states have adopted the firefighter's rule in some form,¹ there is no definitive pronouncement from this Court either adopting or rejecting the rule. In Taylor v. Palmetto Theater Co., 204 S.C. 1, 28 S.E.2d 538 (1943), the plaintiff, a Columbia city firefighter, responded to a fire alarm at a building adjoining the Palmetto Theater ("Theater"). While performing his duties as a firefighter he was hurrying through a walkway owned by the Theater when he fell into an inadequately guarded pit and suffered injuries. According to the complaint, although the walkway was privately-owned, the Theater generally made it open to the public, and knew of the dangerous condition of the pit. The firefighter appealed after the trial court granted the Theater's motion to strike substantial portions of the complaint, including those alleging the walkway was open to the public.

In reversing the trial court, the Court distinguished between private property and property generally open to the public:

Upon a careful analysis of the complaint ... it alleges an invitation extended to the general public to use this passageway or walkway, and that relying on this invitation and the fact that such use was made thereof by the general public with the at least implied acquiescence of the [Theater], the [firefighter] entered thereupon while in the performance of his duties as a fireman, and suffered ... injuries.... In other words, that the plaintiff entered upon the walkway or passageway as a member of the general public, although in the discharge of his duties as a fireman, and was therefore an invitee or licensee.

In the circumstances alleged in the complaint, the fact that the [plaintiff] was a fireman, and in the discharge of his duties as such, should not limit his cause of action to the right or permission to enter the premises of [the Theater] extended by the law. Of course, upon a trial of the case the [firefighter] will have to establish ... that the general public (as the complaint alleges), `used the alley in the rear of the [Theater's] premises, as well as the ... passageway..., with the knowledge, acquiescence and consent of the [Theater]' at the place where the [firefighter] alleges he was injured; otherwise any cause of action the [firefighter] may have against the [Theater] for his injuries will be governed by the law applicable to a fireman or other municipal employee who goes upon privately owned premises in the discharge of his duty.

Id. at —, 28 S.E.2d at 541 (emphasis supplied). Despite its allusion thereto, the Taylor Court, did not define "the law applicable to a fireman or other municipal employee ..." injured while discharging his duty on private property. The italicized language above, however, suggests that the Court would apply a different standard of care to the Theater based upon the firefighter's status as either an invitee or a licensee.

A later decision of this Court implies that a police officer can recover from a negligent party when the officer is injured while discharging his duties.

In Gardner v. Columbia Police Dep't, 216 S.C. 219, 57 S.E.2d 308 (1950), the Court held that a police officer, injured while on duty, could not maintain a worker's compensation action against his employer after having previously recovered from, and having executed a release in favor of, the negligent tortfeasor. By releasing the negligent trucking company, Gardner "deprived his employer ... of the right of subrogation to enforce against the [negligent party] any legal liability for the injuries suffered by [Gardner] under ... the Workmen's Compensation Act." Id. at 224, 57 S.E.2d at 310.

The facts in Gardner suggest that the officer's injury did not occur on private property, but on a public street. Thus, Gardner implies no basis for a distinction arising out of the police officer's status as an invitee or licensee, and does not mention Taylor, supra. Gardner implicitly suggests, however, that a police officer may recover from a negligent party for injuries suffered during the discharge of the officer's duties.

Finding no definitive answer to the certified question in the case law of this state, we examine the various rationales advanced in support of the rule, and its applications and limitations in other states.

Rationales for the Firefighter's Rule

The common law firefighter's rule originated in the case of Gibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182, 32 N.E. 182 (1892). There, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a firefighter who entered private property in the performance of his job duties was a licensee, and as such, the property owner owed the firefighter a duty only to "refrain from willful or affirmative acts which are injurious." Id. at 189, 32 N.E. 182. Practically, this meant that a firefighter, injured while fighting a blaze on private property, could not recover tort damages from the property owner whose ordinary negligence caused the fire.²

A number of courts reason that police officers and firefighters, aware of the risks inherent in their chosen profession, have assumed those risks. See e.g. Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343 (Minn.1979) (firefighter assumes all risks of the job); Berko v. Freda, 93 N.J. 81, 459 A.2d 663 (1983) (nature of police work requires officers to recognize inherent dangers; police officer assumes the risks of the job). As such, the firefighter or police officer should not be allowed to recover when injured as a result of confronting these known and accepted risks.

A third rationale advanced is public policy. The Supreme Court of Virginia, in Pearson v. Canada Contracting Co., 232 Va. 177, 349 S.E.2d 106, 111 (1986),³ cited two fundamental policies in support of that state's firefighter's rule: First, injuries to firemen and policemen are compensable through workers' compensation. It follows that liability for their onthe-job injuries is properly borne by the public rather than by individual property owners. Second, firemen and policemen, unlike invitees or licensees, enter at unforeseeable times and at areas not open to the public. In such situations, it is not reasonable to require the level of care that is owed to invitees or licensees.

Still other courts reason that the public fisc pays to train firefighters and police officers on the ways to confront dangerous situations, and compensates them for doing so. If these public employees were permitted to bring suit against the taxpayers whose negligence proximately caused injury, the negligent taxpayer would incur multiple penalties in exchange for the protection provided by firefighters and police officers. See Kreski v. Modern Wholesale Elec. Supply Co., 429 Mich. 347, 415 N.W.2d 178, 187 (1987).

The Various Forms of the Rule

Not only have courts been unable to agree on a consistent rationale for the rule, they have not been able to agree on the proper parameters for the rule. A number of courts which recognize the firefighter's rule as a viable defense to negligence claims allow recovery for willful and wanton conduct resulting in injury. As one court observed, "a tortfeasor who acts wilfully and wantonly is so culpable that the fireman's rule ought not to preclude the injured officer from suing the egregiously culpable wrongdoer." Miller v. Inglis, 223 Mich. App. 159, 567 N.W.2d 253, 256 (1997).

Courts have allowed police officers and firefighters to recover for injuries resulting from an act of negligence unrelated to the specific reason for which the officer or firefighter was originally summoned. As stated by the Supreme Court of New Jersey:

The core of the "fireman's rule" is that a citizen's ordinary negligence that occasioned the presence of the public safety officer shall not give rise to liability in damages for the injuries sustained by the officer in the course of the response to duty.... The corollary of the rule is that independent and intervening negligent acts that injure the safety officer on duty are not insulated.

Wietecha v. Peoronard, 102 N.J. 591, 510 A.2d 19, 20-21 (1986) (citation omitted) (Police officers were injured while investigating a traffic accident when drivers negligently...