Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 85.

• Decision Date: 10 December 1934
• Docket Number: No. 85.,85.
• Citation: 269 Mich. 295,257 N.W. 831
• Parties: MINNIE v. PORT HURON TERMINAL CO. et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

269 Mich. 295

257 N.W. 831

MINNIE

v.PORT HURON TERMINAL CO. et al.

No. 85.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 10, 1934.

Appeal from Department of Labor and Industry.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law by E. F. Minnie, employee, against the Port Huron Terminal Company, employer, and another. From an award of the Department of Labor and Industry, employer and another take an appeal in the nature of certiorari.

Award vacated.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

Leo J. Carrigan, of Detroit, for appellants.

Stewart & Black, of Port Huron, for appellee.

WIEST, Justice.

Plaintiff was a longshoreman, employed by defendant terminal company in unloading a vessel at Port Huron. While upon the deck of the vessel and about his work, he was struck by a swinging hoist, lifting cargo from a hatch, precipitated to the wharf, and injured. This is an appeal in the nature of certiorari from an award to plaintiff under the Workmen's Compensation Law (Comp. Laws 1929, § 8407 et seq., as amended).

Defendant contends that the accident was upon navigable water and, therefore, not within the provisions of the compensation law of this state.

The commission found that the injury must have been occasioned by plaintiff's fall upon the wharf, and held that the injury consummated, in whole or in part, upon the land brought the case within the compensation act, even though the injuries would not have been received except for the direct force applied upon plaintiff's person while on the deck of the vessel.

A longshoreman, while employed in unloading a vessel lying in navigable water, is engaged in work of a maritime nature under a maritime contract. Peters v. Veasey, 251 U. S. 121, 40 S. Ct. 65, 64 L. Ed. 180. The work of the longshoreman was upon the vessel and the force was applied to his person there with serious consequences when he was knocked from the deck of the vessel to the wharf. The judicial power of the United States extends to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 37 S. Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed. 1086, L. R. A. 1918C, 451, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900. The accident was on the deck of the vessel and the injury by fall upon the wharf. The place of the accident identifies the applicable law.

We held in Cooke v. Holland Furnace Co., 200 Mich. 192, 166 N. W. 1013, L. R. A. 1918E, 552 (quoting syllabus):

‘While the words ‘accident’ and ‘injury’ are not synonymous, the accident produced the injury, and in point of time they are concurrent.'

There can be no award of compensation without an accident and consequent injury. The unlooked for mishap or untoward event was upon the deck of the vessel and constituted an accident, and cannot be separated from the fall to the wharf and injuries there sustained for, under our compensation act, the award must be for ‘accidental injuries.’ Savage v. City of Pontiac, 214 Mich. 626, 183 N. W. 798, 800. We cannot separate the cause from the consequences; the origin from the immediate end; the accident from the injuries. To do so would result in a finding of an accident while engaged in work of a maritime nature and, therefore, not within the state act, and then another finding that the injuries, occasioned thereby, are to be distinguished from the proximate cause thereof and, therefore, not of federal cognizance.

Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (Act March 4, 1927, c. 509, 44 Stat. 1424; U. S. C. tit. 33, §§ 901-950, 33 USCA §§ 901-950) must be considered. Under that act, “Injury,' within the statute, ‘means accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment,’ and the term ‘employer’ means one ‘any of whose employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part,’ upon such navigable waters.' Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 38, 52 S. Ct. 285, 287, 76 L. Ed. 598.

The Senate Judiciary Committee, in reporting the measure, stated in part:

‘If longshoremen could avail themselves of the benefits of State compensation laws, there would be no occasion for this legislation; but, unfortunately, they are excluded from these laws by reason...