Minor v. Black, 74--2242
Decision Date | 08 December 1975 |
Docket Number | No. 74--2242,74--2242 |
Parties | John Allen MINOR, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harold E. BLACK, Superintendent, Respondent-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
John Allen Minor, pro se. Martin Baker, Cleveland, Ohio (Court Appointed--CJA), for petitioner-appellant.
Ed W. Hancock, Atty. Gen., Douglas E. Johnson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, Ky., for respondent-appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and WEICK and PECK, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner-appellant, testifying at his state court trial on armed robbery and murder charges, asserted the alibi that he was home asleep. On cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited without objection from petitioner his failure, when arrested, to tell the police of his alibi, petitioner explaining his post-arrest silence as being '(o)n the advice of (his) attorney.' 1 In his closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor, also without defense objection, emphasized:
. . . . Trial transcript 87--88.
The state court jury convicted petitioner of armed robbery and murder, and petitioner was sentenced to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment. The state court of appeals affirmed the convictions, although 'condemning' the prosecutor's closing argument that petitioner should have 'go(ne) to the police' to explain his whereabouts. That court, however, found insufficient prejudice to petitioner's substantial rights to warrant reversal stemming from the prosecutorial argument that petitioner should have told the police of his alibi when he reported to the police three days after the commission of the crime, at least in the absence of timely objection to the argument. Minor v. Commonwealth, 478 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Ky.1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064, 93 S.Ct. 563, 34 L.Ed.2d 517 (1972).
Thereafter, petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging, inter alia, the closing argument as infringing upon his constitutional right to remain silent in the wake of police interrogation. The district court, examining the trial transcript and finding an evidentiary hearing unnecessary, dismissed the petition because the closing argument 'was fair comment on petitioner's credibility' and 'not violative of his Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment rights.'
On the instant appeal of that dismissal, petitioner claims, inter alia, that the cross-examination and closing argument infringed upon his constitutional right of due process and his constitutional privilege from compelled self-incrimination. Respondent counters that the cross-examination and closing argument were permissible because Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), has established that Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), 'cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense.' 401 U.S. at 226, 91 S.Ct. at 646.
Of course, had petitioner been convicted in a federal, rather than a state, court, the admission of evidence of his pre-trial silence presumably would have been reversible error. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975), 'in the exercise of (the Court's) supervisory authority over the lower federal courts,' invalidated cross-examination concerning pre-trial silence 'under the circumstances of (that) case.' But see United States v. Grubb, 519 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3069 (July 25, 1975) (No. 75--137). Hale did not, 2 as we must, decide the constitutional issue, but many of the policy factors favoring the exercise of the federal courts' supervisory power, to wit, the prejudice and ambiguity of pre-trial silence, also favor holding that the admission of such testimony violates constitutional standards.
Unless Harris permits the cross-examination and argument as impeaching petitioner's credibility, such cross-examination and argument was error. Miranda explicitly recognized that
384 U.S. at 468 n. 37, 86 S.Ct. at 1625 n. 37.
Moreover, this court, prior to Harris, had held that cross-examination of a defendant into his failure to inform law enforcement officials earlier of his exculpatory trial testimony was plain error 'of constitutional magnitude.' United States v. Brinson, 411 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1969).
Harris permits statements elicited in violation of Miranda, and, arguably, silence in compliance with Miranda, to be admitted to impeach petitioner's credibility if, but only if, those statements or silence is sufficiently 'trustworth(y),' 'sharply contrast(ing),' or 'inconsistent' with the testimony to be impeached. Harris, supra, 401 U.S. at 224--26, 91 S.Ct. 643. We hold that the instant cross-examination and closing argument was error of constitutional magnitude because, petitioner's silence not being sufficiently inconsistent with his trial testimony to permit the use of that silence to impeach his testimony, the admission of evidence of and comment on such silence violated petitioner's right to remain silent. As Judge Breitenstein framed the issue in a comparable case,
'The use of pre-trial silence for impeachment depends on whether, in the circumstances presented, there is such inconsistency between silence and testimony as to reasonably permit the use of silence for credibility impeachment.'
Breitenstein, J., dissenting in Johnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066, 1070 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878, 94 S.Ct. 64, 38 L.Ed.2d 124 (1973) (emphasis supplied).
Other courts have similarly found such silence insufficiently inconsistent, e.g., Deats v. Rodriquez, 477 F.2d 1023, 1025 (10th Cir. 1973), Patterson, supra, 475 F.2d at 1068 () , People v. Bobo, 390 Mich. 355, 212 N.W.2d 190 (1973), Sutton v. State, 25 Md.App. 309, 334 A.2d 126, 130--133 (1975), Commonwealth v. Bennett, 317 N.E.2d 834 (Mass.App.1974), but see United States v. Harp, 513 F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir. 1975), United States v. Quintana-Gomez, 488 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1974), United States ex rel. Burt v. State of New Jersey, 475 F.2d 234, 237 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 938, 94 S.Ct. 243, 38 L.Ed.2d 165 (1973), United States v. Ramirez, 441 F.2d 950, 953--54 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869, 92 S.Ct. 91, 30 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971), Lebowitz v. State, 313 So.2d 473 (Fla.App.1975), State v. Mink, 23 N.C.App. 203, 208 S.E.2d 522, cert. denied, 286 N.C. 340, 211 S.E.2d 215 (1974), Commonwealth v. Jennings, Pa.Super., 338 A.2d 598 (1975), especially with the suspect remaining silent knowing of his right to remain silent, Hale, supra, 95 S.Ct. at 2137 () , United States v. Fairchild, 505 F.2d 1378, 1382 (5th Cir. 1975) (), Rothschild v. State of New York, 388 F.Supp. 1346, 1350 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 525 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1975), 2042, 2d Cir., filed September 25, 1975), see United States v. Tyler, 505 F.2d 1329, 1333 (5th Cir. 1975), United States v. Matos, 444 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1971), but see Agnellino v. State of New Jersey, 493 F.2d 714 (3rd Cir. 1974). Though neither the state court nor habeas corpus record reflects whether petitioner was told of his Miranda rights, there was uncontradicted evidence at his state court trial that petitioner's attorney had advised him to remain silent. See Harp, supra, 513 F.2d at 790 n. 7; Commonwealth v. Jones, 229 Pa.Super. 236, 327 A.2d 638, 643 (1974). Similarly, this court has recognized that silence often is, at best, ambiguous. See Glinsey v. Parker, 491 F.2d 337, 342 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921, 94 S.Ct. 2630, 41 L.Ed.2d 227 (1974) (...
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